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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND,PLANNING
t
IN SYRIA, 1950-1962 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Economic development is a relatively recent phenomenon 
to many underdeveloped countries. In the decade of I95O-I960, 
its significance has become so apparent that it has preoccu­
pied the minds of many experts in the fields of economics and 
politics. The pressure to discover effective means of launch­
ing economic growth has compelled economists to reconsider 
their concepts of the scope and methods of economics. Econ­
omists, according to Higgins, are being forced into "a whole 
galaxy of peripheral fields in which they are somevrtiat unsure 
of their footing."^
This dissertation provides a case study of the econ­
omic development of Syria. In his Economic Planning in Under­
developed Areas, Edward Mason has remarked that the Middle 
East is difficult to characterize in a discussion of condi­
tions and prospects of development, admitting the presence of 
factors that distinguish this region from other parts of the
^Benjamin Higgins, Economic Development (New Yoric:
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1959), p. xiii.
underdeveloped world
Egypt Is confronted by a population problem . . . 
Turkey enjoys a degree of political stability and of 
economic development . . .  In the rest of the Middle 
East, Including Iran, the dominant factors relating to 
development appear to be the possession of oil revenues 
that represent a prodigious potential, a degree of 
political backwardness and Instability that Is unique In 
the world, and a scarcity of private entrepreneurship 
that borders on complete absence . . . Governments and 
frontiers will undoubtedly change many times before the 
social and political conditions of sustained economic 
growth have been established.
These conditions lead Mason to believe that If and 
when a sustained process of development Is put In motion the 
government will play a dominant role. But, as he puts It,
"it takes a hardy forecaster to chart the probable path of 
economic development In the Middle East."
What about Syria? Does It fit In this description 
by sharing the same characteristics and conditions of other 
Middle Eastern countries as observed by Mason? Insofar as 
political Instability Is concerned It does. But Syria does 
not have oil In large amounts, and Its principal natural re­
sources are land and water. Furthermore, the country Is not 
confronted with an overpopulation problem and has a relatively 
large and efficient supply of private entrepreneurship.
Objectives
The primary objective of this study Is to find out 
whether the Syrian economy has been able to achieve. In the 
decade of 195O-196O, what Is theoretically known as a
1
Edward Mason, Economic Planning In Underdeveloped 
Areas (New York: FordhiS"University Press, 195b), pp. lb-19.
3sustained rate of growth. Approximately, the period covered 
In this study extends from 1950 to I962. However, that part 
of the study, which deals with the historical survey of Syrian 
development, goes as far back as 1947 because of the necessity 
of linking the early phase of studies and recommendations with 
the later phases of development, so that the Syrian efforts 
toward economic planning may be placed In better perspective. 
Certain statistical data are not available for some of the 
twelve years Included In the period covered.
International experts have maintained that real na­
tional Income In Syria rose at an annual rate of five to six 
percent between 1950 and 1953*^  Total gross Investment as a 
percent of gross national product during the period 1950-1953
p
was estimated at 13 to l4 annually.
This study traces the factors underlying this rate 
of growth and the problems Involved. An attempt Is made to 
answer two basic questions:
1. Has a steady rate of growth been sustained In 
Syria from 1950 to i960?
2. What have been the contributions of economic 
planning In Syria? Has planning provided the answer to the 
fulfillment and maintenance of a sustained rate of growth In 
Syria?
^International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment, The Economic Development of Syria (Baltimore: The
Johns kopklns Press, 1465/, p. 21. (Hereafter referred to 
as I.B.R.D.).
2
Ibid., p. 22.
4The study Is couched In terms of Rostov's frame of 
reference. Three conditions are listed by Rostov as required
1
for the rate of grovth to be regularly sustained. These are:
1. A rise In the rate of productive Investment from 
about five percent or less to over ten percent of national 
Income or net national product;
2. The development of one or more substantial manu­
facturing sectors, vlth a high rate of grovth;
3. The existence or quick emergence of a political, 
social and Institutional framevork vhlch exploits the Impulses 
to expansion In the modem sector and the potential external 
economy effects of the take-off and gives to grovth an on­
going character.
These conditions are taken as given. This author 
elects to use them as criteria In determining vhether the 
rate of grovth In Syria has been sustained.
Since 1958, Syria has engaged In comprehensive plan­
ning and has drawn up a number of development plans. The 
Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan of 1960/1961 - 
1964/1965 has been In operation for three years. This study 
contains an evaluation of this plan vhlch Is undertaken In 
terms of the above criteria and In view of the set objectives 
and realized achievements In the first tvo years of execution. 
It further attempts to determine whether the plan Is vorklng,
^W. W. Rostov, The Stages of Economic Qmvth (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, i960), p. 39*
5thus far, according to schedule, and whether it provides the 
answer to the maintenance of a sustained rate of growth.
Method
This study is primarily empirical in nature.
Chapter II is primarily descriptive. It attempts to 
trace the factors contributing to growth in the major economic 
sectors. The method of approach in this chapter is historical 
in that an effort is made to establish the pattern of growth 
in the postwar period.
Chapter III traces the various attempts made by the 
government at economic planning. A brief account of the 
proposed studies and plans is given.
Chapter IV analyzes the Five-Year Plan of 196O/196I - 
1964/1965 in Syria. A study of the objectives, planned ex­
penditures, sources of financing, and expected effects is 
undertaken. It is noted that the government has finally come 
to assume a positive role in the direction and planning of 
the economy. This is the first plan that has been given 
proper attention by the Syrian authorities.
In Chapter V, an effort is made to evaluate the Five- 
Year Plan, on the basis of the criteria provided by Ounnar 
Myrdal and Arthur Lewis. Accordingly the plan is appraised 
in view of the set goals and realized achievements of the 
first two years of its execution. The plan is also assessed 
in terms of its contribution to.policy-making, the size of 
expenditures, the priorities, as well as consistency.
6Chapter VI contains a summary and an evaluation of 
the major findings. Certain recommendations concerning future 
policy are presented.
Sources
The primary sources used in this study contain in­
formation and public documents collected by the author during 
his visit to Syria in the summer of 1963. They consist mainly 
of the reports and pamphlets obtained from the Ministry of 
Planning and of official statistical data published by the 
Syrian government, notably the Statistical Abstract of Syria. 
The information obtained through personal interviews with 
government officials and heads of departments in the Ministry 
of Planning has been valuable in the preparation of this 
study.
Complementary sources include reports and data pub­
lished by the United Nations and its related agencies, as 
well as studies undertaken by the Food and Agricultural 
Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Other sources include books, articles and public 
documents published in Arabic and in English, all of which 
are listed in the bibliography.
CHAPTER II 
A DECADE OP ECONOMIC GROWTH
In the postwar period the Syrian economy has witnessed 
growth unprecedented in the history of the country.
With the advent of World War II certain favorable 
conditions emerged. It was primarily Allied military ex­
penditures, coupled with import restrictions, which spurred 
economic development in Syria. Agriculture, industry, trade,
transportation and other economic activities expanded greatly
*
during the war and continued expanding after the war. Pri­
vate initiative and entrepreneurship, aided by existing agri­
cultural and industrial potentialities, played a major role 
in the economic development of the country. Large areas of 
readily tillable land were put to use. The Korean war and 
the cotton boom in the early fifties gave an added stimulus 
for further agricultural expansion.
Thus, stimulating factors were not entirely endog­
enous. It is interesting to note that exogenous conditions 
such as Allied expenditure and the Korean war played a major 
role in the initial spur and take off for development.
Some outside factors proved to have harmful effects 
on the Syrian economy. This is indicated by Syria's
7
8unfavorable terms of trade.
Syrian economic growth did not go smoothly without 
Interruptions and setbacks. The structure of the Syrian 
econony Is vulnerable and continuously threatened by unfavor­
able factors. The political system did not-help much In 
eliminating these obstacles to continuous progress. The na­
tion has been plagued by political Instability ever since It 
gained Its Independence In 1945. It has set a world record 
In engineering coups d'etat within the past fifteen years.
It Is well established that political stability Is a necessary 
condition for economic growth. But Instability has been the 
rule rather than the exception In Syria. The political at­
mosphere, Instead of being conducive to growth, has consti­
tuted a major obstacle to growth.
Given this political framework, the economic develop­
ment of Syria has been rather remarkable.
Area and Population 
Official statistics Indicate that Syria's population 
was about 4.8 million at the end of i960. With a total area 
of 184,479 square kilometers (72,234 square miles), Syria Is 
not densely populated, as can be seen from Table 1. Popula­
tion has been growing at Irregular rates. The average annual 
rate of population Increase has been about 3*9 percent during 
the decade of 1950-I960. The Irregular variation of the 
annual rate of Increase in population Is largely due to the 
fact that birth registration Is not strictly adhered to.
9Parents in the remote villages often fail to register their 
newly bom babies. That is why birth registration in one year 
does not necessarily reflect actual birth during the year.
But it is fair to assume that the net natural increase in 
population is somewhere between two and three percent per year.
TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OP POPULATION, RATE OP INCREASE 
AND DENSITY IN SYRIA, I95O-I96O
Annual Rate y
Year Population* of Increase Density
(Thousands) (Percent)
1950 3,253 18
1951 IM 2.3 181952 3.1 19
1953 3,656 6.5 20
1954 3,807 4.1 21
1955 3,915 2.8 21
1956 4,025 2.8 22
1957
1958
4,145 3.0 22
4,421 6.6 24
1959) 4,657 5.3 25
i960® 4,841 3.9 26
Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1962
(New York: United Nations, 1962), Table 4, pp. 13b-l39.
(Hereafter United Nations is referred to as U.N.).
Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning, Directorate of 
Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 1961 (Damascus: Government
Press, 1962), Table 1, p. 22. (Hereafter, Syrian Arab 
Republic is abbreviated as S.A.R.).
^Excludes Palestinian refugees numbering 86,841 in 
1950 and 131,510 in 196O.
^Population per square kilometer of area. The total 
area of Syria is estimated at 184,479 square kilometers 
(72,234 square miles).
^Official census was undertaken in September, i960.
10
Table 2 shows the classification of area land use In
TABLE 2
CLASSIFICATION OF AREA LAND USE IN SYRIA, 1930 AND I96O
(THOUSANDS OF HECTARES)*
1950 i960
Type of Land
Area Percent of Total Area
Percent 
of Total
Cultivable Lands:
Irrigated 395 2.1 527 2.9
Non-lrrlgated 3,095 16.8 2,953 16.0
fallow 2,534 13.7
Total Cultivated 3,490 18.9 6,014 32.6
Uncultivated 3,897 21.1 2,040 11.1
Total Cultivable 7,387 40.0 8,054 43.7
Uncultlvable Lands:
Forests 422 2.3 432 2.3
Pastures 5,651 30.7 6,552 35.5
Miscellaneous 4,988 27.0 3,410 18.5
Total Uncultlvable 11,061 60.0 10,394 56.3
Grand Total 18,448 100.0 18,448 100.0
Source : S.A.R. , Statistical Abstracts. 1951. i960.
a
One hectare equals 2.471 acres.
11
Syria. A comparison of the use of land In 1950 and i960 Is 
given. It will be noted that the total cultivated land, which 
accounted for I8.9 percent of the total area In 1950, has 
registered an Increase of 72 percent In i960. There was an 
Increase of nine percent In total cultivable land from 1950 
to i960. This Increase was made possible by Irrigation and 
the farming of new land. Although roughly one-fourth of the 
total land In Syria Is under crops, this still compares 
favorably with other Middle Eastern countries. There are 
presently In Syria 1.3 hectares of cultivated land to each 
Inhabitant.^
Natural Resources
Syria Is well endowed with land and water which con­
stitute Its main natural resources. Oil, which was a mere 
dream ten years ago, has recently promised to become an Im­
portant resource. Exploration and drilling for crude oil 
estimated the Syrian oil reserves at 350 million tons; of 
which 90 million tons can be exploited from the Karatchuk and 
Suwaldla oil wells.^ Oil production from the various fields 
In 1961 reached an average of 24,876 barrels a day, or 3,948.5 
tons dally.^
^One hectare equals 2.471 acres.
2
S.A.R., Ministry of Defense, Organization of General 
Mobilization. The Chemical Industries: Petrol (Damascus:
August, 1962), p. 50.
3lbld.
12
Natural gas. In varying queintities and chemical com­
position, has been discovered In four fields In eastern Syria.
There are Important deposits of natural asphalt or 
bitumen In the province of Latakla at Kafrla. Bitumen produc­
tion In this area rose from 13,018 tons In 1953 to 21,462 
tons In 1960.^ These and other far richer deposits which are 
uncovered In the Blchrl Mountain, west of Delr-ez-Zor, are 
considered of great Importance In the road building program.
Other mineral and non-mineral deposits such as Iron, 
chrome, manganese, lead, copper, magnesium, asbestos, gypsum, 
sulphur and phosphates are located In Syria, and their use Is 
pending further geological and technical studies concerning 
their qualities, quantities and methods of extraction.
Salt rocks are found In several localities. The
2largest field at Jabboul produces 20,000 tons per year. . 
Better methods of extraction and refining are expected to 
raise salt production In the future.
Agriculture
Syria Is predominantly an agricultural country. 
Agriculture and animal husbandry are the chief occupations.
The rural population accounted for about 69 percent of total 
population In 1960.^
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, I961, Table 7, p. 243.
p
Mohammed P. Dandashl and Amer Sharif, Oil Economics 
of Syria (Damascus: Bureau Des Documentations Syriennes et
Arabes, I963), P* 9*
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, I961, Table 2, p. 24.
13
Agriculture in Syria is characterized by low yields, 
extensive farming, dependence on seasonal and scanty rainfall, 
defective marketing methods and organization, and until re­
cently, concentration of ownership and private investment on 
the land. Yet, in spite of these features, it was in this 
field that rapid progress has been achieved.
During the decade of 195O-1960, the total cultivated 
area increased from 3*5 million hectares in 1950, to six 
million hectares in i960. Rainfed land under cultivation 
increased by 77 percent, and irrigated area increased by 33 
percent, as can be noted from Table 2.
The main agricultural crops of Syria are wheat, barley 
and cotton. About 4o percent of the total cultivated area 
was planted in wheat and barley in 1958.^  The area under 
grain production has increased by 62 percent between 1950 and 
i960, while that under cotton production has about tripled, 
as may be seen from Table 3. However, the rate of expansion 
in grain production has proved to be unstable and varying 
from year to year. A glance at Table 3 indicates this fluc­
tuation. The production of wheat and barley increased 19 
percent from 1950 to 1952. By 1954, the increase was 39 
percent, and by 1957, it reached a peeik of 80 percent. But 
from 1958 to i960 the level of production fell short of that 
in 1950. Grain production had somewhat recovered in 1962 and
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1958, Table 2, p. 247. 
See also Table 3«
14
reached a level of 1.95 million tons, an Increase of about 
69 percent over the 1950 production figure.^
TABLE 3
AREA AND PRODUCTION OP MAIN CROPS IN SYRIA
1950-1960
Area Production
(Thousands of Hectares) (Thousands of Metric Tons)
Year
Wheat Barley Cotton Wheat Barley Cotton*
1950 992 4l6 78 830 322 100
1951 1,037 344 217 510 155 175
1952 1,167 397 189 900 467 176
1953 1,314 439 128 870 472 126
1954 1,347 543 187 965 635 221
1955 1,463 6l4 249 438 137 233
1956 1,537 636 272 1,051 462 252
1957 1,495 813 258 1,354 721 291
1958 1,461 769 261 562 228 250
1959 1,422 727 227 632 218 265
i960 1,550 742 212 555 156 279
Source; S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1958, I961, 
Tables 3, 6, pp. 248, 258 and Tables 5# b, pp. 250, 265.
U.N., Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook, 
1962 (Rome: F.A.O., 1963)* pp. 36, 4o. (Hereafter referred
to as P.A.O.).
^nginned cotton.
Arab East News Agency, "Agricultural Progress in
15
Since 1950, Syria has had four seasons during which 
grain production was curtailed drastically, and cotton pro­
duction did not maintain its annual rate of increase. On the 
other hand, the production of unginned cotton about tripled 
since 1950.
Productivity has been low in comparison to other 
countries. It will be seen from Table 4 that the yields of
TABLE 4
CROP YIELDS IN SYRIA AND OTHER SELECTED COUNTRIES, I96O 
(100 KILOGRAMS PER HECTARE)
Region and Country Wheat Barley Cottonseed
Syria 5.7 4.6 8.2
Canada 7.5 11.0 — — —
United States 16.1 16.4 8.6
Europe 18.7 23.2 6.4
Near East 9.3 8.7 3.8
Far East 9.1 12.1 1.4
Africa 4.6 3.5 3.9
World 11,7 13.7 5.9
Source : F.A.O., Production Yearbook, 1962, Tables
10, 11, 13, 51, pp. 34-36 39-40, 119-120.
wheat and barley are far below the world average But cotton
yield is well above the world average and almost equal to tha
Syria During Ten Years," International Fair of Damascus
(Damascus: September, 19b3J, p. 22.
16
In the United States.
Thus, the expansion of the cultivated area Is rather 
notable. It has been mainly the result of the cultivation 
of new land, which was made possible by mechanization In 
agriculture. The number of tractors rose from 855 In 1950 
to 4,754 In 1960.^ The number of harvesters which was 718 
In 1957 reached 1,101 In 1960.^
The system of land tenure In Syria was regulated by
the promulgation of two agrarian reform laws In September,
3
1958. The first law regulated the relations between land­
owners and tenants, and the second set a maximum limit to 
land ownership. The second law provided for the expropriation 
of areas In excess of 00 hectares of Irrigated and 300 hec­
tares of rain fed land per person. Expropriated land was to 
be distributed to small farmers In plots not exceeding eight 
hectares of Irrigated and orchard land and thirty hectares of 
non-lrrlgated land. The Irrigated land subject to expropria­
tion represented about 21 percent of the total Irrigated land 
under cultivation In 1958, and the non-lrrlgated land ear­
marked for expropriation represented about 40 percent of the 
total non-lrrlgated land under cultivation In the same year.
^Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, Production Yearbook, 1962 (Rome: F.A.O., 1963),
p. 267. (Hereafter referred to as F.A.O.).
^Ibld., p. 272.
3
U.N., Economic Developments In the Middle East, 1958- 
1959 (New York: Ü.N., 1960J, p; I3.
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The number of new beneficiaries affected by the 
Agrarian Reform Law was estimated to be 750,000 persons, or 
about 150,000 families, representing 17 percent of the total 
population or 27 percent of the rural population in 1958*^
Regarding the implementation of this law as of June 
1961, the total expropriated area was 670,212 hectares, cover­
ing 678 villages and classified as follows: 21,3^9 hectares
of irrigated land, 6o6,027 hectares of non-irrigated land and 
42,836 hectares of uncultivated land.^
The expropriated land that was actually distributed, 
as of June 1961, was 148,439 hectares, divided into 8,479 
hectares of irrigated land, 97,969 hectares of rain fed land,
I,372 hectares orchard land and 40,6l9 hectares of unculti­
vated land. The beneficiaries of the redistribution of land 
through expropriation were l4,064 families, representing 
49,083 persons. In addition, the State distributed 27,090 
hectares of public domain to 2,090 families, representing
II,640 persons.3 This put the total distributed area, as of 
June 1961, at 175,529 hectares and the total number of 
beneficiaries at 60,723 persons.
Cooperative societies were formed in order to assist 
the farmers in their productive endeavors. In May 1961, the
^Ibid.
%.N., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959- 
1961 (New York : DTK .T l9'6è ), p. .
3lbid.
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number of these societies reached 134, with a membership of 
10,671 and a total area of l88,l6l hectares.^
In 1962, the Land Reform Law was amended by the 
Syrian Parliament. The most important features of these
p
amendments were as follows: Ownership of land was to be
made more flexible, depending on the availability of water 
resources and the mode of cultivation in each region; family 
members were to receive the same share of land as that allowed 
to the head of the family; the farmers were to receive their 
new land free of charge and the financial burden of expropria­
tion was to be assumed by the state; and, finally, the land 
reform bond redemption period was to be reduced from forty 
years to ten, carrying 2.5 percent interest instead of I.5 
percent, and the bonds were to become negotiable.
The recent amendment to this law came in July 1963,
o
when decree No. 88 was enacted. This law reduced the maximum 
limit of ownership and made it vary according to specific 
regions, taking into consideration the fertility of the soil, 
the availability or lack of rainfall, the various means of 
irrigation and access to markets.
The underlying reason for these amendments of the 
Land Reform Law was the changes that took place in the govern­
ment. In 1962 the policy of the new government was more
^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 26.
3
Arab East News Agency, op. cit., p. 10.
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moderate than that of the previous or succeeding one. In 
1963, the proclaimed policy of the government was socialist. 
Apparently, these amendments were enacted for the purpose of 
correcting the flaws in the law as was originally passed and 
as viewed by these governments.
It will be observed that these reforms have cut down 
the size of the farms in certain cases by a fifth and in 
others by one-half to what it was prior to 1958. It is too 
soon to determine the effect of these revolutionary changes 
on agricultural production. But unless the government extends 
more credit to the new farmers and provides them with tech­
nical aid and education, the effect of these reforms may 
prove to be detrimental to output.
When the law was first applied, a large quantity of 
cereals was distributed among the farmers for the purpose of 
sowing, but instead of sowing the seeds so furnished, most 
of the farmers either ate their share or sold it, because 
they were either so poor and famished or they lacked the 
rudimentary farming tools. It is also known that the small 
size of the farm impedes production on a large scale and 
raises overhead cost.
By and large, Syria has undoubtedly witnessed growth 
in the agricultural field. Yet this growth was surrounded 
with uncertainty. Although more land has been put to cultiva­
tion and more agricultural machines have been employed for 
that purpose, agricultural production has been exposed to
20.
unpredictable hazards from one year to another. The one 
essential characteristic feature responsible for fluctuations 
and periodical crop failures is the reliance on rainfall. 
Syrian agriculture has suffered from droughts in 1955, 1958, 
1959* and i960, which are the years in which output has fallen 
below the yearly average for the period of I950-1960. In 
Syria, which enjoys a Mediterranean type climate, rain falls 
mainly in the months of November to March. The average rain­
fall ranges from four inches in the extreme Syrian Desert, 
to twenty-four inches and over in the Latakia Zone, on the 
Mediterranean Coast.^  The unreliability of rainfall can to 
a certain extent be remedied by irrigation, which is essential 
to the expansion of cultivation and the stabilization of 
agricultural production, upon which 65 to 75 percent of the 
people depend for livelihood.^
The irregularity of rainfall, significant as it is, 
should not mean that land in Syria is totally barren and dry. 
Syria is well endowed with water. There are thirteen rivers 
in Syria, the most important of which are the Euphrates, the 
Khabour, and the Orontes. The Euphrates is by far the largest 
and most important. It runs 675 kilometers inside Syrian 
territory, with an average annual flow of 735 cubic meters 
per second, which accounts for 84 percent of the aggregate
^Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the 
Middle East, A Study of Egypt. Syria and Iraq (London:
Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 85.
2
I.B.R.D., op. cit., p. 9.
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annual flow of Syria's rivers, as is shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
LENGTH AND RATES OF FLOW OF RIVERS IN SYRIA
Length (Kilometers)
Rivers
Within Syria Total
Average Flow*
Euphrates 675 2,330 735
Al-Khabour 460 460 52
Jaghjagh 100 124 3
Al-Balikh 105 105 6
Sajour 48 108 3
Al-Assi^ 325 571 18
Afrin 85 149 8
Queig 110 126 3
Al-Kabir 56 80 3
Sinn 6 6 12
Barada 71 71 7
A'waj 66 66 3
Al-Yarmouk 47 57 15
Source ; S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1961, Table 2
p. 4.
Cubic meters per second. 
^Orontes.
The real problem is not the scarcity of water, but 
rather the ineffective exploitation and distribution of the
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available water supply through irrigation schemes. The Syrian 
authorities have devoted substantial efforts and huge re­
sources for implementing projects for irrigation and land 
reclamation, such as the construction of a dam on the 
Euphrates, the Ghab Valley Project, and the Khabour Project, 
all of which are already under way and in operation.
The most recent development, which has brought hope 
to the expansion and stabilization, as well as the diversifi­
cation of Syrian agriculture was the major discovery of under­
ground water in arid eastern Syria, "enough to supply a 
quarter million acres of wheat or cotton l a n d s . T h i s  has 
been confirmed in May 1964 by headquarters of the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome.
The new Syrian water source, an underground flow of 
120 cubic meters per second, would increase by 30 to 40 per­
cent the acreage available for Syria's biggest cash crop,
2
cotton, and considerably augment its cereal production.
This discovery culminated a three-year survey by 
P.A.O. experts under a $472,000 grant from the United Nations 
special fund. The Syrian government contributed the equiv­
alent of $570,000 for the survey of the Jezireh area drained 
by the Euphrates River. P.A.O. sources said it would increase 
Syria's presently available groundwater supply by sixfold and
^Robert T. Hartmann, "Large Water Supply Pound in 
Arid Syria," The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.: May 6,
1964), p. Alff:
2%bid.
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"could potentially irrigate the largest area in the world 
watered from underground sources."
This discovery, together with the present irrigation 
plans, may well brighten the future of development in the 
agricultural field, and in turn, improve the prospects for a 
more stable and sustained growth of the Syrian economy.
Industry
Modern factory production in Syria is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. Industrialization, in the modem sense, 
is a postwar development. Pre-war manufacturing was predomin­
antly handicraft in nature with the exception of the textile 
and cement industries.
Substantial spending of the Allied Forces stationed 
in Syria during the Second World War, together with the 
scarcity and high prices of foreign manufactured goods, gave 
a strong stimulus to the expansion of Syrian industries. The 
accumulated profits in commerce induced merchants to invest 
their surplus capital in industry. Profit opportunities 
stimulated some influx of foreign capital, especially from 
Lebanon. The Second World War provided the impetus for the 
growth of industry in Syria.
The textile industry is by far the most important in­
dustry in the country. About 28,450 workers were employed by 
the textile industry in 1950.^ In 1958 the industry possessed
^Ibid.
2
I.B.R.D., op. C i t . ,  p. 361.
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about 92,000 spindles (against 10,000 in 1939) with a capacity 
of 12,000 tons of cotton and rayon y a m  per year; over 5,500 
mechanical looms and some 6,000 hand looms.^ "in cotton 
cloth Syria is approaching self-sufficiency and in rayon 
cloth it has already achieved a net export surplus."^ The 
woolen industry is less developed and depends on imported 
wool.
Other important industries are sugar refining, vege­
table oil, soap, cement, canned food, glass, tobacco, and 
others. The steady growth of most of these industries is 
illustrated in Tables 6 and 7»
The new industries which were established recently 
included those for the production of cutlery, electric bulbs, 
bicycles, plastic, batteries, washing machines, refrigerators, 
rubber shoes and pharmaceuticals. Plans under way include 
the building of a car assembly line in Latakia through the 
cooperation of Fiat, a factory for the production of radios 
and television sets in Damascus and plants for salt refining 
and onion dehydration.
Expansion in electric power generation provided the 
bulk of power in industry. Output of electricity rose from 
about 98.8 million kilowatt hours in 1952 to about 368.2
^National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin, Vol. XI,
No. 1 (Cairo: Research Department of the N.B.E., 1958), p. I6.
^I.B.H.D., op. cit., p. 105.
Ü.N., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959-
1961. p. 39.
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million in 1960.^ This constituted an increase of about 273 
percent over the same period.
TABLE 6
PRODUCTION OP THE MAIN INDUSTRIES IN SYRIA 
IN 1952 AND i960 
(THOUSANDS OP TONS)
Industry 1952 i960 Percent Increase
Cement 107.3 489.0 356.0
Sugar 19.2 69.6 262.0
Vegetable Oil 7.0* 15.1 116.0
Soap 11.of 25.0 127.0
Cotton Y a m 8.0® 9.7 21.0
Silk and Cotton Textiles 16.0^ 25.0 56.0
Canned Pood 1.3 3.0 131.0
Mechanical Glass 5.7 15.3 168.0
Tobacco 2.5 3.5 40.0
Macaroni 1.0 2.1 110.0
Margarine 2.1^ 3.0 43.0
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1956, 196I,
Tables 21 and 1, pp. 491 and 23b. 
*1954 figure.
^1955 figure.
®1956 figure.
^1953 figure.
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1956, 196I, Tables
21, 1, pp. 491, 2361
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TABLE 7
INDEX NUMBERS OF THE PRODUCTION OP MAJOR MECHANIZED 
INDUSTRIES IN SYRIA, 1954-1960
(1956 = 100)
Industry 1954 1955 1957 1958 1959 i960
Mining and Quarrying 68 54 77 68 75 76
Food 70 93 95 115 79 138
Beverages 79 88 186 207 177 187
Tobacco gind Tumbac 93 97 94 93 103 112
Spinning and Textiles 104 . 115 115 123 124 134
Paper 86 87 105 99 100 100
Rubber Shoes 95 120 143 152 212 215
Chemical 82 97 138 149 189 187
Non-Metalllc 79 75 90 124 130 149
Electricity 78 89 159 178 203 210
General Index 92 99 112 125 127 144
Source; S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, i960. Table 10,
p. 269.
Another manifestation of Industrial progress was the 
completion In 1959 of the petroleum refinery at Horns. The 
refinery, built by Techno-Export of Czechoslovakia at a 
total cost of 54 million Syrian pounds, has an Initial pro­
ductive capacity of 750,000 tons a year, and a maximum capac­
ity of 1,200,000 tons a year.^ The output of the refinery
^S.A.R., The Chemical Industries: Petrol, pp. 52-54.
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rose from 247,000 tons in 1959 to 769,843 tons in 1961.^
It is interesting to note that most of the new enter­
prises took the form of Joint-stock companies (corporations). 
Initiative in promoting and establishing the various companies 
came from a limited number of entrepreneurs who retained the 
controlling interest in the business. There has been, however, 
a growing appeal for investment in industrial firms which has 
led to a wider dispersion of stock ownership.
In i960, private capital invested in mechanized in­
dustries was estimated at about L.S. 397 million, distributed 
among 3,417 industrial establishments. The number of indus­
trial Joint-stock companies has grown from 24 in 1950 to 75
O
in i960. The declared capital for these corporations has 
increased from L.S. 100 million in 1950 to about L.S. 189 
million in 1960,^ Of the total declared capital of the in­
dustrial corporations, 4l.6 percent was invested in the tex­
tile industry in i960. However, the textile industry together 
with the non-metallic products and food industries accounted 
for 90.3 percent of the total declared capital of industrial 
corporations in i960, as shown in Table 8.
The number of handicraft workers and artisans engaged
^Ibid.
U^N., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959-2
1961, p. 38. (L.S. hereafter stands for the Syrian pound
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1961, Table 8, p. 394.
4
Ibid.
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TABLE 8
CAPITAL OF INDUSTRIAL JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES ACCORDING 
TO TYPE OP INDUSTRY IN SYRIA, I96O 
(L.S. THOUSAND)&
Type of Industry Capital Percent of Total
Textile 78,424 41.6
Non-metalllc products 51,602 27.4
Food 40,118 21.3
Chemical products 5,219 2.8
Wood 4,000 2.1
Alcoholic drinks 3,350 1.8
Metallic products 2,875 1.5
Electricity 2,070 1.1
Quarries and asphalt 400 0.2
Paper 300 0.1
Rubber 252 0.1
Total 188,610 100.0
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, I961, Table
10, p. 395-
^Hereafter L.S. stands for Syrian pound.
In some form of manufacturing was estimated at over 100,000 
In 1954.^ This comprised a little less than three percent of
O
the total population at that time. About 40 percent of
^I.B.R.D., op. cit., p. 11.
2
Syria's population In 1954 was estimated at 3.67
million.
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these persons were employed in mechanized manufacturing estab­
lishments.^ The textile industry employed about 20 percent
2
of the total industrial population.
According to a recent study undertaken by the Depart­
ment of Statistics in ig6l, the total labor force in Syria
•3
was estimated at about 1.1 million. This constituted about 
23 percent of the population in I96O. About 227,300, or 20.4 
percent of the labor force were employed in industry and 51.6 
percent in agriculture as illustrated in Table 9*
It is difficult to assess the contribution of industry 
to national income in Syria because the available figures for 
the national income are no more than rough estimates. How­
ever, according to official statistics, industry in Syria con­
tributed approximately I6 percent in 1960.^ In 1950, the 
contribution of industry to national income was estimated at 
ten percent.5
Syria has forged ahead in the field of industrializa­
tion, but the fact remains that the Syrian economy is basical­
ly agriculturally oriented. It should also be pointed out
^I.B.R.D., op. cit., p. 10.
^Ibid., p. 11.
o
Yousseph Hilbawi, "Population, Labor Force and Econ­
omic Development in the Syrian Arab Republic," Al-Raed Al- 
Arabi (Kuwait: April, 1963), pp. 18-22.
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, I96I, Table 1, p. 390.
^Edmund Y. Asfour, Syria: Development and Moneta^
Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 16.
TABLE 9
CLASSIFICATION OP THE LABOR FORCE IN SYRIA ACCORDING 
TO SEX AND ECONOMIC SECTORS, I96O
Economic Sector
Males Females Total
Number
(Thousands)
Percent Number
(Thousands)
Percent Number
(Thousands)
Percent 
of Total
Agriculture 462.7 47.4 114.2 80.3 576.9 51.6
Industry 221.1 22.7 6.2 4.4 227.3 20.4
Services 275.8 28.3 21.3 15.0 297.1 26.6
Unclassified 15.6 1.6 0.5 0.3 16.1 1.4
Total 975.2 100.0 142.2 100.0 1,117.4 100.0
Source: Yousseph Hllbawl, "Population, Labor Force, and Economic Development
in the Syrian Arab Republic," Al-Raed Al-Arabi (Kuwait: April, 1963), p. 21.
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that most of the established industries depend on the locally 
produced raw materials. The agricultural products are too 
limited In quantity and variety to justify greater expansion 
and diversification In Industry. Shortage of fuel and power 
provides a further handicap for Industrial growth. This 
shortage has been partially reduced by the recent and current 
efforts toward raising petroleum and electricity output.
Since Syria Is deficient In basic metal resources 
such as Iron and steel, which are Important raw materials for 
heavy Industries, It Is difficult to foresee large scale In­
dustrialization In the future.
Further deterrents to Industrial growth which can be 
rectified are: the Inadequacy of the home market, the short­
age of skilled labor and lack of technology, the shortage of 
capital and the absence of an efficient capital market.
The home market can be expanded through the construc­
tion of an adequate transportation network linking the urban 
Industrial centers with the rural regions. The per capita 
Income on the average Is low In Syria. Its uneven distribu­
tion reduces further the possible local demand for local 
products. The relatively wealthy minority has a preference 
for Imported manufactured goods, while the poorer majority 
cannot afford to buy on a large scale the locally manufactured 
goods with which they are generally satisfied. The shortage 
of skilled labor can be remedied through the technical train­
ing of unskilled labor and the capital market can be organized
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in such a manner as to serve the economy and stimulate its 
growth.
Transportation
Geographically, Syria is strategically located, and 
has for centuries served as the crossroad between East and 
West. But unfortunately, the Syrian transport system is poor.
Transport facilities did not keep pace with the expan­
sion in production and particularly with shifts in the geo­
graphical pattern of agricultural output. Transportation is 
generally costly and subject to interruption. The cost of 
road transport is high, partly because of the poor road con­
ditions and partly as a result of the high cost of fuel. The 
wide seasonal fluctuations in the demand for road transport 
also raises rates at the harvest peak when the larger part of 
marketed crops are moved to the center of consumption or to 
the export terminals.^ These factors have weakened the com­
petitive position of Syrian commodities in the foreign markets.
The three railways that serve Syria were all con­
structed before the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and are 
no longer adequate to serve the needs of the presently grow­
ing economy. The gauges (distance between rails) are not
^Ibid., p. 34. Transport rates by road vary between 
L.S. 40-50 per ton of grain from the Jezira to Aleppo in the 
peak season and L.S. 25-30 per ton in the low season. This 
excludes cost of loading and unloading. Rates to Latakia are 
about 50 percent higher. This compared with a wholesale 
price in Aleppo of L.S. 220 for a ton of wheat and L.S. 180 
for a ton of barley in the 1956 season.
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uniform. There is no direct rail connection, either between 
Damascus and Aleppo, the two largest commercial centers, or 
between Damascus and Latakia, the only major port.
The roads are badly maintained, and the majority are 
dirt roads or tracks, which are unuseable in winter. The 
total length of roads has increased from 9,235 kilometers in 
1956 to 11,375 kilometers in 1960,^ Only 37 percent of all
the roads were paved with asphalt in 196O; and 33 percent were
2
dirt roads which were unsuitable for winter transportation. 
However, the number of motor vehicles rose from 19,517 in 
1955 to 28,791 in 1960.3
The only port which serves the bulk of Syrian exports
and imports is Latakia, which is located on the Eastern
Mediterranean. Banias is a small port through which only 
oil, transmitted by pipeline from Iraq, is shipped. Under 
construction is another harbor at Tartous, which is expected 
to serve the central and southern regions of Syria.
Domestic commercial aviation is in its infancy, and 
only recently were services established to connect the prin­
cipal cities. There are six civil airports, and an air 
terminal was recently constructed in Damascus. Syria is well 
served by international airlines. A new international
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1957, 1961, Tables 1, 
1, pp. 212, 218.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., Tables 2, 2, pp. 213, 219. These figures in­
clude taxis,private sedan cars, buses, and commercial
vehicles.
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airport with up-to-date equipment is under construction in 
Damascus.
The telecommunications system in Syria is satisfac­
tory. The telephone network has been considerably expanded 
to cover most of the country. In i960, a television network 
was installed for the first time.
Internal trade and the movement of goods are 
hindered by the inadequate transportation facilities. This 
accounts for the high costs of transportation and the limited 
size of the market.
Since dependable transportation systems are considered 
to be the basis of a sound economic system, it is little 
wonder that they deserve the full attention of the economic 
planners.
National Income
National income estimates can give a good summary of 
the economic structure of a country.
Several attempts have been made at estimating the 
national income of Syria. The first estimate was made for 
1950. According to this estimate, national income was put 
at L.S. 1,250 million.^ However, the International Bank 
Mission estimated income for the year 1950 at L.S. 1,380, 
and for 1953 at L.S. 1,600 million.^
^Republic of Syria, Ministry of Finance, A1 Iqtisad 
As Suri (Damascus; Government Press, 1953), p. 233Ü Esti- 
mate made by Sami Wafa A1 Dajani.
2
I.B.R.D., op. cit., pp. 20-21.
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Although these estimates are very tentative calcula­
tions based on inadequate data, they are, nevertheless, use­
ful in the sense that they give an idea of the relative magni­
tude of Syria's national income and its distribution among 
the major economic sectors.
In 1956, the Directorate of Statistics undertook the 
task of estimating national income in Syria. The 1956 esti­
mate was taken as a base. Then, according to certain economic 
indicators and volumes of production, estimates of national 
income in 1956 prices were reached for the years 1953 to i960. 
These estimates have since been taken as official and are 
shown in Table 10.
The noticeable fluctuation of agricultural income 
points, quite significantly, to the instability of the agri­
cultural sector resulting from unreliable weather conditions. 
Agriculture constituted the major source of income and ac­
counted for 44 percent of the national income in 1953 and 
1957. Its contribution in 1960, dropped to 30 percent as 
shown in Table 11.
Income from industry ranked second in importance in
i960. Its contribution to national income ranged from 11 to 
16 percent. Commerce, on the other hand, ranked third in 
importance and contributed l4 percent in i960.
Overall, the increase in national income from 1950 
to i960 was 54 percent. However, from 1950 to 1957» national 
income registered an increase of 78 percent. This shows that
TABLE 10
INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN OF NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF SYRIA, 1953-1960*
(L.S. MILLION)
Industrial Origin 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960
b
Agriculture 824 927 636 936 1,067 702 721 636
Industry® 227 246 264 267 288 304 315 341
Construction 60 80 95 98 75 90 79 117
Residential Dwellings 116 122 130 137 144 155 163 170
Finance , 22 37 4l 44 48 46 45 45
General Government 114 127 l4o 150 157 168 178 182
Transportation® 129 142 139 137 124 130 136 l40
Wholesale and Retail Trade 270 349 319 375 386 335 320 308
Services 130 146 156 159 162 172 176 184
f
N.D.P. at Factor Cost 1,892 2,176 1,920 2,303 2,451 2,102 2,133 2,123
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1961, Table 1, p. 390.
U.N., Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1962 (New York: U.N., I963), p. 255.
*At factor cost of 1956.
^Includes forestry, hunting, fishing and livestock.
^Includes mining, quarrying, electricity, gas and water.
^Includes public administration and defense.
0 'Includes communication and storage.
f
Net Domestic Product.
(JÜo\
37
TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 
IN SYRIA, 1953,
OP NET DOMESTIC 
1957 AND i960
PRODUCT .
Industrial Origin 1953 1957 i960
Total Net Domestic Product
(L.S. Million) 1,892 2,451 2,123
Percentage Distribution
Agriculture 44 44 30
Industry 12 11 16
Wholesale and Retail Trade 14 16 l4
Government 6 6 9
Services 7 7 9
Residential Dwellings 6 6 8
TransportâtIon 7 5 7
Construction 3 3 5
Finance 1 2 2
Total 100 100 100
Source; Calculated from Table 10.
national income did not maintain a steady rate of growth 
throughout this period, because of the Interruption In the 
rate of Increase of the agricultural sector.
Per capita Income estimates are given In Table 12.
It will be seen that per capita Income registered an Increase 
of only two percent from 1950 to i960. Yet, In the first half
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TABLE 12
ESTIMATES OF POPULATION, NATIONAL INCOME AND 
PER CAPITA INCOME IN SYRIA, 1950-1960
Year Population
(Millions)
National&'b
Income 
(L.S. Million)
Per Capita 
Income 
(L.S.)
Per Capita® 
Income 
(U.S. $)
1950 3.2 1,380 431 120
1951 3.3 1,431 434 121
1952 3.4 1,641 483 135
1953 3.6 1,892 525 147
1954 3.8 2,176 573 160
1955 3.9 1,920 492 137
1956 4.0 2,303 575 160
1957 4.1 2,451 598 167
1958 4.4 2,102 478 133
1959 4.6 2,133 464 130
i960 4.8 2,123 442 123
Source: S .A.R ., Statistical Abstracts, 1958, 1961,
Tables
U.N.,
3, 3, 1, pp. 25, 25, 390. 
Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1962, p. 307.
^Net domestic product at factor cost.
^At constant prices of 1956.
^Converted into U.S. $ at the exchange rate of U.S. 
$1 = 3.58 Syrian pounds.
of the decade per capita income gained an increase of about 
39 percent from 1950 to 1957.
In the area of capital formation, it is interesting
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to note the growth of gross investment from L.S. l80 million 
in 1950 to L.S. 319 million in 1958, and L.S. 397 million in 
1960.1 This is given in Table 13. The ratio of gross
TABLE 13
COMPOSITION OF GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
IN SYRIA BY TYPE OF CAPITAL GOOD, 1954-1958*
(L.S. MILLION)
Type of Capital Good 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Dwellings'^
Other Construction
110 127 122 119 120
and Works 90 110 135 78 115
Transport Equipment 83 43 61 26 30
Machinery® 51 68 56 43 54
G.D.F.C.F.d 334 348 374 266 319
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, I961, Table 3,
p. 391.
Ü.N., Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1962, p. 255-
*At current market prices, 
b
Including non-residential buildings.
^Including other fixed assets.
^Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation.
investment to national income has varied from 11 percent to 
18 percent in this period as shown in Table l4. On the 
average, about 13 percent of the national income has been in 
vested each year.
The predominance of private enterprise is evident
^The i960 investment figure is taken from: U.N.,
Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959-1961, p. 38.
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TABLE l4
NATIONAL INCOME, GROSS INVESTMENT AND THE 
RATE OP INVESTMENT IN SYRIA, 1950-1958 
(L.S. MILLION)
Year
National®’
Income
Gross^
Investment
Ratio of^ 
G.I. to N.I.
1950 1,380 180 13
1951 1,431 197 14
1952 1,641 180 11
1953 1,892 232 12
1954 2,176 334 15
1955 1,920 348 18
1956 2,303 374 16
1957 2,451 266 11
1958 2,102 319 15
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1961, Tables
1, 3, pp. 390-391.
Ü.N., Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1962, pp. 255 
and 3071
I.B.R.D., The Economic Development of Syria (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1955)» P. 21.
Edmond Y . Asfour, Syria: Development and Monetary Policy
(Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 72-?4.
®Net Domestic Product at factor cost and at 1956
prices.
^Excludes Investment by oil companies and changes In
stock.
c
Ratio of gross Investment to national Income.
from Table 15. About 88 percent of total gross Investment 
In 1954 came from private enterprise. In 1958, this share
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TABLE 15
GROSS DOMESTIC FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN SYRIA 
BY TYPE OF PURCHASE, 1954-1958*
(L.S. MILLION)
Private Enterprise General Government^
Year
Amount Percent of Total Amount
Percent 
of Total
Total 2 
G.D.F.C.F.
1954 295 88 39 12 334
1955 289 83 59 17 348
1956 305 82 69 18 374
1957 206 77 60 23 266
1958 235 74 84 26 319
Source : S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1961, Table 3,
p. 391 
Ü.N., Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1962, p. 255.
At current market prices.
b
Including public corporations and government 
enterprises.
^Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation.
had dropped to 74 percent as the government started assuming 
more responsibility In the Investment field. But private 
enterprise remained to hold the lion's share In the economy.
Prices and the cost of living, as shown In Table l6, 
have been more or less stable. Although these Indexes are 
taken for Damascus only, they do, nevertheless. Indicate the 
price trend In Syria. It will be noticed that while the
TABLE 16
INDEXES OF WHOLESALE PRICES AND COST OF LIVING IN DAMASCUS, SYRIA, 1951-1959
(1953 = 100)
Item 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Wholesale Prices
General 119 120 100 96 97 102 98 96 101
Raw Materials 147 116 100 108 95 96 91 90 79
Finished Goods “ 115 100 95 110 122 124 110 102
Building Materials 117 123 100 100 107 111 113 103 104
Cost of Living* 102 109 100 92 91 104 109 102 106
Source: U.N., Statistical Yearbook , i960. Tables 160 and 161, pp. 450 and
ÎO
*Food (including soap, kerosene and cigarettes).
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general index of wholesale prices was one percent higher in 
1959 than in 1953  ^ the cost of living registered an increase 
of six percent in the same period.
Money and Banking
The present monetary system of Syria dates back to 
1920, when Syria came under the French Mandate. The French 
authorities gave the Banque de Syrie et du Liban - a French 
commercial bank - the right of issuing paper notes in Syria. 
The monetary system remained tied to the French franc, and 
was completely dependent upon French monetary policies, until 
1949, when Syria withdrew from the French bloc and established 
an independent currency.
In 1947 Syria became a member of the International 
Monetary Fund. The value of the Syrian pound was then fixed 
at 405,512 milligrams of gold, according to the agreement 
with the I.M.F.^
In 1952, the decrees No. 208 and 637 established the
' 2 ' .
new Exchange Control Office.
However, Law No. 87 which was enacted in 1953 with 
the aim of reforming the currency system, constituted a land­
mark in the history of money and banking in Syria.
■a
The main provisions of this law v e r e ' .
^George Ashi, The Currency System of Syria (Damascus: 
Damascus University Press, 1959J , P . 127. (The International 
Monetary Fund is hereafter referred to as I.M.F.).
^Ibid., pp. 196-209.
^Ibid., pp. 276-284.
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First, the creation of the Currency and Credit Board 
as a central monetary authority which was empowered to super­
vise all aspects of the currency system;
Second, the establishment of the Central Bank of 
Syria, which was to be an independent institution operating 
under the direction of the government;
Third, the reorganization of the currency system in 
such a way as to meet the needs of the economy;
Fourth, the organization of the banking system. All 
banks were, for the first time, to be subject to the control 
of the monetary authorities, whereas before this law, the 
banks were subject to the general commercial law of the 
country.
It will thus be noticed that the present independent 
monetary system of Syria actually took shape during the 
decade of 1950-1960.
The banking system, likewise, was formerly dominated 
by a few branches of foreign banks. The last decade witnessed 
the growth both in number and activity of the banking system. 
While the number of banks rose from nine in 1951 to 21 in 
1957, the number of branches rose from 32 to 56 respectively. 
In 1962, the number of banks was 16 and the number of branches 
was 60.1 This drop in the number of banks, though not in the 
total number of banks and branches, was due to the significant
^Abdullah Azmeh, The Role of the Banks in the Economic 
Development of Syria (Damascus: Ministry of Planning, April,
l9t>3), p. 42.
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events which recently took place in the banking system.
In 1959, in line with its socialization program, the 
government arabized the foreign banks operating in Syria.^
In 1961, Law No. 117 nationalized all the banks in Syria. 
Following the withdrawal of Syria from the United Arab Repub­
lic, the banks were denationalized in 1962.^ However, the 
Socialist Baath regime, which took over in March 1963, re­
nationalized the banking system in Syria. As a result of 
these nationalization decrees, the banks were consolidated 
and the number was reduced, but the number of branches was 
increased.
These banks were mainly engaged in financing the for­
eign trade of Syria. The nature of the credit advanced was 
primarily short term and seasonal. Of the still existing 
banks, the Banque de Syrie et du Liban was the largest and 
most important prior to 1956. It was the principal depository 
of government funds and was acting as the bank of issue until 
1956, when this function was entrusted to the newly estab­
lished Central Bank of Syria.
The only government bank that existed before 1956 was 
the Syrian Agricultural Bank which extended a limited amount 
of credit to agriculture. When it was first founded in 1924, 
its capital was L.S. 45 million. In 1958 this was raised to
^Ibid., p. 6. The control of foreign banks was 
turned over to Syrians and citizens of Arab countries.
^Ibid., p. 10.
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L.S. 100 million, because of its important role in the 
development of agriculture.^ Table 17 shows the number and
TABLE 17
NUMBER AND VALUE OF LOANS ADVANCED BY THE 
SYRIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK, 1952-1960
Year Number of Loans
Value of Loan 
(L.S. Thousand)
1952 24,374 14,327
1953 20,325 12,466
1954 13,400 15,347
1955 42,178 29,534
1956 35,652 38,165
1957 35,247 37,109
1958 177,148 81,653
1959 106,723 28,186
i960 68,407 44,324
Source : S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1958, I96I,
Tables 22, 22, pp. 363, 382.
total value of the yearly loans advanced by this bank. The 
fluctuations in the number and value of the loans, from one 
year to another, reflected the success or failure of the 
agricultural crops. The sharp increase in 1958 of the number 
and value of loans, was largely due to the increase in the 
bank's capital and the new land reform law.
^Ibid., p. 21.
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The sources of funds of the bank came chiefly from 
its capital, its reserves and borrowings. Deposits were in­
significant £uid formed a secondary source. It must be noted, 
however, that although the credit advanced by the bank is 
still inadequate, considering the significance of agriculture 
in the economy of the country, it has, nevertheless, together 
with loans advanced by commercial banks (as shown in Table l8), 
provided a major part of the financial needs for agricultural 
development in Syria.
A most recent development in the banking system of 
Syria was the establishment of the Industrial Bank in 
February, 1959- This bank was formed as a private corporation 
with a capital of L.S. 12.5 million.^ The government sub­
scribed 25 percent of its capital and the Central Bank eight
2
percent. The main objective of this bank was the promotion 
of industrial projects in conformity with the industrializa­
tion plans and the economic policy of the government. The 
bank has been rather conservative in advancing loans to in­
dustry. The loans advanced by the Industrial Bank have in­
creased from L.S. 19-5 million in 1959 to L.S. 24 million in
1961. This was due to the limited resources of the bank,
which have grown from L.S. 22 million in 1959 to L.S. 30
3
million in 196I. As a result, the bank has negotiated for
llbid., p. 22.
^Ibid., p. 23.
^Ibid., p. 68.
TABLE 18
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS ACCORDING 
TO ECONOMIC SECTORS IN SYRIA, I954-I960& 
(L.S. MILLION)
Year Commerce Industry Agriculture Finance Miscellaneous Total
1954 291.4 54.8 32.4 14.5 4.6 397.7
1955 282.5 55.2 39.9 22.6 8.7 408.9
1956 302.9 ' 59.9 38.1 21.0 10.4 432.3
1957 318.2 67.3 58.9 10.8 15.4 470.6
1958 277.7 )4.4 60.8 14.7 12.8 440.4
1959 363.6 90.8 54.7 27.9 12.8 549.8
i960 445.9 133.9 62.5 II.3 20.1 673.7
Source; S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1958, 1961, Tables 17, 6,
■f=-
00
pp. 358, 376. 
aIn December.
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a loan of five million dollars from the United States Develop- 
ment Loan Fund in August i960. This loan, guaranteed by the 
Syrian Government, was to extend over a period of 12 years
and to be used in advancing long-term loans to private indus-
2trial companies for their development projects. But unfor­
tunately, this loan did not materialize by the end of I96I 
because of the strict conditions attached to the agreement; 
the higher prices of American machinery compared to European 
machinery; the routine and delaying practices involved in ad­
vancing the loans; and because Syrian industrialists are 
accustomed to better and easier means of acquiring
intermediate-term credit from industrial companies in Europe
3
and the U.S. itself. It is, however, too soon to pass any 
judgment on the effects and contributions of the Industrial 
Bank to the development of industry. But unless its resources 
are increased, its contribution will remain insignificant. 
Nevertheless, it does indicate a major step forward in the 
development of the banking system in Syria.
Table 18 shows the distribution of the loans advanced 
by the commercial banks to the various economic sectors. 
Commercial loans were by far the greatest and most important 
since these loans financed the exports and imports of Syria. 
The table further shows that loans granted to industry were
^Ibid., p. 22.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
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greater than those extended to agriculture. This may seem 
paradoxical, since agriculture is the chief occupation. It 
may be partially explained by the rapid growth of industiy 
and the uncertainty and fluctuation of the agricultural crops, 
A further explanation is that loans advanced by the Agricul­
tural Bank, as shown in Table 17, are not included in this 
table which refers to commercial banks only.
It will be seen from Table 19 that private deposits
TABLE 19
DEPOSITS AT THE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN 
SYRIA, 1954-1962*
(L.S. MILLION)
Year Private Deposits Public Deposits Total Deposits
1954 136.1 213.7 349.8
1955 146.2 198.6 344.8
1956 158.0 200.7 358.7
1957 185.2 30.1 215.3
1958 200.7 38.2 238.9
1959 298.0 85.1 383.1
i960 380.6 68.8 449.4
1961 280.2 74.5 354.7
1962 268.9 87.2 356.1
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1958, 196I,
Tables 15, l4, pp. 356, 3W .
Abdullah Azmeh, The Role of the Banks to the Economic Develop­
ment of Syria (Damascus: Ministry of Planning, April, 19b3),
Table 4, p. 63.
^In December.
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have registered an Increase of about 97 percent from 1954 to 
1962, Though 38 percent of total deposits were private in 
1954, this ratio increased to 75 percent in 1962. Private 
deposits have increased regularly up to i960 when they reached 
a maximum L.S. 38O million, but they dropped about L.S. 100 
million in 1961, and continued falling in 1962. This recent 
fall in private deposits may be attributed to the nationaliza­
tion of the banking system and other major corporations in 
1961, and the subsequent fear among businessmen which led to 
the flight of capital outside the country.
It is difficult to predict the long-run effect of 
nationalization at present but the immediate effects have 
certainly been unfavorable. It will all depend on how soundly 
the machinery of the government can manage the banks, and how 
soon it can regain the confidence of the people in the banking 
system.
Trade and the Balance of Payments 
Trade and commerce play an important role in the 
Syrian economy. This has already been noted by the fact that 
commerce generates a relatively large share of the national 
income (Table 11). There has been a general trend of increas­
ing imports and exports since the end of the war as shown in 
Table 20. The percentage of the value of exports in propor­
tion to imports reached its highest (89 percent) in 1957 and 
its lowest (43 percent) in i960.
It is important to note that since 1951, Syria has
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TABLE 20
IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND BALANCE OP TRADE OF SYRIA
1951-196oa'D,c
(L.S. MILLION)
Year Imports 
(C.I.F.)
Exports 
(F.O.B.)
Balance 
of Trade
Percentage 
Value of Exports 
to Imports
1951 435 . 277 -158 64
1952 459 320 -139 70
1953 462 376 -86 81
1954 634 466 -168 74
1955 677 474 -203 70
1956 690 516 -174 75
1957 616 548 -68 89
1958 730 420 -310 58
1959 652 356 -296 55
i960 806 344 -462 43
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, I96I, 1962,
Tables 1, 1, pp. I8I, 256I
a
These figures pertain to value of goods that passed 
through customs.
^Figures for 1958-1960 exclude trade with Egypt.
^Import figures for 1959-1960 Include raw petroleum 
Imported by Refinery of Horns.
always had a deficit In Its balance of trade. The size of 
this deficit has varied considerably. In 1957 It reached a 
low level of L.S. 68 million, while In i960 It moved up to a 
record of L.S. 462 million. The reason for this wide
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fluctuation is attributed to the nature of the exported goods. 
In 1956 and 1957 Syria's exports amounted to a little less 
than one-quarter of the national income. Thus exports have 
a great effect on national income, as well as on imports.
It must be noted that the 1958 through i960 figures exclude 
trade with Egypt. This accounts for the low export figures 
in these particular years.
Among Syria's main imports are raw materials, machin­
ery, minerals, foodstuffs and chemicals, as well as the 
others shown in Table 21.
Syria's exports depend mostly on agricultural produc­
tion which, in turn, is subject to changes in climatic condi­
tions. Unstable weather has been largely responsible for the 
great variation in the volume and value of exports from year 
to year. A further important factor explaining variation in 
the value of exports is the fluctuation in the prices of 
agricultural commodities in the world market, on which Syria 
can exert no significant influence, because the volume of its 
exports is relatively small in relation to world supplies.
The main components of Syria's exports are shown in Table 22.
The terms of trade have turned against Syria through­
out the decade of 1950-1960, as shown in Table 23. While the 
prices of exports tended to be stable and even declining in 
certain years since 1952, the prices of imports tended to 
surge upward particularly in i960, the fact which accounts 
for the highly unfavorable terms of trade in these particular 
years. Thus, Syria may be said to be sharing the common trend
TABLE 21
IMPORTS OF SYRIA, 1952, 1957, AND 196O (VALUE IN L.S. MILLION)
Items
1952 1957 i960*
Value
Percent 
of Total Value
Percent 
of Total Value
Percent 
of Total
Livestock, Plant and 
Vegetable Products 56.9 18.2 82.5 13.4 186.7 23.2
Food Products, Beverages 
and Tobacco 17.0 5.4 30.4 4.9 31.0 3.8
Mineral Products 38.8 12.4 85.7 13.9 30.7 3.8
Chemicals 16.8 5.4 45.0 7.3 56.9 7.1
Rubber, Leather, Wood 21.1 6.7 47.0 7.6 64.1 8.0
Paper and Utilizations 5.6 1.8 11.8 1.9 14.8 1.8
Textile Materials and 
Goods 64.3 20.5 121.0 19.7 117.6 14.6
Metals 35.2 11.2 71.1 11.5 92.6 11.5
Machinery £ind Electrical 
Appliances 38.4 12.3 78.5 12.8 117.0 14.5
Transport Materials 13.4 4.3 29.0 4.7 38.0 4.7
Raw Petroleum —  —  —  — —  — — 37.5 4.7
Miscellaneous 5.8 1.8 l4.l 2.3 18.8 2.3
Total 313.3 100.0 616.1 100.0 805.7 100.0
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts. 1953. 1958, 1961, Tables 4, 5, 5,
pp. 92-93, 178-183, 184-189^
ui
Excluding trade with Egypt.
TABLE 22
EXPORTS OF SYRIA, 1952, 1957, AND I96O (VALUE IN L.S. MILLION)
Items
1952 1957 i960*
Value
Percent 
of Total Value
Percent 
of Total
, Percent 
Value Qf Total
Livestock, Plant and
Vegetable Products 117.6 36.8 227.2 41.5 51.7 15.0
Food Products, Beverages
and Tobacco 10.1 3.2 13.0 2.4 14.9 4.3
Mineral Products 1.8 0.5 1.3 0.2 3.4 1.0
Chemicals 4.1 1.3 6.1 1.1 1.7 0.5
Leather £uid Wood 3.6 1.1 6.9 1.3 10.3 3.0
Papers 0.7 0,2 1.1 0.2 1.0 ^0.3
Textile 177.6 55.6 269.4 49.1 235.3 68.3
Pottery and Glassware 0,7 0.2 2.0 0.4 2.8 0.8
Metals 1.9 0.6 11.3 2.1 16.8 4.9
Machinery 0.8 0.2 5.7 1.0 3.3 1.0
Transport Materials 0.2 0.1 2.2 0.4 1.1 0.3
Miscellaneous 0.5 0.2 1.8 0.3 2.0 0.6
Total
1
319.6 100.0 548.0 100.0 344.3 100.0
Source: S.À.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1953, 1958, 196I, Tables 3, 6, 6,
pp. 90-91, 184-189, 190-195.
U1
VJl
aExcluding trade with Egypt.
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TABLE 23
INDEXES OF QUANTUM, PRICES AND TERMS 
OF TRADE OF SYRIA, 1953-1960 
(1952 = 100)
Year
Exports Imports
Terms 
of Trade
Quantum Price Quantum Price
1953 l4l 83 104 97 86
1954 163 89 146 94 95
1955 176 90 151 92 98
1956 183 91 154 101 90
1957 207 83 125 93 89
1958 187 80 158 95 84
1959 171 86 151 96 89
i960 189 70 168 134 52
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1956, 1958,
1961, Tables 35, 3, 3, pp. 2l6, 17b, 102.
of unfavorable terms of trade which Is experienced by most 
underdeveloped countries.
In spite of the large and continuous deficit In Its 
balance of trade, Syria's balance of payments has shown a 
relatively moderate deficit In Its balance of current account 
and has. In fact, been positive In certain years, as shown 
In Table 24. It will be noticed that the 1957 deficit In the 
balance of trade was L.S. 78.9 million, while the balance of 
current account reflected a surplus of L.S. 5.5 million.
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TABLE 24
ESTIMATES OF SYRIA'S BALANCE OP 
PAYMENTS, 1957-1960 
(L.S. MILLION)
Item 1957 1958 1959 i960
A. Current Account 
1. Exports (F.O.B.) 586.5 475.0 467.6 505.0
2. Imports (C.I.F.) -665.4 -729.6 -709.0 -898.0
Net of 1 and 2 -78.9 -254.6 -241.4 -393.0
3. Net Transit, Commis­
sions 14.5 12.0 25.0 17.0
4. Net Travel, Tourism -15.0 20.0 12.0 20.0
5. Expenses, Royalties 
from Oil Companies 58.4 83.5 113.5 120.0
6. Net Government 
Expenditures 8.0 22.0 20.0 20.0
7. Net Emmigrants 
Remittances 10.0 15.0 35.0 35.0
8. Relief Aid to
Palestinian Refugees 5.5 3.0 7.0 7.0
9. Foreign Currency 
Exchange Profits 3.0 3.0 5.0 4.0
10. Relief from Egypt —  —  — —  —  — 13.5 15.0
11. International Relief Aid — -- —  —  — — — — 15.0
Net Balance,of 
Current Account 5.5 -96.1 -10.4 -140.0
B. Capital Account
1. Net Capital Movement 
in Private Sector -10.0 -15.0 -5.0 -15.0
2. Net Capital Movement in 
Government Sector ___ ___ -28.2 33.0
3. Net Banking Balances 5.1 38.6 40.3 37.4
4. Net Monetary Reserve and 
Payment Agreements Ac­
counts 11.7 58.4 -16.0 61.9
5. Errors and Ommissions -12.3 14.1 19.3 22.7
Net Balance of 
Capital Account -5.5 96.1 10.4 i4o.o
Source: S.A.R., Statistical Abstracts, 1958, I961,
Tables 23, 23, pp. 365-3657384=3851
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Although the deficit in the balance of trade was L.S. 241.4 
million in 1959, the balance of current account indicated a 
deficit of only L.S. 10.4 million.
The deficit in the balance of trade is covered prin­
cipally by the expenses and royalties of oil companies, which 
have increased from L.S. 58.4 million in 1957 to L.S. 120 
million in 1960, and by the transfer of capital.
The Syrian economy is exposed to outside forces which 
are beyond its control. The above analysis indicates the 
following characteristics:
First, persistent deficits in the balance of trade; 
Second, concentration of exports in agricultural 
products and textile goods;
Third, dependence of exports on agricultural crops 
with the resulting unfavorable effect of climatic conditions;
Fourth, the vulnerability of exports to external 
forces, such as the fluctuations in world prices which are 
beyond the control of Syria and which account for the falling 
trend in the terras of trade.
Ent repreneurship 
Most economic development theories emphasize the sig­
nificance of the entrepreneurial function as a vital force 
in the economy. This feature was the most distinctive aspect 
of Schumpeter's theory. The shortage, or in most cases the 
lack of entrepreneurs is considered a principal retarding 
factor to growth in underdeveloped countries.
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In view of the crucial role given the entrepreneur in 
the process of development, it is only proper to ask what is 
meant by the entrepreneur. This word is naturally derived 
from the word enterprise. According to Schumpeter, enter­
prise is the carrying out of new combinations of the means 
of production. Entrepreneurs are "the individuals whose 
function it is to carry them out.
As to what determines the supply of entrepreneurs, 
Schumpeter considers the "climate" to be responsible for the 
rise of the New Men who will do the Job of establishing New 
Firms and making the economy grow. A framework of public
order, stability, and legal rights will enhance the oppor-
2
tunities for entrepreneurship.
The entrepreneur is, among other things, a social
deviant, egocentric, untraditional and a m b i t i o u s .^ He is
attributed with
the will to conquer; the impulse to fight to prove one­
self superior to others, to succeed for the sake, not of 
the fruits of success, but of success itself. . . .
Finally, there is the Joy of creating, of getting things k 
done, or simply of exercising one's energy and ingenuity.
In short, motives, abilities and a congenial environment all
combine to promote entrepreneurship.
^Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Develop­
ment (Cambridge; Harvard UniversIïy~Trëss7~Î955T7"pT"7 r^i
2
Gerald M. Meier and Robert E. Baldwin, Economic 
Development (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1^ 57)» P• 358 •
“'Higgins, op. cit., p. 139.
4
Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 93.
60
What is the role played by entrepreneurs in Syria?
Is there any shortage of entrepreneurs and is the climate 
conducive to the rise and proper functioning of entrepreneurs?
Syria is often regarded as a good example of an under­
developed economy where private initiative has largely con­
tributed to the postwar economic growth of the country. This 
point is particularly stressed by Doreen Warriner in connec­
tion with Syrian agricultural development. She compares the 
upsurge of private enterprise and the rapid rate of tech­
nical change through the investment of private risk capital, 
to the nineteenth-century type of expansion in Western Europe, 
or better still, to that of the Middle West in the United 
States. Warriner observes that
Syria's nineteenth-century type of development has been 
accompanied by the emergence of strong "inner-directed" 
personalities who break through the crust of tradition 
in practical ways.1
In spite of Syria's marked aversion to foreign assis­
tance, the postwar period witnessed a rather remarkable expan­
sion in cultivated area and production. A characteristic 
feature of this rapid development is that it has been almost 
wholly due to private enterprise. The Syrian merchant class 
has played a prominent role in the development of the country, 
both in the fields of agriculture and industry. The spirit 
of voluntary saving and enterprise seems to be inherent in, 
and characteristic of, the Syrian people. For instance,
^Warriner, op. cit., pp. 110-112.
6l
according to the Mission Report of the International Bank,
in 1955 only 48,000 hectares were irrigated by government
programs, whereas 250,000 hectares were irrigated by privately
installed pumps.^  Furthermore, the expansion in cotton has
been financed almost entirely from commercial capital.
In 1951, it was estimated that some 200 to 300 million 
Syrian pounds had been required to finance the planting 
and moving of the cotton crop, of which all but 50 
million Syrian pounds came from outside a g r i c u l t u r e . ^
Manufacturing industiy has developed primarily by 
private entrepreneurs. An important indication of the role 
of private enterprise is the relatively large share of pri­
vate investment. Private investment amounted to 86 percent 
of total gross investment in 1950.^  This share went up to 
88 percent in 1954 and has fallen to 74 percent in 1958, as 
shown in Table 15.
Private investment at such a high level was made 
possible by the ploughing back of entrepreneurial profits.
This factor was historically the major source of capital ac­
cumulation in Western economic growth and as such occupied 
a central place in Schumpeter's theory of development. Nurkse 
asserts that "if there is any hope for substantial private 
saving it lies mainly in the reinvestment of entrepreneurial
II4profits. This is so because the individual entrepreneur
^I.B.R.D., op. cit., p. 23.
2Ü.N., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945- 
1954, p. 184.
Q
^I.B.R.D., op. cit., p. 21.
ii
Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in
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can have the advantage of providing the machinery for saving 
the increment of income which capital investment creates.
However, an important condition for the success of 
capital formation is a "capital-conscious community," The 
business community in Syria has been "investment conscious"
and has engaged in little conspicuous spending except perhaps
1
for housing.
Nothing matters so much as the quality of the people.
The personal habits and traits associated with the use 
of capital - among them initiative, prudence, ingenuity 
and foresightedness - give a deeper and surer base to a 
nation's economic advance than the blueprints of a 
planning commission.2
Such traits and habits, together with favorable circumstances,
have combined to raise private investment and saving in Syria,
to such a high level as to contribute considerably to the
development of the Syrian economy in the decade of I950-1960.
Conclusion
In spite of limited resources, the Syrian economy has 
experienced a rapid rate of growth during the decade of 1950- 
1960. Growth has been noticeable in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors. The rate of productive investment ranged 
from 11 percent to 18 percent of the national income
Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957),
p. 155.
^This point was acknowledged by almost all literature 
on this subject, and was particularly stressed by the I.B.R.D. 
Mission, on page 23.
%urkse, op. cit.
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throughout the period.
The textile industry has developed into a substantial 
manufacturing complex, satisfying the home market and provid­
ing a surplus for export. The processing of agricultural 
products by modern technical methods exemplified by the growth 
of the canning industry has also developed into a well estab­
lished industry. In the last decade, 1950-I960, the emergence 
of the banking system as an important contributing force to 
economic development was noticeable. An important feature 
of economic growth has been the prominent role played by the 
Syrian entrepreneur, who has exhibited an initial ability to 
mobilize savings productively.
Thus far, although it is safe to conclude that econ­
omic growth in Syria has forged ahead, it cannot be claimed 
for sure that Syria has met all the conditions for the take­
off, The process of development was full of bottlenecks.
As may be deduced from the above analysis, economic growth 
in Syria was precarious.
Three major facts emerge from this analysis:
First, growth in the agricultural sector was not sus­
tained, In spite of the rather remarkable expansion in the 
area cultivated, agricultural production was interrupted by 
unfavorable weather conditions and did not maintain a steady 
rate of growth. Because agriculture is the predominant 
sector in the economy, the repercussions of the periodical 
crop failures were noticeable on the level of income and the
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rate of growth.
Second, political instability has been a major deter­
rent to sustained growth.
Third, the government was behind in providing the 
social overhead capital necessary to sustain growth.
Thus, it may be concluded that Syria has passed beyond 
the stage of the preconditions for the take-off, and has done 
this at a rather remarkably fast rate. Yet, it cannot be 
possibly claimed that growth has been sustained.
Admittedly, there have been various attempts under­
taken by the government to remove the serious bottlenecks 
which stood in the way of sustained growth. The government 
invested in piecemeal projects such as irrigation and land 
reclamation, transportation, electricity and well drilling.
It has also indicated interest in speeding up the economic 
development of the country through economic planning. For 
example, in 194?, the government invited foreign experts to 
undertake a comprehensive study of the economic resources 
and potentialities of the country and to present recommenda­
tions for the future development of the Syrian economy. In 
1954, a similar task was entrusted to an International Bank 
Mission. As a result of these studies and recommendations, 
the Seven-Year Plan of 1955-1961 was fonmilated. But these 
attempts were seemingly, neither sufficient nor effective 
enough to eliminate these bottlenecks. It may be rightly 
assumed that the burden of development, in the first part
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of the decade, from 1950-1958, has fallen almost entirely on 
the shoulders of the Syrian entrepreneurs.
Since 1958, however, the Syrian government has become 
more aware of its responsibilities toward the development of 
the economy, and has embarked on an all-out attack on the 
problems thus far unsolved. It has turned to.comprehensive 
planning as a possible solution to these problems.
In the following chapters, an attempt will be made 
to find out whether planning is the answer to the problems 
retarding economic growth in Syria.
CHAPTER III 
THE HISTORY OP PLANNING IN SYRIA
Prom the analysis given in Chapter II it may be in­
ferred that the Syrian government took an indifferent attitude 
toward the problems confronting the economic development of 
the country. In fact, Syriein authorities were not completely 
oblivious to the implications of bad harvests and their de­
terring effects on the level of income and sustained growth. 
But while responsible Syrian authorities seemed to have recog­
nized the importance of governmental work in this field, in 
practice, their efforts have been inadequate and their accom­
plishments have been ever short of the goals set by them. 
Nevertheless, their attempts and efforts were not entirely 
fruitless. Experience has been gained through trial and 
error.
The attempts made by the Syrian government to secure 
sustained growth through economic planning will now be traced.
Syrian Government action in the area of economic 
planning is arbitrarily delineated into three stages:
1. The early phase of studies and recommendations:
1947-1955.
2. Planning from 1955 to 1958.
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3. Planning in the unification era: 1958-1961.
I. The Early Phase of Studies and 
Recommendations: 1947-1955
Prior to 1955» projects were studied and carried out 
individually and out of expedience, as the need for each one 
of them arose, but without prior planning and with little re­
gard to classification as to priority or to financial ability.
Although economic planning in Syria did riot start be­
fore 1955* various preliminary studies were undertaken for 
that purpose. In 19^7* the Syrian authorities invited the 
British engineering firm of Alexander Gibb and Partners to 
formulate a development plan for Syria. In the following 
years, the government invited several Dutch and German ex­
perts to advise it on economic planning. Most of their 
recommendations were rejected on the grounds that they would 
fail to industrialize the country. In 1954, a mission from 
the International Bank submitted a report containing its 
recommendations for a plan for economic development. Out of 
studies prepared by Gibb and the International Bank's Mission, 
the Seven-Year Economic Development Plan for Syria emerged 
and was put in force in 1955.
It is now pertinent to give a brief account of the 
studies and recommendations presented by Gibb and the Inter­
national Bank's Mission.
Alexander Gibb's Report 
This report contained a ten-year development program
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with a total expenditure of L.S. 477 million to be spent on 
development projects as follows;^
L.S. 70 million on irrigation and drainage works 
covering studies and execution of such projects as the 
Halabiya gorge in the Euphrates valley, completion of projects 
in the Khabour river area, Mzerib in Hauran province, drainage 
of the Ghab valley, as well as the Rouj and upper Orontes 
projects.
L.S. 70 million on hydro-electric and thermal power.
L.S. 65 million on rural and urban water supplies,
including the construction of new water supply and distribu­
tion systems in Aleppo, Homs, Latakia and Damascus.
L.S. 40 million on construction of new secondary
roads (l,l40 kilometers) and maintenance of old roads.
L.S. 93 million on railways, including the alignment 
of Aleppo-Raqqa Railroad (200 kilometers), Raqqa-Hasakeh-Tel 
Kotchek (310 kilometers), and Raqqa-Deir ez-Zor-Abu Kamal 
(290 kilometers).
L.S. 25 million was allocated for the construction 
and repair of seaports.
Other proposed expenditure included L.S. 12 million 
on airports, L.S. 32 million on telephone and broadcasting 
facilities, and L.S. 70 million on public buildings.
^United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees, "The Economic Development Projects of Syria," 
Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development No. 15 (Beirut; 
March, 1958), p. 13. (Hereafter referred to as UNRWA).
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The International Bank Mission's Report
In 1954, a mission organized by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development visited Syria at the
request of the government. Its task was
to undertake a general review of Syria's economic poten­
tialities and to submit recommendations designed to assist 
the government to formulate a long-run development pro­
gram for increasing Syria's productive resources and 
raising the standard of living of its people.1
In March, 1955, the Mission submitted its recommenda­
tions which were embodied in a six-year development program 
(1955-1960). The total proposed expenditures amounted to 
L.S. 1,903.4 million, out of which L.S. 986.1 million was 
allotted for development, L.S. 453 million for defense, L.S. 
439.3 million for administration, and L.S. 25 million for
o
increase in government salaries.
A summary of the proposed expenditure on development 
projects for the period 1955-1960 is given in Table 25. It 
will be seen from this table that 34.5 percent of total ex­
penditure on development was recommended for agriculture. 
Education ranked second in priority with 27.6 percent, and 
transport and communication came third with 17.6 percent.
The total expenditure on these three fields accounted for
79.7 percent of total government expenditure on development. 
Thus, the emphasis on agriculture and social overtiead capital 
was quite obvious from the Mission's recommendations.
^I.B.R.D., op. cit., p. vii. 
^Ibid., p. 175.
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TABLE 25
PROPOSED GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON DEVELOPMENT BY
I.B.R.D. MISSION FOR 1955-19ÔO 
(L.S. MILLION)
Planned Expenditures
Type of Project
Average
Annual Total
Percent 
of Tota:
Irrigation and Reclamation 33.5 201.2 20.4
Other Agriculture 23.2 139.1 14.1
Industry 2.0 12.0 1.2
Tourist Trade 1.3 7.9 0.8
Electric Power 10.1 60.7 6.2
Transport and Communication 28.9 173.3 17.6
Education 45.3 271.8 27.6
Public Health 12.4 74.2 7.5
Community Planning and Services* 4.2 25.0 2.5
Housing 1.3 7.5 0.7
Miscellaneous^ 2.3 13.5 1.4
Total® 164.3 986.1 100.0
Source: I.B.R.D., The Economic Development of Syria
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 175.
^Including public administration buildings.
^Including L.S. 10 million for capital of the pro­
jected Central Bank, L.S. 2.5 million for a development 
commission, and L.S. 1 million for the expansion of statisti­
cal services.
^Totals do not check because they are expressed In 
round figures.
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Out of the total proposed government expenditure,
51.8 percent was recommended for development projects, 24.4 
percent for administration and increase in government salaries, 
and 23.8 percent for defense.
A brief summary of the various expenditures involved 
in each broad category, listed in Table 25, might be helpful 
at this point.
In the field of agriculture, the Mission recommended 
the implementation of the Ghab project which involved widening 
of the Orontes, constructing new drainage and irrigation 
canals, the construction of two dams for flood control, water 
storage and the generation of hydroelectric power. The com­
pletion of the Ghab project would make a total area of 65,000 
hectares available for irrigation.^ In addition, the Mission 
recommended the completion of irrigation projects underway in 
Tel Maghass, Sinn and the Rouj, and the implementation of 
four other small projects (Mzerib in Hauran, Nahr al-Kabir in 
Latakia, Barada in Damascus and El-Taf on the Khabour River).
When completed, these projects would bring about 44,000
2
hectares under irrigation.
Other agricultural projects included a number of re­
lated investments having a direct effect on agricultural 
productivity. Such expenditure would allow for better agri­
cultural credit facilities, more organized and efficient
llbid., p. 44. 
^Ibid., pp. 46-48.
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marketing methods and facilities, research and experimenta­
tion, and agricultural settlements.^
It will be noticed from Table 25, that industry was 
allotted a relatively small share (1.2 percent) of the pro­
posed total government expenditure on development. The 
Mission felt that the industrial field must be left to the 
initiative of private enterprise. It suggested, however, 
that the government play an indirect role, such as by author­
izing the establishment of an industrial investment bank, the
construction of industrial zones, the promulgation of labor
2laws, as well as through fiscal and monetary policies.
In the field of transportation, emphasis was laid on 
the construction of new highways linking the major urban 
centers with the rural areas, the major seaport at Latakia, 
and with the resort areas. The repair and maintenance of 
existing roads and railways, as well as improvements to 
Latakia port and the expansion of telecommunication facil­
ities, were also included in the recommendations.
In view of the considerable shortage of power and 
energy resources, the Mission recommended the installation 
of steam and hydroelectric plants in the main cities.
In the field of education, a huge volume of invest­
ment was suggested. The program would improve general, voca­
tional, elementary and higher education, as well as necessary
llbid., p. 103.
^Ibid., p. 120.
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equipment and construction.
The Mission's further recommendations included ex­
penditure on public health, housing, and community planning 
and services. New hospitals and quarantine stations were to 
be established, and anti-malaria campaigns were to be launched. 
A housing census and the building of research stations for 
technical assistance were to be undertaken. Community plan­
ning and services for the provision of water supply, urban 
social welfare, housing and settlement administration were 
to be initiated.
The Mission was highly justified in recommending a 
large volume of investment in human resources. It considered 
better education, health and housing as not only objectives 
of development in themselves, but also as important means, 
however indirect, of raising production and standards of 
living. According to the Mission,
. . . it is a truism that an expansion and improvement 
of educational opportunities is indispensable to economic 
progress as well as to the development of stable and 
free political institutions.!
The means of financing this program was outlined by 
the Mission as indicated in Table 26. As may be noted, the 
plan would rely mainly on internal sources of finance. Only 
eleven percent was expected in foreign aid. The plan was ex­
pected to be financed without risking the danger of inflation.
It would seem that the major aim of this elaborated 
program of investment was the indirect stimulation of private
^Ibid., p. 149.
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TABLE 26
EXPECTED FINANCIAL SOURCES OF THE MISSION
(L.S. MILLION)
PLAN, 1955-1960
Source Amount Percent of Total
Existing Revenues, with Anticipated 
Growth^ 1,360 69.5
Additional Taxes and Revenues 90 4.6
Improved Tax Administration 40 2.0
Income from Aleppo and Damascus Public 
Utilities 60 3.1
oil Transit Revenues 73 3.7
Domestic Borrowing^ 120 6.1
Foreign Aid and Foreign Borrowing® 215 11.0
Total 1,958 100.0
Source: I.B.R.D., op. cit., p. 177.
^Annual increase of three percent was estimated to 
yield L.S. 1,315 million as a minimum and that of four per­
cent L.S. 1,360 million as a maximum income from this source. 
These estimates excluded oil revenues.
^This source was expected to bring in between L.S. 85 
million and L.S. 120 million.
^Foreign aid was expected to be between L.S. 175 
million and L.S. 215 million.
enterprise by relieving it from overhead investments. The
Mission was of the opinion that at
this time it is obvious that the government's economic 
efforts must be directed largely toward stimulating out­
put and that the volume of production and private
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investment in turn affects the resources available to 
the government for financing its program.!
However, in the first ten years since independence, 
actual government expenditure amounted to L.S, 427.6 million. 
The distribution of this expenditure on the various projects 
is shown in Table 27. During this period, some projects were 
financed within the framework of the General Budget, but the 
majority were financed either through loans provided by the 
Money Issue Institute with the guarantee of the government 
or by Treasury advances.
II. Planning from 1955 to 1958
In 1 9 5 5 j the Syrian government decided to have a 
uniform and well-defined development plan which would take
o
into consideration the following points:
1. The country's long-term needs for development 
projects;
2. The consolidation of all such projects into a 
comprehensive plan;
3. The organization of all possible financial re­
sources, including the availability of foreign exchange;
4. The classification of all projectsr-by priority 
and with regard to their effects on welfare, national 
production, and the country's balance of payments position.
Accordingly, the government issued the Extraordinary
^Ibid., p. 27.
^UNRWA, op. cit., p. 12.
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TABLE 27
ACTUAL EXPENDITURE ON PROJECTS FINANCED 
OUTSIDE THE GENERAL BUDGET, 1945-1955 
(L.S. MILLION)
Project Expenditure
Dial Telephone and Broadcasting System 36.8
Major Irrigation Projects 12.6
Municipalities 23.4
Deficit of the Department of Supply 5.2
Mlra& 50.0
Cereals Office 6.0
Railroads 18.6
Agricultural Bank 49.3
Latakia Harbor 18.7
Aleppo Water Supply 25.6
Electric Power Institutes 21.1
Ghab Project 6.6
Oil Reservoirs 0.8
Guaranteed Corporations 16.9
Yarmouk Project 0.1
Jezlreh Land Survey and Registration of Titles 1.9
Nationalization of Textbooks 0.5
International Fair of Damascus 1.5
Central Bank 2.5
Construction of Embassies Abroad 0.3
Road Projects 0.1
Well Drilling Projects . 0.1
National Defense Projects 129.0
Total 427.6
Source: United Arab Republic, Syrian Region, Economic
Development Institute, The Ten-Year Economic Development Plan, 
1958-1967 (Damascus: Government Press, 1958), p. 13. (Here­
after United Arab Republic Is referred to as U.A.R.).
^Ira was a department established during the war to 
avoid the shortage of food materials and to ration them out.
^For 1949, 1951 and 1955.
Budget for Economic Development, which embodied the Seven- 
Year Plan.
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Prior to 1955y Syria had used two budgets:
1. The Ordinary Budget - included the Syrian govern­
ment's normal expenditures and revenues.
2. The Related and Autonomous Budgets - included the 
special budgets of certain government departments such as 
Customs, Broadcasting, University, Tobacco Monopoly, Archeol­
ogy, Posts and Telegraph, Agricultural Bank, the Cereals 
Office, the Central Bank, the International Pair, and the 
Palestine Arab Refugee Institute.
The newly promulgated Law No. Il6 of August, 1955, 
issued the Extraordinary Budget which was confined to the 
development projects of the country.^ The Seven-Year Economic 
Development Plan, based on previous studies and recommenda­
tions, was then formulated and included in the Extraordinary 
Budget. This plan consolidated and classified various in­
dividual projects and organized the sources of revenues re­
quired to finance them.
However, the execution of this plan necessitated the 
simultaneous establishment of two autonomous institutions 
for economic development. Law No. 115 of August, 1955, or­
dered the formation of the Permanent Economic Council and the 
Economic Development Institute.^
The Economic Council consisted of the Minister of the
^Republic of Syria, Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech 
of 1955 (Damascus: Government Press, 1955), p. b?*
^Republic of Syria, "Law 115,” Official Gazette, No.
42 (Dzunascus: Government Press, August, 1955 ) •
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National Economy who acted as Chairman, the members of the 
Economic Development Institute, the Secretary Generals of all 
the ministries, the Director of Customs, a representative of 
the Central Bank of Syria, eight members representing com­
merce, agriculture, finance. Industry and labor, to be elected 
by their respective organizations, and the Directors of the 
various autonomous project administrations. Altogether, the 
Council consisted of thirty members.
The composition and status of the Council was amended 
In 1957 and 1958. The Minister of National Economy was re­
placed by the Minister of National Planning as Chairman of 
the Council. The Secretary Generals of all the ministries 
were replaced by the Ministers of Trade and Economy, Public 
Works, Agriculture, Finance, Transportation, and Municipal 
and Rural Affairs. All other members were retained.
The Economic Council was primarily concerned with the 
organization and development of the economic potentialities 
of the countly. The main objective of Its task was to Increase 
employment and the national Income, and to exert every poss­
ible effort to Improve the standard of living of the Syrian 
people, to which end, the Council was by law directed to:
1. conduct such Investigations and studies In connec­
tion with general economic conditions and the prospects of 
future growth of the Syrian economy;
2. advise the government on matters related to 
economic affairs. The government. In turn, would seek the
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Council's advice on such matters;
3. guide the Economic Development Institute in pre­
paring the various development programs and their related 
budgets;
4. submit to the government and to Parliament such 
programs and budgets as would have been prepared by the 
Economic Development Institute accompanied by its suggestions 
and recommendations;
5. supervise the execution of all development 
programs.
The Council would meet at least once every three 
months and would be directly responsible to the Council of 
Ministers.
In addition to the above mentioned functions, the 
Council was required to submit to the government and to 
Parliament an annual report reviewing the general economic 
situation of the country.
The Economic Development Institute was an autonomous 
organization which operated under the supervision and guidance 
of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Economic Coun­
cil. Its committee consisted of a chairman to be appointed 
by the Council of Ministers for a period of five years (this 
position was later assumed by the Minister of National Plan­
ning), and four experts representing the fields of develop­
ment, construction, finance and general economics.
The functions of the Economic Development Institute
were to;
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1. survey the natural resources of the countiy with 
a view to their development and exploitation;
2. prepare an organized program far the economic 
development of the countiy;
3. develop the nation's economy as a part of the 
economy of the Arab World;
4. prepare development budgets;
5. put all the economic programs so organized into
effect;
6. coordinate the activities of the various depart­
ments connected with development, and to provide all the 
technical assistance they might need;
7. undertake all necessary investigations and studies 
referred to it by the Permanent Economic Council;
8. represent Syria in the Arab development 
conferences.
The Institute was to meet at least twice a month and 
was required to submit its annual report to the Council of 
Ministers and the Permanent Economic Council.
With the establishment of these two organizations, 
it was hoped that the institutional framework for development, 
which has been lacking for such a long time, would be a for­
ward step toward the effective organization and implementation 
of economic and social planning in Syria.
The Seven-Year Plan, 1955-1961
A summaxy of the proposed expenditure under the
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Seven-Year Plan is given in Table 28. The total expenditure
TABLE 28
CLASSIFIED EXPENDITURE OF THE SEVEN-YEAR 
PLAN, 1955-1961 
(L.S. MILLION)
Project Expenditure
Percent 
of Total
I. Agriculture :
Irrigation and Power 181.35
-
Well Drilling 19.75
Agricultural Bank 20.00
Subtotal 221.10 33.7
II. Industry:
Nationalization of Public 
Utilities 16.00
Subsidies to Electricity 
Institutions 8.50
Petroleum Refinery 80.00
Industrial Bank 10.00
Salt Factory 2.50
Subtotal 117.00 17.8
III. Tran^ort and Communications: 
Roads, New Constructions 
and Repairs 90.48
Railroads, New Constructions 
and Repairs 26.13
Airports 27.50
Telephones 3.01
Latakia Port 38.00
Subtotal 185.12 28.2
IV. Construction:
Government Buildings, 
Hospitals, Schools 28.52 4.3
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TABLE 20— Continued
Project Expenditure
Percent 
of Total
V. Defense 45.00 6.9
VI. Community Development: 
Bedouin Program 
Water Supply
10.00
2.30
Subtotal 12.30 1.9
ril. Others:
Surveys and Studies 
Administrative Expenditures 
Grants-ln-Ald to Municipalities 
International Fair 
Fireproof Storage Facilities 
for Inflammables 
Tourist and Historical Sites 
Real Estate Bank
24.54
5.15
5.00 
1.45
1.21
4.50
5.00
Subtotal 46.05 7.2
Grand Total 655.89 100.0
Source: UNRWA, "The Economic Development Projects
of Syria," Quarterly Bulletin of Economic Development, No. 
15 (Beirut: March, 1958), p. 21.
on all projects covered by this plan for the period 1955-1961 
was set at L.S. 655.89 million.
It Is clear from Table 20 that the plan's main em­
phasis was laid on the development of the country's agricul­
tural, water and electric power resources. A sum of L.S.
221.1 million, or 33.7 percent of the total contemplated
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expenditure, was allocated to this field.
The development•of transport and comraunicàtion ranked 
second in importance, for which L.S. 185.I2 million, or 28.2 
percent of total contemplated expenditure, was allotted in 
the plan. Thus, the expenditures earmarked for these two 
fields (agriculture and transportation) added up to 62 percent 
of total expenditures.
Industrial projects occupied third place, and account­
ed for 17.8 percent of total expenditures.
Expenditures of the Seven-Year Economic Development 
Plan, as ratified by Parliament by Law No. II6 of August,
1955, were classified into four major categories:^
1. New public projects;
2. Previously planned projects;
3. Loans and advances to government agencies;
4. Investments in public and semi-public institutions.
The expenditures earmarked for new public projects
amounted to L.S. 301.25 million. This constituted 46 percent 
of the plan's total expenditures. The allocation of expendi­
ture on the various projects in this category is shown in 
Table 29.
Under Law No. II6 of August, 1955j establishing the 
Extraordinary Development Budget, the Economic Development
^Mohammed Imadi, "Economic and Social Planning in 
Syria: Its Development and Achievements," L'Economie et les
Finances de la Syrie et des Pays Arabes (Damascus: Centre
D'Etudes et des Documentations, May, 1963O; P* 36.
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TABLE 29
NEW PUBLIC PROJECTS EMBODIED IN THE 
SEVEN-YEAR PLAN 
(L.S. MILLION)
_ , . Percent
Project Expenditure Total
I. Irrigation and Electric
Power 87.50 29.1
II. Transportations 98.00 32.5
New Road Construction 30.50
Road Repairs 32.00
Airports 27.50
Railroads 8.00
III. Defense 45.00 14.9
IV. Government Buildingss 26.60 8.8
Syrian University
Installations 11.60
Hospitals 7.00
Other Buildings 8.00
V. Surveys and Studies 22.00 7.3
VI. Others: 22.15 7.4
Bedouin Program 10.00
Tourist and Historical
Sites 4.50
Administrative Expenses 5.15 
Salt Factory 2.50
Grand Total 301.25 100.0
Source: UNRWA, op. cit., p. 25.
Institute was empowered to Implement the new projects In this 
category. Out of these funds, about L.S. 10 million were 
appropriated for the study of certain projects aimed at 
Increasing the national Income.
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These projects were:^
1. Construction of new railroad network connecting 
Latakia, Aleppo and Kamishli, and adjacent to the Euphrates 
and Khabour Rivers;
2. Yusef Pasha Dam, which would provide electric 
power and irrigation;
3. Grain storage facilities;
4. Construction of Tartous Harbor;
5. Utilization of natural gas;
6. Extraction of metals.
These projects were not expected to be implemented 
during the lifetime of the plan, but only prepared for such 
a time when financial resources would become available. The 
cost of these projects was estimated at over L.S. 343 million.
For the second category, that of the previously 
planned projects, a sum of L.S. 64.74 million was allocated, 
or about 9 «8 percent of the plan's total expenditures. These 
projects have been in the planning stage for a considerable 
period of time. The allocation of these funds on the various 
projects is shown in Table 30.
The third category of the plan included a total ex­
penditure of L.S. 216.94 million to be loaned to government 
agencies for the execution of approved projects within their 
domain. The distribution of these loans to the different 
agencies is shown in Table 31. These agencies were authorized
^Ibid.. pp. 36-37.
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TABLE 30
'expenditures on previously planned projects
APPROPRIATED IN THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN 
(L.S. MILLION)
Project Expenditure
Well Drilling 19.75
Roads and Other Construction 27.98
Completion of Irrigation Projects 2.60
Yarmouk Project 3.75
Jezireh Land Survey 2.54
Storage of Inflammable Materials 1.21
Construction of Embassies I.16
Grants-in-Aid to Municipalities 5.00
Construction of Public Schools 0.75
Total 64.74
Source: UNRWA, op. cit., p. 30.
to continue spending on their respective projects within the 
limits of their unused loans during the life of the plan.
The loans were to be repaid with interest in annual install­
ments from the future revenue of the agencies. The terms of 
these loans would be set by negotiation between the debtor 
agency and the Treasury. Such negotiations would be governed 
by the ability of each agency to repay out of future opera­
tional income. However, it was stipulated that the loans must 
be fully repaid within a period of fifteen years from the date 
of the actual granting of the loan.
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TABLE 31
LOANS AND ADVANCES TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
UNDER THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN 
(L.S. MILLION)
Agency Loan
The Ghab Administration 87.50
Aleppo Water Service - 2.30
Nationalization of Electricity Companies 16.00
Aleppo Electricity Installations 4.50
Homs-Hama Electricity Installations 4.00
Damascus International Pair 1.45
Hedjaz Railroad Deficit 4.8o
Re-operation of Hedjaz Railroad 13*33
Dial Telephones 3.06
Petroleum Refinery 80.00
Total 216.94
Source; UNRWA, op. cit., p. 30.
Under the fourth category of expenditure covered by 
the Seven-Year Plan, a total amount of L.S. 73 million was 
allocated for government investments in public and semi­
public institutions. The funds were to be invested in the 
various public institutions as follows:
1. L.S. 38 million as the government's capital 
holdings in the Latakia Harbor Company;^
UNRWA, op. cit., p. 31. Private capital amounting 
to L.S. 4 million is excluded.
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2. L.S. 20 million to be invested in the Agricul­
tural Bank;
3. L.S. 10 million for the proposed Industrial Bank;
4. L.S. 5 million for the establishment of Real 
Estate Bank.
The Latakia Harbor Company and the Agricultural Bank 
have already been established and in operation. The amounts 
allocated under the plan to these institutions were addi­
tional capital for improved services. According to the plan, 
both institutions were instructed to continue the execution 
of previous plans for expansion of their activities within 
the limits of their unused and additional capital. The In­
dustrial and Real Estate Banks were only in the planning 
stage. However, the Industrial Bsmk was later established 
in February, 1959.
Financing the Seven-Year Plan
The sources of financing the plan were divided into 
two categories. The first category consisted of revenues in­
tended to finance unrecoverable expenditures contributed 
exclusively by the government from the sources shown in Table 
32. Revenues from this category were estimated at L.S. 369.95 
million, or 56 percent of the aggregate amount to be spent on 
the program.
The second category of revenues covered those intended 
to finance recoverable expenditures to be made available from 
borrowing. The sources of loans in this category, as
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conceived at the time, totalled L.S. 285 million and consisted 
of L.S. 77 million from the International Bank, and L.S. 208 
million from the collection of previous loans, the sale of 
Treasury securities, the Issue Department and available 
Treasury funds.
TABLE 32
GOVERNMENT SOURCES OF FINANCING THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN
(L.S. MILLION)
Source Amount
Ordinary B u d g e t .................................. 90.00
Petroleum Revenues.........................   155*00
Reserve Funds .................................... 68.95
Palestine Stamp Revenues ..........................  17*00
Internal Loans .................................... 34.00
Other S o u r c e s .................................... 5*00
Total . . . .  .................. . . . . . . .  369*95
Source; UNRWA, op. cit., p. 33*
Foreign exchange was to come from petroleum transit 
royalties and loans granted by the International Bank.
Implementation of the Seven-Year Plan 
During the first two years of the plan, 1955-1956, 
total expenditure on all four categories amounted to L.S.
136.2 million. This represented 20.7 percent of the total 
contemplated expenditure.
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Tables 33 and 34 give a picture of the rate at which
TABLE 33
SUMMARY OF EXPENDITURE ON THE SEVEN-YEAR 
PLAN DURING 1955 AND 1956 
(L.S. MILLION)
Category
Total
Allo­
cation
Actual 
Expend­
itures In 
Two Years
Percent
Imple­
mented
1. New Public Projects 301.25 64.80 21.5
2. Previously Planned 
Projects 64.74 14.60 22.5
3. Loans and Advances to 
Agencies 216.95 26.80 12.3
4. Investment In Public 
Institutions 73.00 30.00 4l.l
Total 655.94 136.20 20.7
Source : UNRWA, op. cit., p. 34.
the plan has been Implemented, and the actual expenditure on 
the various projects.
If the total expenditure were to be divided propor­
tionally over the seven-year life of the plan, approximately 
28 percent of L.S. 655 million, or L.S. l83 million should 
have been spent during the two-year period under review. It 
would then be concluded that the rate at which the plan had 
been Implemented (20.7 percent) had fallen short of the pro­
portional rate (28 percent). But It Is erroneous to assume
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that the total expenditures should be divided proportionally 
over the seven-year period, because some of the more Important 
projects might not have been ready for execution at the time 
the plan was Initiated.
TABLE 34
ACTUAL EXPENDITURE ON PROJECTS OF THE SEVEN-YEAR 
PLAN DURING 1955 AND 1956 
(L.S. MILLION)
Project Expenditure
Irrigation...........................    4.51
R o a d s ............................................ 10.54
Al-Muwassat Hospital ............................ O.50
National Defense Program ........................ 50.62
Purchase of Damascus-Hama Railroad.............. 8.00
Department of Antiquities Program ..............  O.09
Survey and Settlement of Jezlreh' L a n d ..........  0.48
Embassy Buildings (Cairo, Washington) .......... 0.77
Well-Drilling Project .......................... 2.88
Ministry of Agriculture Pr o g r a m ................  0.I9
Ghab Project  .................................. 4.31
Aleppo Water Supply; .  ........................ 2.40
Damascus Electricity Nationalization ............  7.60
Aleppo Electricity Nationalization ..............  6.71
Aleppo Electricity Administration ..............  4.50
Homs-Hama Electricity Administration ............  O.76
Hedjaz Railway Deficit ..........................  0.53
Oil Refinery.................................... 0.02
Municipal Funds (Latakia) ......................  0.75
Latakia Harbor .................................. 10.00
Agricultural B a n k ................................ 20.00
Total.........   136.16
Source: Syrian Republic, Ministry of National
Economy, Syria 1957 (Damascus: Government Press, 1957),
pp. 98-99.
Revenues from the Extraordlnary Budget for financing 
the plan In 1955 and 1956 amounted to L.S. 150.4 million.
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These funds were derived from the following sources:^ L.S. 
86.4 million came from the settlement of a retroactive agree­
ment with Iraq Petroleum Company for the revision of royalty 
payments on oil transited through Syrian territory from 
April, 1952 up to the end of 1 9 5 5 L.S. 6.6 million accum­
ulated from the collection of previous loans; L.S. 19*7 
million came from the Issue Department; and L.S. 37.7 million 
from Treasury available fund.
It is importEint to note that the amount spent on de­
fense in the first two years of the plan totalled L.S. 50.6 
million, whereas the estimated expenditure on defense through­
out the life span of the plan did not exceed L.S. 45 million. 
The build-up of defense was caused by the Suez crisis of
1956, as a result of which, the government was forced to halt 
spending on the Seven-Year Plan, in an effort to reduce the 
overall budgetary deficit. Thus, only L.S. 25 million were 
spent during the first five months of 1956.^ In fact, while 
work on large projects already underway continued during
1957, no major projects were undertaken until late in 1958, 
when the new Ten-Year Plan was issued.
III. Planning in the Unification Era; 1958-1961
As mentioned above, the Suez crisis of 1956 brought
^Imadi, op. cit., p. 4l.
1955.
^This agreement was ratified by Law 128 of June 12,
3
Imadi, op. cit.
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to a standstill the execution of the Seven-Year Economic 
Development Plan.
Immediately following the Suez crisis, Syria started 
seeking foreign aid, and to that end it turned to the Soviet 
Union. The negotiations with the Soviet Union resulted in 
the ratification of the Syro-Soviet Economic and Technical 
Aid Agreement in October, 1957.
The Syro-Soviet Economic and Technical 
Aid Agreement 
The first article of the Agreement expressed the 
U.S.S.R.'s readiness to cooperate with the Syrian government 
in the construction of railroads, electric power generating 
stations, irrigation networks, the supply of water to pasture 
land for cattle feeding, the construction of bridges for motor 
roads, the construction of a fertilizer plant and an agricul­
tural laboratory for scientific research, and geological sur­
veys and prospection for mineral resources. The U.S.S.R. 
government undertook to cariy out, through Soviet agencies, 
the necessary studies, designs and prospection and to provide 
Syria with those materials, equipment and machines which were 
lacking for the execution of the works and the realization of 
the projects mentioned in the Agreement. The U.S.S.R. govern­
ment pledged to provide technical aid in the form of experts 
for the realization of these projects and to train Syrian ex­
perts in connection with the operation of those projects.
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If Syria so desired.^
It was stipulated by Article 4 of the Agreement that 
the Syrian government would be responsible for the implementa­
tion, administration and supply of local materials and 
manpower.
According to Article 5 of the Agreement, the Soviet 
Union would advance the necessary credits to the Syrian 
government to meet the costs arising out of the works, stud­
ies, investigations, that proportion of designs carried out 
by Soviet agencies, the cost of materials and equipment needed 
for the projects, travel expenses of Soviet experts, and also 
the expenses incurred in the training of Syrian experts in 
the Soviet Union.
The credit extended would be in roubles (one rouble
= 0.222168 grams of pure gold) bearing interest at 2.5 per-
2cent and could be drawn upon over a period of seven years.
According to Article 6, the Syrian government would 
have to repay that part of the credit expended annually in 
twelve equal installments, starting from the year following 
that in which that part of the credit was expended. Interest 
charges were to be borne as of the day on which the credit was 
expended, and would be paid during the first quarter of the 
year following the year in which the credit was actually used.
^Republic of Syria, "Law 454," Official Gazette, No.
54 (Damascus; Government Press, 1957), p. 6818.
^Ibid., p. 6819.
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Furthermore, according to Article 7 of the Agreement, 
the Syrian government was to repay the equivalent of the 
credit used and interest charges thereon, in the form of 
Syrian commodities or convertible currency, as might be agreed 
upon between the Central Bank of Syria and the Soviet govern­
ment bank. Agreement on the type, quantity euid prices of 
such goods, as well as on the duration of delivery, would be 
reached between the two parties, three months before each 
annual repayment would fall due. However, if repayment of 
loans and accrued interest charges was to be made in convert­
ible currency, the conversion rate would then be calculated 
on the basis of the exchange rate of the roubles and the 
particular currency involved at the time of repayment.
Finally, Article 9 of the Agreement outlined the 
responsibility of the Syrian government for the payment of
the expenses of Soviet experts incurred during their stay in
2
Syria in local currency.
This Agreement was put into action when Law 454, 
dated November 12, 1957, promulgated it and entrusted to the 
Economic Development Institute the execution of all projects 
mentioned in the Agreement, within the limits of the forth­
coming development budgets.
The total amount of the Soviet Aid specified in the 
Agreement was L.S. 535.5 million.^
llbid.
^Ibid.
Sibid.
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The Ten-Year Economic Development Plan
Shortly after the unity between Egypt and Syria was 
achieved In 1958, and In the light of the Syro-Soviet Economic 
and Technical Aid Agreement and the need for a long-run 
economic development plan capable of a balanced and rapid 
rate of growth, the Ten-Year Plan was drawn up.
This plan was embodied In Law 133 of September, 1958.^
The long-run objectives of the Ten-Year Plan were;^
1. The exploitation of all hitherto unemployed re­
sources through the development of Irrigation, electric
energy and transportation;
2. The establishment of capital and consumption 
Industries;
3. Raising national Income by about 60 percent over 
Its level at the end of 1957;
4. Raising per capita Income by about 25 percent over 
Its level at the end of 1957»
5. The gradual Increase In the rate of Investment, 
during the lifetime of the plan, from 13 percent to 17 per­
cent of the national Income.
The Immediate objectives of the Ten-Year Plan were:^
1. to free agriculture from Its dependence on rainfall;
^U.A.R., Syrian Region, Economic Development Insti­
tute, The Ten-Year Economic Development Plan, 1958-1967 
(Damascus: Government Press, 1958;, p. ItJ.
^Ibld., p. 131.
3lbld., pp. 149-151.
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2. to improve and modernize methods of cultivation;
3. to produce chemical fertilizers;
4. to reduce freight costs on agricultural products;
5. to establish a transport network between the
production centers and the major ports;
6. to construct an oil refinery and establish an 
industrial bank;
7. to draw up a graphic geological map for oil and 
mineral prospection.
In short, the Ten-Year Plan aimed at securing "a 
balanced growth for all the different sectors of the Syrian 
economy in the shortest possible period."^
The total amount expected to be spent on the projects 
included in this plan, plus the interest to be paid during 
the lifetime of the plan on external and internal loans, was 
estimated at L.S. 2139.9 million. In addition, about L.S.
46.1 million were set as reserve for paying interest on 
external loans after the period of the plan, and L.S. 508.4 
million for settling installments of foreign credits and re­
serve for repaying foreign loans. This brings the total ex­
penditures under this plan to L.S. 2694.4 million.
The allocation of expenditures on the various major 
projects is given in Table 35* The development of the agri­
cultural sector received top priority in the Ten-Year Plan. 
The emphasis on agricultural, irrigation and power projects
llbid., p. 151.
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Is clearly shown In Table 35. Expenditure on such projects 
amounted to L.S. 1,461.5 million, or 68.2 percent of the 
total planned expenditure. Transportation projects ranked 
second in importance and industrial projects were third. 
Total appropriations for administrative expenses amounted 
to L.S. 15 million, and those for technical and professional 
education to L.S. 10 million. Interest charges on internal 
loans were estimated at L.S. 15 million and on foreign loans 
at L.S. 83.4 million, with a total of L.S. 98.4 million.
TABLE 35
PROPOSED EXPENDITURE OP THE TEN-YEAR PLAN
1958-1967
(L.S. MILLION)
Project Expenditure
Percent 
of Total
Agricultural, Irrigation and 
Electric Power Projects 1,461.5 68.2
Transportation Projects 365.0 . 17.1
Industrial Projects 160.0 7.5
Tourism 30.0 1.4
Administrative Expenses 15.0 0.7
Technical and Professional Education 10.0 0.5
Interest on Loans 98.4 4.6
Total 2,139.9 100.0
Source: U.A.R., The Ten-Year Economic Development
Plan, 1958-1967, pp. 152-153:
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Sources of Financing the Ten-Year Plein
Article 11 of the Ten-Year Economic Development Bud­
get, pointed to four main sources of financing the plan:^
1. Foreign loans. The Soviet loan which amounted to 
L.S. 535-5 million, would be used to finance the plan In
accordance with the terms of the Syro-Soviet Economic and
Technical Aid Agreement.
2. Domestic loans. This source consisted of the 
funds secured by the Public Debt Bureau from:
a. recovering old debts;
b. private and public revenues;
c. Issuing bonds;
d. treasury funds;
e. advances from the Central Bank of Syria.
3- Anticipated revenues from the development proj­
ects. The estimate of these revenues was reached by special 
studies made In connection with each project.
4. Contribution of the General Budget. This con­
tribution was provided by virtue of the Law No. Il6 of 1955, 
which embodied the Seven-Year Plan. The Ten-Year Plan re­
tained this provision.
The foreign exchange needed for financing this plan 
came from the extension of the Soviet loan. Table 36 shows 
the estimated contribution of each source In financing the 
Ten-Year Plan.
^Ibld., pp. 332-3 44.
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TABLE 36
SOURCES OF FINANCING THE TEN-YEAR PLAN 
(L.S. MILLION)
Source Amount
Percent 
of Total
Foreign Loans 535.5 20.0
Domestic Loans 688.9 25.5
Revenues from Development Projects 1,320.0 49.0
Contribution from the General Budget 150.0 5.5
Total 2,694.4 100.0
Source; U.A.R., The Ten-Year Economic Development
Plan, 1958-1967. p. 332.
Comprehensive Planning and the Five-Year Economic 
and Social Development Plan 
In April, 1958, the idea of comprehensive planning 
was carried a further step forward with the establishment of 
the Ministry of National Planning, which was given all plan­
ning functions previously assigned to the Permanent Economic 
Council and the Economic Development Institute.
In February, 1959, both the Economic Development In­
stitute and the Permanent Economic Council were abolished.
The task of implementing development budgets was given to all 
the ministries concerned so that each ministry would imple­
ment the projects which came under its Jurisdiction.
However, a new development agency was formed in 1959*
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It was called "the Major Projects Administration," and was, 
placed under the supervision of the Minister of Public Works. 
The main tasks of the Administration were:^
1. The utilization and conservation of natural water 
resources, land reclamation and the reservation of water for 
Irrigation;
2. The construction of dams for Irrigation and 
power, the establishment of hydroelectric power plants, the 
drainage of swamps, and the erection of fish ponds;
3. The survey, research and studies of underground 
water In the arid and desert regions;
4. The construction of storage facilities for 
cereals, such as grain silos;
5. The construction of Tartous Harbor, one of the 
most modem planned harbors on the Mediterranean;
6. The construction of a new International airport 
In Damascus.
On the other hand, the newly established Ministry of 
National Planning was authorized to prepare a national com­
prehensive plan for economic and social development In Syria. 
Such a plan must encompass the public and private sectors, 
deal with the national economy as a single Indivisible unit, 
and comprise all Its sectors Including the economic projects 
and social aspects. The Ministry was further required to
^Abdel Basset Khatlb, Major Projects Administration 
In the Syrian Arab Republic (Damascus: Government Press,
1963), p. 1. -----------
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mobilize all available financial, natural and human resources, 
to determine the long-term goals of economic development 
which must be realized by annual stages, and to study the 
exploitation and effects of these investments, together with 
the needs and possibilities for the development of the na­
tional economy.
With the issuance of Law No. 232 of i960, the govern­
ment recognized the principle of organizing the national 
economy in accordance with studied plans, and the methods of 
drawing, executing and following up such plans.^ Conse­
quently, joint committees, consisting of experts representing 
both the public and private sectors were formed to study the 
most important development projects and to determine the most 
important financial and natural resources of the country.
In the light of these various studies, a general 
framewoiic was established for economic and social development 
covering the decade 1960/1961 - 1969/1970. The ultimate aim 
was to double the national income within this period.
It is important to note that these studies were based 
on, and constituted a revision and an extension of, the Ten- 
Year Plan 1958-1967, which was examined earlier in this 
chapter.
It was decided, however, that the Ten-Year Economic 
and Social Development Plan was to be executed in two
^S.A.R., Ministry of Planning, Annual Report on the 
Economic and Social Development Plan, 196o-19bl (Damaacus; 
Bureau Des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes, 1962), p. 3*
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separate stages.
The first stage was to be achieved under the First 
Five-Year Plan. By breaking down the implementation of the 
Ten-Year Plan into two stages for the purpose of efficient 
execution and follow-up, a new plan was announced— the Five- 
Year Economic and Social Development Plan, I96O/196I - 
1964/1965. The examination and study of this plan is the 
subject of Chapter IV.
Conclusion
It may be concluded from the above presentation that 
the Syrian authorities showed interest in meeting the chal­
lenge of economic development. In spite of the predominance 
of private initiative and the apparent inadequacy of social 
overhead facilities, the government was not completely indif­
ferent to the problems confronting the economic growth of 
the country.
Although the first part of the decade, 1950-1955, 
was concentrated on studies and investigations, the second 
half was full of preparations and formation of plans, which 
were based on earlier studies and recommendations.
The Seven-Year Econoinic Development Plan of 1955-1961, 
which was the first plan adopted in Syria,, was discontinued 
in the latter part of 1956 because of the Suez crisis and 
the ensuing political events. But there is no doubt that 
the studies made in the early part of the decade, 1950-1955, 
were useful and constituted a basis for the formulation of
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plans in the latter part of the decade, 1955-1960. Also 
experience has undoubtedly been gained from these attempts.
Nevertheless, the shift before completion from one 
plan to another makes It difficult to evaluate the effective 
contribution of the Seven-Year Plan to the stabilization and 
development of the economy. Yet, one can detect a trend of 
continuity, as the shift occurred from the Seven-Year ?lan 
to the Ten-Year Plan. The common factor to both plans Is 
perhaps exhibited In the similarity of objectives. The 
attack on the agricultural problems with the Intention of 
stabilizing the economy In order to achieve sustained growth, 
raise the national Income and Improve the standard of living 
Is evident and cannot be Ignored.
The Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan 
of 1960/1961 - 1964/1965 has been chosen to be the subject 
of detailed study for the following reasons:
1. The Seven-Year Plan, which was the only other 
plan adopted, was discontinued;
2. The Five-Year Plan Is a part of the long-range 
Ten-Year Development Plan;
3 . The Five-Year Plan symbolizes the comprehensive 
economic and social planning In Syria;
4. The Five-Year Plan Is the plan that Is presently 
under Implementation.
CHAPTER IV
THE FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Prom the successive attempts made at planning In the 
decade of 1950-1960, it was evident that economic and social 
planning had become an integral and essential part of the 
economic policy of the Syrian government.
Since 1958, however, the concept and goals of planning 
have been broadened to cover not only the development of 
economic resources as such, but also the reorganization of 
the social structure. With the issuance of the Ten-Year Plan, 
a war was waged on ignorance, disease and poverty. It was 
made clear by the government that raising the national income 
and improving the standard of living were no longer considered 
as an end by themselves, but rather as a means toward the 
ultimate aim of establishing "a democratic, cooperative, 
socialist s o c i e t y . A s  a result, the creation of equal 
opportunity for every citizen and the equal distribution of 
income and wealth were to be effected.
With these considerations in mind, the Five-Year
^IJ.A.R., Syrian Region, Ministry of Planning, The 
Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plyi, 196o/l^5T - 
1964/1955 (Damascus ; Government Press, 1950), p. 8. (Here­
after referred to as the Five-Year Plan).
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Economic and Social Development Plan of 1960/1961 - 1964/1965 
was drawn up.
Objectives of the Plan
The principal objectives of the plan were:^
1. The exploitation of the mineral, petroleum, and
electric resources of the country;
2. The diversification of Industrial production In
such a way as to meet the needs of local consumption and
ensure a surplus for exportation;
3. The expansion of agriculture and Increase of Its 
productivity In order to liberate labor on the farm for em­
ployment In Industry and elsewhere, and also to redress the
balance of payments;
4. The utilization and conservation of natural water
resources, land reclamation and the construction of dams for
Irrigation and power, with the aim of Increasing and stabi­
lizing agricultural production;
5. The Improvement of the transport and communica­
tions system. In order to keep pace with the present and 
future growth of the economy;
6. The Investment of resources In housing projects 
In proportion to the growth In population. Income, cities 
and Industrialization.
7. For the realization of maximum social welfare and
^Ibld., pp. 15-1 8.
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the improvement of human values, funds were allotted to raise 
the standard of education, health care, technical and pro­
fessional training, and all other fields that would develop 
human efficiency and ensure comfort;
8. The increase of national income by 40 percent 
over the five-year period;
9. The increase of per capita income by 24.5 percent 
over the life span of the plan.
However, in setting the national income target, the 
following principles were taken into consideration:^
1. Development should take place without inflationary 
or deflationary effects which would harm the national economy, 
ruin the chances of the success of the plan, and the benefits 
to be reaped therefrom;
2. The plan should work for a balanced development 
in which economic crises were minimized. By so doing, the 
Syrian economy could be safeguarded against its notoriously 
wide fluctuations in production and income, resulting from 
unfavorable natural conditions and fluctuations of inter­
national prices;
3. The necessary endeavor to distribute the benefits 
of development among the citizens, each according to his 
participation in production, to distribute income in a proper 
manner, and to apply social Justice to all citizens. In 
other words, the plan should work for achieving the policy of
^Ibid., p. 9 .
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the government in realizing the socialist, democratic, 
cooperative society;
4. The plan must be executed in an atmosphere of 
confidence among all citizens and the various classes, in 
order to enable savers and investors alike to expand their 
activities and participate effectively in the required 
investments;
5. The public and private sectors must cooperate 
harmoniously in the development operations.
The Investment Program of the Plan
The total expenditure estimated to realize the na­
tional income target of the Five-Year Plan amounted to L.S. 
2,720 million. The allocation of these funds over the dif­
ferent economic sectors is shown in Table 37.
It will be seen that the share of the public sector 
accounted for about 63 percent of the planned expenditure.
The private sector was expected to participate to the extent 
of 37 percent of the total contemplated investment.
It is clear from this investment program that the 
emphasis was laid on the stabilization of agricultural pro­
duction, the improvement of agricultural productivity, and 
the furnishing of overhead facilities. Priority was given 
to the productive projects which would contribute directly 
to the increase in national income. The aggregate expenditure 
on such projects as irrigation, agriculture, industry and 
transportation accounted for 78.8 percent of the total planned
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TABLE 37
INVESTMENT PROGRAM OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN, I96O-I965
(L.S. MILLION)
Economic Sectors
Public
Sector
Private _ .  ^
Sector Total
Percent 
of Total
Irrigation and Land 
Reclamation 780 50 830 30.5
Agriculture 95 175 270 9.9
Transport and 
Communications 387 150 537 19.7
Industry, Electricity, 
Mining and Petroleum 240 269 509 18.7
Housing 15 245 260 9.5
Education 100 - 100 3.7
Health 46 10 56 2.1
Public Utilities and 
Tourism 32 - 32 1.2
Social Affairs 18 - 18 0.7
Recreation - 11 11 0.4
Laboratories, Training, 
Research 7 - 7 0.3
Change in Inventory - 90 90 3.3
Total 1,720 1,000 2,720 100.0
Source: U.A.R., Syrian Region, Ministry of 
The Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan,
Planning,
1960/1961
(Hereafter referred to as the Five-Year Plan*
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investment. The investment in services and social projects 
was considered as an aim, and that in productive projects, as 
a means toward realizing that aim.
It is worth noting that the private sector was given 
a relatively large share in this development plan. The con­
tribution of the private sector was expected to be mostly in
the fields where it could achieve great benefits and maximum 
returns such as industry, housing and agriculture.
Sources of Financing the Plan
Financial sources for this plan were drawn from both
the public and private sectors. Resources concerning the 
public sector were estimated at L.S. 1,720 million as shown 
in Table 38.
The source from the ordinaiy budget constituted the 
excess of government revenues over its expenses. The estimate 
of this surplus was based on the present structure of the 
taxing system, and the expected growth of revenues resulting 
from the benefits to be gained through the implementation of 
the plan. However, the imposition of additional taxes and 
the improvement of the method of collection were expected to 
bring more revenues from this source.
The surplus from the Public Debt Fund which was esti­
mated at L.S. 98 million, consisted of L.S. 53 million from 
recovering old debts; L.S. 28 million from the profits of the 
Central Bank, the share of the government from the profits 
of Latakia Harbor, and interest on loans; and L.S. 17 million
Ill
from domestic borrowing,
TABLE 38
ESTIMATED SOURCES OP FINANCING THE FIVE-YEAR 
PLAN, 1960-1965 
(L.S. MILLION)
Source Revenue
Percent 
of Total
A. Sources Available for the Public 
Sector: -
Surplus from the Ordinary Budget 420 15.4
Available Funds from Municipalities 110 4.1
Surplus from Public Debt Fund 98 3.6
Revenue Surplus from State Property 26 1.0
Surplus from Government Authorities 131 4.8
Surplus from Social Insurance 
Authority 145 5.3
Surplus from Exploitation of 
Petroleum and Minerals 100 3.7
Miscellaneous Sources 50 1.8
Foreign Loans, Aids, Grants 640 23.5
Total Government Sources 1,720 63.2
B. Funds of Private Sector for 
Investment 1,000 36.8
Grand Total 2,720 100.0
Source: U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 28.
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It will be seen that foreign loans, aids and grants, 
as an Item by Itself, constituted about 23-5 percent of the 
total estimated sources.
However, the estimation of the sources of foreign ex­
change was subject to many obstacles, the most noticeable of 
which were :^
1. The unpredictability of the agricultural crop 
which was Influenced by climatic conditions and which. In 
turn, constituted a major source of foreign exchange;
2. The paucity of statistical data on many Items 
which earned foreign currency, such as the expenditures of 
foreign tourists at home and Syrian tourists abroad, remit­
tances of emigrants, and revenues from the transit trade;
3. The fluctuation of revenues from Invisible ex­
ports such as transit trade and tourism.
For these reasons any estimate of foreign exchange 
sources was approximate and must be revised periodically In 
view of the prevailing economic conditions and the avail­
ability of new statistical data.
At the time the plan was prepared, the revenues In 
foreign exchange were estimated at L.S, 4,625 million, 
throughout the five-year period. The estimated sources of 
these revenues are Itemized In Table 39-
The calculation of the estimated revenues from ex­
ports was based on the average annual export figures of
^Ibld., p. 3 2.
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TABLE 39
ESTIMATED SOURCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
DURING 1960-1965 
(L.S. MILLION)
Source Revenue
A. Visible and Invisible Sources:
Exports 2,825
Royalties and Expenses of Oil Companies 800
Remittances from Syrians Abroad 150
Net Profits from Transit Trade 100
Profits of the Exchange Control Office 25
Net Government Expenses 25
Aids to Palestinian Refugees 35
Net Tourism 25
B. Foreign Aids and Loans 640
Total 4,625
Source: U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 33.
1955-1959, together with the expected Increase In the produc­
tion of export commodities resulting from the completion of 
Irrigation and agricultural projects conceived In the plan. 
The total value of exports during the five-year period, 1955- 
1959 amounted to L.S. 2,3l4 million with an average annual 
amount of L.S. 463 million.^ It Is, however, acknowledged 
that the anticipated growth In the value of exports will not
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1962, Table 1, p. 256,
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take place before the third year of the plan, when most of
the projects are expected to start yielding the anticipated
benefits and before attempts are made at opening new markets
for Syrian commodities and negotiating trade and payments
agreements. In the light of these considerations, foreign
exchange revenues from exports were estimated at L.S. 2,825
million throughout the five-year period.
The uses to which earnings in foreign exchange were
1
scheduled to be put were classified as follows:
1. Private use for imports, L.S. 1,800 million;
2. The import of raw materials for current production 
in agriculture, industry, and other sectors, L.S. 100 million;
3. The import of machinery and equipment for capital 
formation, L.S. 1,225 million;
4. The repayment of foreign loans and interest 
accrued thereon, L.S. 350 million;
5. The building of a reserves fund to meet the bal­
ance of payments deficits, L.S. 250 million.
However, it was estimated that L.S. 1,225 million,
or about 45 percent of the total planned expenditure, would
2
be needed in foreign exchange.
Functional Classification of Expenditures
Agriculture
It is needless to repeat the emphasis placed on the 
^U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 39.
^Ibid., p. 40.
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development of the agricultural sector in this plan. The 
most important factors behind the significance given to agri­
cultural projects were:^
1. Preventing the violent fluctuations in agriculture 
and assuring maximum stability of production through the ex­
pansion of irrigation networks;
2. Agricultural production provided a'basis for 
development in industry and commerce, and contributed to the 
increase of purchasing power;
3. Overemployment on the land would be relieved 
through intensive farming, liberating excess labor which 
could be employed in the industrial and other sectors of the 
economy;
4. Agricultural expansion would lead to the redress 
of the balance of payments.
However, two methods were combined to achieve agri­
cultural development. Vertical (intensive) farming and hori­
zontal (extensive) expansion.
Vertical expansion, through intensive farmiiig, aimed 
at raising agricultural productivity (yield per hectare), to 
be attained by agricultural projects.
Horizontal expansion through extensive ifarming aimed 
at bringing more land under irrigation and increasing the 
area under cultivation. This was expected to be achieved 
through irrigation and land reclamation projects.
^Ibid., p. 15.
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For the attainment of Intensive farming the investment 
program was based on the following strategical considerations:^
1. Efforts were to be concentrated on the development 
of certain products of special economic significance both 
from the point of view of providing food materials such as 
wheat and barley, and supplying foreign exchange through such 
cash crops as cotton and sugar beet;
2. Priority was given to projects which would yield 
quick results;
3. The new land which would become available as a 
result of the irrigation projects was to be cultivated 
according to the agricultural plan;
4. Special attention was directed to the study of 
the needs of fertilizers in the rain-fed lands, particularly 
since a large percentage of the agricultural production came 
from the cultivation of such lands.
In view of the above considerations, government ex­
penditure on agricultural projects was estimated at L.S. 95 
million. The allocation of this expenditure on the various 
projects is shown in Table 40.
Additional efforts were concentrated on generalizing 
the use of more fertilizers in agriculture. Syria's annual 
consumption of chemical fertilizers was estimated at about
35,000 tons, or about 7*5 kilograms per hectare.^ This is
Ifbid., p. 45.
^Ibid., p. 47.
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TABLE 40
CLASSIFIED EXPENDITURES ON AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS
UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project
Augmentation of Wheat and Barley Seeds
Augmentation of Cotton Seeds
Agricultural Guidance
Protection of Crops
Animal Breeding
Planting of Fruit Trees
Afforestation
Laboratories and Research
Agricultural Education and Training
Construction of Silos and Seed Selection Centers
Total
Investment
1,415
1,101
1,840
3,581
18,316
2,816
7,458
6,448
6,326
45,699
95,000
Source: U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 46.
well below the average used In agriculturally developed 
countries. The reason for the limited use of fertilizers was 
the reliance on rain water, particularly with regard to wheat 
crops. The Syrian farmer ^ sed to plant half of the land In 
one year, leaving the other half fallow. The continual use 
of this method would cause the land to lose a lot of Its 
fertility and would reduce Its productivity.
The plan aimed at abolishing this method and required 
that no part of the land must be left fallow. Thus, the
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government intended to raise the consumption of fertilizers 
to about 300,000 tons a year, at a total cost of about L.S.
60 million.^
Irrigation and land reclamation projects were planned 
to achieve horizontal (extensive) expansion in agriculture.
The total government expenditure earmarked for this purpose 
amounted to L.S. 78O million. The distribution of this ex­
penditure on the various projects and its annual allotment is 
shown in Table 4l. In selecting the irrigation projects, the 
government gave priority to the completion of projects already 
under execution, and to the projects which would increase 
production in the shortest possible time.
Furthermore, the plan laid specific emphasis on re­
organizing and improving the methods of cultivation with a 
view to increasing and stabilizing production.
The cultivated area was estimated at 5.5 million 
hectares planted to the various crops as follows:^ 1.45 
million hectares to wheat; 0.8 million hectares to barley;
0.25 million hectares to cotton; 0.23 million hectares to 
fruits; 70,000 hectares to vegetables; and 2.0 million 
hectares were left fallow each year.
It will be seen that about 40.9 percent of the total 
cultivated area was planted to wheat and barley. Both crops 
relied heavily on rain water and their production varied with
llbid., p. 48.
2lbid., p. 5 3.
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TABLE 4l
ESTIMATED ANNUAL EXPENDITURES ON IRRIGATION PROJECTS
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(L.S. MILLION)
Project
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Total
Rouj 5.0 2.5 - -■ - 7.5
Ghab - Ashameh 44.0 44.0 35.0 - - 123.0
Barada 1.2 0.8 8.0 13.0 12.0 35.0
Upper Orontes 0.5 6.5 21.5 18.5 — 47.0
Sinn 5.5 10.5 - - - 16.0
Khabour 3.0 25.0 22.0 20.0 20.0 90.0
Yarmouk 7.0 1.0 - - - 8.0
Euphrates 9.0 4.0 86.0 100.0 105.0 304.0
Banlas 0.3 7.2 - - - 7.5
Land Reclama­
tion 2.0 38.5 25.9 43.1 30.5 l40.0
Various
Projects - - 1.0 0.5 0.5 2.0
Total 77.5 140.0 199.4 195.1 168.0 780.0
Source ; U.A.R. , The Five-Year Plan, p. 52.
the scarcity or abundance of rainfall. For example, the 1955 
production stood In sharp contrast to that of 1957. In the 
drought season of 1955, wheat production was 438,000 tons and
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barley production was 137,000 tons. But the 1957 production 
of wheat reached 1,354,000 tons, almost triple that of 1955, 
and the barley production was 721,000 tons, over five times 
that of 1955.1
Agriculturally, Syria may be divided into six zones.
1. Arid Zone; with an average annual rainfall of 
less than ten inches, and a total area of 12,481,000 hectares.
This area constitutes largely the Syrian Desert and 
is mainly a pasture leind in the spring of each year. Cultiva­
tion, however, is possible only where water is available.
With irrigation, cotton, sugar beet and wheat can be produced. 
Nevertheless, some adventurer farmers and bedouin tribes had 
practiced dry farming which failed to give any significant 
yield.
2. Semi-Arid Zone - A; with the average annual rain­
fall ranging between ten and fourteen inches, and an estimated 
area of 2,417,000 hectares. In some years, the dry farming
in this area is successful where barley is the principal crop. 
Most of the land in this zone is cultivated with two years 
rotation, half crops and half fallow.
3. Semi-Arid Zone - B; with average annual rainfall 
ranging between fourteen and twenty inches, and an estimated 
area of 1,032,000 hectares. The dry farming in this zone is 
usually successful especially for wheat. The cultivation
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1962, Table 3, p. 352. 
^U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 54.
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method follows a three-year rotation between cereals, pulses 
and fallow.
Both of the above zones, however, are subject to 
frost which limits the plantation of fruit trees, except in 
sheltered areas where apricot is highly successful.
4. Semi-Humid Zone; with average annual rainfall 
ranging from 20 to 32 inches, and an estimated area of
1,693,000 hectares.
This is the main productive region in Syria with the 
highest yield. Non-irrigated crops, such as wheat, barley, 
cotton, sugar beet, millet and sesame, are successfully pro­
duced. Irrigated crops, such as potatoes (in coastal areas), 
vegetables and cotton are also cultivated. The main fruit 
trees planted in this zone are olive, citrus (in coastal 
areas), cherry (in slightly higher altitudes), pistachio, 
vine and fig.
5 . Humid Zone; with average annual rainfall exceed­
ing 32 inches, and an estimated area of 230,000 hectares.
Forestry is predominant in this region except in 
valleys where tobacco is the principal product together with 
non-irrigated potatoes, maize, vegetables and other field 
crops. Fig trees are also found and recently, the planting
of cherries and apples was started.
6. Irrigated Zone: with an area of about 595,000
hectares.
Although the arid zone is suitable only for pasture.
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the cultivation of wheat and barley has spread to this area 
in the past, as a result of the profits made by some farmers 
in good rainy seasons. But huge financial losses were in­
curred by farmers in subsequent dry seasons.
Thus, the government through this plan, has forbidden 
the cultivation of wheat in the Arid and Semi-Arid - A Zones, 
and the cultivation of barley in the Arid Zone because of 
scanty rainfall, limiting the Arid Zone to natural pasture.
The cultivation of barley was limited to the Semi-Arid Zone - 
A. The cultivation of wheat was to replace that of barley in 
the Semi-Arid Zone - B, Semi-Humid Zone, Humid Zone, and 
Irrigated Zone.
Although this rearrangement would lead to a reduction 
in the wheat area by about 428,000 hectares, the resulting 
increase in yield and stability of production were expected 
to offset the reduction in the cultivated area. Also, through 
better seed selection, crop protection, improved methods of 
cultivation, more fertilization, and irrigation projects, the 
area planted to wheat was expected to reach about 1,110,000 
hectares and wheat production about 1,400,000 tons, by the 
fifth year of the plan.^
Special attention was directed toward the regulation 
and control of the cotton crop which was considered the most 
significant cash crop from the economic and foreign exchange 
points of view. The area under cotton production was
llbid., p. 55.
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estimated at 250,000 hectares, about 25 percent of which was 
in dry farming. The government program aimed at gradually 
eliminating the dry farming of cotton, and raising its produc­
tion from 270,000 tons to about 444,000 tons.^
The cultivation of sugar beet was also given special
prominence in the plan because of its economic significance
in reducing the import of sugar and satisfying the home
market. The area under beet cultivation was 5,000 hectares
in 1959, and production was 91,600 tons.^ Processing yielded
an amount of 12,400 tons of refined sugar. This, however,
did not meet the needs of the home market and the government
was importing about 55,000 tons of raw sugar every year,
which were processed in the Damascus and Homs sugar refining
plants. The combined productive capacity of these plants
reached 1,500 tons of beet a day.^ Since sugar constituted
an essential food material, the government aimed at raising
beet production to about 563,000 tons, and refined sugar to
4
about 70,400 tons a year by the end of the plan.
Other measures covered by the agricultural plan in­
cluded, expanding the forest and animal wealth of the country 
and raising the standard of agricultural education.
^Ibid., p. 69.
^S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1962, Table 6, p. 363.
^U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 80.
^Ibid., p. 8 2.
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Industry
Industrial projects ranked third in importance after 
agriculture and transportation. The investment allotted to 
this sector amounted to L.S. 509 million, or about 18.7 per­
cent of the total contemplated expenditure. Forty-seven 
percent of this amount was to be invested by the public sector 
and 53 percent to be undertaken by the private sector. This 
distribution was based on the nature of the projects. For 
instance, the public sector confined its activities to mining, 
exploration in oil and electricity, because of the huge 
amounts involved, while the private sector was to concentrate 
on processing industries and other projects which needed a 
relatively small capital to construct.
The distribution of this expenditure on the various 
categories of industries is shown in Table 42. It will be 
seen that great emphasis was laid on the development of the 
oil industry which accounted for 41.5 percent of the planned 
expenditure in industry. The chemical industry which concen­
trated on the production of fertilizers, accounted for 25.7 
percent, and the share of electricity was 12.4 percent. 
Together, these projects accounted for 79.6 percent of the 
plan's industrial investments.
The allocation of funds on the industrial projects 
was based on the following considerations:^
1. Exploiting the mineral, petroleum, and power
^Ibid., p. 132.
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TABLE 42
PLANNED INVESTMENTS IN INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS
UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(L.S. MILLION)
Industry Amount Percent of Total
Electricity 63 12.4
Mining 30 5.9
Petroleum 211 41.5
Chemical 131 25.7
Mechanical 31 6.1
Food 38 7.5
Other Various Industries 5 0.9
Total 509 100.0
Source: U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 131.
resources of the country and making their use available at 
reasonable prices;
2. Supplying the needs of Industrial products whether 
for Immediate consumption such as food material, or for use
In agriculture such as fertilizers, or for use In construction 
such as cement, and providing a surplus for exportation;
3. Consolidating and supporting first the already 
established Industries, through vertical and horizontal expan­
sion as the case may require In each Industry, and then con­
sidering the establishment of new Industries;
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4. Providing the necessary technical knowhow, through 
the establishment of Institutes for professional training;
5. Priority was given to projects which would con­
tribute most to national Income In the shortest period.
Transport and Communications
Projects for the development of the transport and 
communications system were arranged In accordance with the 
practical needs of the growing economy. They were planned 
to be Implemented side by side with the Irrigation projects, 
agricultural expansion and Industrial development.
The total amount appropriated for this sector was 
L.S. 537 million, or 19*7 percent of the total planned Invest­
ment. The share of the public sector which was Intended to 
furnish the required social overhead facilities amounted to 
L.S. 387 million, allocated among the various projects as 
shown In Table 43. The share of the private sector was to be 
Invested In the means of communications such as cars, trucks, 
civil aeroplanes and the like.
The distribution of funds on the various transporta­
tion projects took the following points Into consideration:^
1. Priority was given to the construction of roads 
and railroads which would fit In with the Irrigation and 
agricultural projects;
2. Linking the sea ports with the production centers;
Sbld., pp. 155-156.
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TABLE 43
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS OF
THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(L.S. MILLION)
Project Investment
Percent 
of Total
Roads 60 15.5
Bridges 14 3.6
Telecommunications 55 14.2
Post 4 1.0
Broadcasting and Television 8 2.1
Tartous Harbor 33 8.5
Airports 40 10.4
Railroads 173 44.7
Total Projects of Public Sector 387 100.0
Projects of Private Sector 150
Grand Total 537
Source; U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 155
3. Implementing the projects which would yield quick
results;
4. Making use of the strategic location of the 
country in international transportation and commerce;
5. Achieving economic complementarity in the sector 
of transport and communications.
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It was hoped that the accomplishment of these projects 
would furnish the overhead facilities and would lead to a re­
duction in the cost of transportation with the ultimate aim 
of expanding the home market.
Education
Expenditure on the educational program amounted to 
L.S. 100 million and was classified as follows:^ L.S. 36.2 
million for expanding the various stages of education, in 
order to accommodate the ever increasing number of students; 
L.S. 35 million for the construction of new schools; L.S. 8.8 
million for the establishment of highly professional and 
technical institutes such as the Agriculture Academy of 
Damascus, the Commerce Academy of Aleppo, the Fine Arts 
Academy of Damascus, and the Industrial Academies of Damascus 
and Aleppo; L.S. 20 million for the expansion of the Damascus 
and Aleppo Universities, and for scholarships.
The education plan was concerned with modernizing and 
expanding the facilities and equipment required to educate 
the largest segment of the population. The program was 
further concerned with training a greater number of teachers 
to meet the shortage created in this field as a result of the 
increasing number of students.
Public Services
The Five-Year Plan did not stop at the investment in
^Ibid., p. 173.
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productive projects. Social welfare was considered necessary 
to enhance economic development. Thus, social objectives were 
an integral part of the plan.
The amount allotted to the improvement of social 
services totalled L.S. 377 million accounting for about 12.4 
percent of the total investment program. This expenditure 
was allocated among the various services according to their 
needs as follows: L.S. 260 million on the housing program;
L.S. 56 million on public health; L.S. 32 million on public 
utilities and tourism; L.S. 18 million on social affairs; and 
L.S. 11 million on various other services.
Table 44 shows the annual allocation of the invest­
ment program on the various projects assigned to the public 
sector.
Expected Effects on Production, Employment and Income 
While in the process of preparing the investment 
program of the Five-Year Plan, the government undertook de­
tailed studies of the various aspects of the economy and 
reached some tentative conclusions regarding the expected 
yields of the investment program. The main concern of the 
government was to estimate the effect of the plan on produc­
tion, employment and income. In a way, these estimates were 
considered as tentatively predetermined goals of the plan, 
and through the implementation of the plan, the government 
was striving to achieve these goals.
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TABLE 44
ANNUAL ALLOCATION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(L.S. MILLION)
Project
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Total
Agriculture 99.4 159.1 218.8 208.4 175.2 860.9
Electricity- 13.1 17.1 12.1 12.2 8.8 63.3
Mining 7.7 6.8 7.1 4.9 3.5 30.0
Petroleum 16.4 54.7 71.4 38.0 30.5 211.0
Fertilizers 1.1 21.8 21.8 20.9 24.9 90.5
Roads 8.0 13.5 13.0 13.0 12.5 60.0
Bridges 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 14.0
Railroads 30.0 35.0 37.0 38.0 33.0 173.0
Airports 4.0 16.7 8.3 10.3 0.7 40.0
Tartous Harbor 6.8 6.1 6.2 7.3 6.9 33.3
Communications^ 15.4 23.8 13.6 7.5 6.5 66.8
Education 19.1 20.0 20.0 19.9 21.0 100.0
Total 223.0 377.6 432.3 383.4 326.5 1742.8
Source : U.A.R., The Five(-Year Plan, p. 15.
^Including such projects as irrigation, land reclama­
tion, well drilling, and silos.
casting.
^Including telegraph, post, television and broad-
Production Goals 
The estimated increase in production of the major 
agricultural and industrial products resulting from the 
development program is shown in Table 45.
The gains in the agricultural crops were expected to 
result from the anticipated increase in irrigated land. The
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TABLE 45
PRODUCTION GOALS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
(THOUSAND TONS)
Sector
Base
Year 1965
Percent
Increase
Agriculture :
Wheat 875 1,480 69
Barley 435 526 21
Cotton 270 444 64
Sugar Beet 91 563 519
Tobacco 7 17 143
Industry:
Cement 450 700 55
Fertilizers - 170 —
Textiles® 26 35 35
Refined Sugar 61 79 30
Soap 17 24 4l
Vegetable Oil 40 51 28
Olive Oil 2 3 50
Glass 23 29 26
Raw Petroleum — 2,000
Source; U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, pp. 23-24. 
’^Including cotton, wool and silk products.
irrigation projects were expected to bring about 254,000 
hectares under irrigation by the end of 1965.^  However, the 
area which would have direct effect on income during the life 
time of the plan was estimated at 195,000 hectares. This 
area was expected to come under irrigation by the end of 1964. 
The additional area of 59,000 hectares which would be reclaimed 
by the end of 1965 would not yield any benefit, as far as
Ibid., p. 5 0 .
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Income is concerned, before the middle of 1966.
The installed capacity of electric power was expected 
to increase from 124,000 kilowatt to about 269,000 kilowatt, 
and that of generated electricity from 300 million kilowatt 
hours to 700 million kilowatt hourp, registering an increase 
of 117 percent and 133 percent respectively.^
Employment Goals 
The population was estimated at about 4.55 million 
and the labor force at about 1.53 million in the base year.
By the fifth year of the plan, the population was estimated 
to reach about 5.12 million and the labor force about 1.72 
million, as shown in Table 46. This estimate was based on
TABLE 46
EMPLOYMENT GOALS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
(THOUSAND)
Population and Employment i960 1965 Increase
Population 4,550 5,120 570
Labor Force
In Agriculture 820 895 75
In Industry and Construction 110 185 75
In Services 600 640 40
Total Labor Force 1,530 1,720 190
Source; U.A.R., The Five--Year Plan, p. 25.
llbid., p. 2 3.
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an assumed 2.4 percent average annual rate of growth In 
population.^
It Is important to note, however, that not all those 
included in the labor force were permanently employed. Em­
ployment in agriculture is, by nature, seasonal and uncertain 
depending on whether the harvest in one year is good or bad.
The estimated increase in the labor force shown in 
Table 46 to be 190,000 by the end of 1965 would result from 
the natural growth of population throughout the five-year 
period of the plan. But the development program was expected 
to create new job opportunities and raise the employment 
figure above the natural rate. For instance, the planned in­
tensive and extensive expansion of agriculture would require 
not less than 175,000 workers, out of which 100,000 would be 
drawn from those who were partially or fully unemployed at 
the time, and the rest would come from the natural annual 
increase.
Also, the industrial projects were expected to employ 
not less than 40,000 workers in addition to the natural rate 
of growth which was estimated at 40,000.
The additional measures taken to assure full employ­
ment included the diversification of production in the various 
sectors of the economy, the geographic distribution of con­
struction works in agriculture and industry, the facilities 
for the movement of labor through road construction, the
^Ibid., p. 2 6.
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building of housing units, schools, centers for agricultural 
and industrial training, clinics, hospitals, and. other provi­
sions for social services, all of which were intended to 
create new job opportunities and provide a favorable and 
congenial climate for raising labor productivity.
Income Goals
The investment program of the development plan aimed 
at raising national income by about L.S. 96O million in 
1964/1965. National income was estimated to grow from L.S. 
2,400 million in the base year to about L.S. 3,360 million in 
the fifth year. In other words, the plan was expected to 
achieve about 40 percent growth in the level of national in­
come throughout the five-year period. The projected contribu­
tion of each sector to the growth in income is shown in 
Table 47.
Furthermore, the effect of the investment program on 
the level of consumption and saving was also estimated under 
the plan. As shown in Table 48, the level of private con­
sumption was expected to rise by about 34.5 percent.
However, the total amount of public and private sav­
ings required for the investment program was estimated at 
L.S. 1,950 million. In order to assure the volume of invest­
ment contemplated by the plan, an additional amount of L.S.
770 million was expected to be raised in foreign aid and 
loans and other meeins. Thus, savings were expected to grow 
gradually at a rate ranging from 11.5 percent to l4 percent
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TABLE 47
ESTIMATED GROWTH OP NATIONAL INCOME UNDER
THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(L.S. MILLION)
Sector
i960 1965 IncomeIncrease
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Agriculture 965 40.2 1,275 38.0 310 32
Industry 275 11.4 425 12.7 150 55
Construction 101 4.2 210 6.2 109 108
Rent l4l 5.9 177 5.3 36 26
Finance 45 1.9 63 1.9 18 40
Government 179 7.5 242 7.2 63 35
Transportation 144 6.0 209 6.2 65 45
Commerce 386 16.1 532 15.8 146 38
Services l64 6.8 227 6.7 63 39
Total 2,400 100.0 3,360 100.0 960 40
Source: U.A.R., The Five-Year Plan, p. 21.
throughout the five-year period.
Moreover, per capita income was estimated to grow by 
about 24.5 percent during the life span of the plan. Per 
capita consumption was also expected to increase by about 19*5 
percent during the five-year period, as indicated in Table 48.
136
TABLE 48
PROJECTED GROWTH OP POPULATION, INCOME, SAVINGS 
AND CONSUMPTION UNDER THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
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i9 6 0 4 ,5 5 0 2,400 400 1 ,7 2 5 275 527 379
1961 4 ,6 6 0 2 ,5 6 6 420 1 ,8 3 6 310 551 394
1962 4 ,7 7 0 2 ,7 4 3 450 1,948 345 575 408
1963 4,885 2 ,9 3 2 480 2 ,0 6 7 385 600 423
1964 5,000 3 ,1 3 4 520 2,184 430 627 437
1965 5,120 3 ,3 6 0 560 2 ,3 2 0 480 656 453
Source: U.A.R., The Fivei-Year Plan, p. 2 0 .
Conclusion
In planned economies, long range projections of na­
tional income play a key role in the planning process. Econ­
omic projection serves as one of the guides for public policy 
makers in designing policies which will help to achieve the 
economic potential. Projections are also useful to public 
policy makers in indicating economic targets for the nation. 
Projection, however, becomes a probability and can serve only 
as a frame of reference for decision makers.
Forecasting national income is a hazardous undertaking.
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especially if done on a long range basis. No matter how 
elaborate the calculations of the forecaster are, the accuracy 
of his results will depend primarily on the correctness of 
his projection regarding the general economic and political 
conditions that will prevail in the country, and on the pol­
icies that the government and various private groups will 
pursue in the face of these conditions during the given 
period. These are matters that cannot be determined scientif­
ically. They depend on a multiplicity of circumstances many 
of which are purely accidental and cannot be predicted. Any 
chance development may throw off anticipated schedules, no 
matter how well they are reasoned.
The attempt to make long range forecasts of national 
income in definitive terms is a hazardous and even futile 
undertaking. Attempts to portray its possible future develop­
ment under certain clearly stated hypothetical conditions are 
entirely feasible and may be exceedingly useful.
Economic projections are merely tools used for ex­
ploring economic potentials, and as such are a necessity for 
the economic planner. Forecasting assumes the availability 
in abundance of reliable statistical data and ample informa­
tion, on which the forecaster must base his projections.
The statistical data in Syria is insufficient and 
rudimentaiy, but it can be considered reasonably reliable. 
Syria started collecting basic data in 1948 and has since been 
publishing it annually in the Statistical Abstract, which
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contains official statistical data about the various aspects 
of the economic and social activities of the country. The 
Statistical Abstract Is designed to be a reference for all 
statistical data which Is supplied regularly by the various 
government departments and ministries. It Is compiled and 
published by the Directorate of Statistics of the Ministry of 
Planning. In order to give a true picture of the economic 
development of the country, the Directorate of Statistics 
has worked continuously for enlarging and Improving the qual­
ity of the contents of the Statistical Abstract.
The targets set by the plan must be considered as 
tentative and must be revised periodically In view of the 
prevailing economic conditions. As a matter of fact, most 
of the predictions are based on past performance of the 
economy and must be carefully viewed as estimates. Other 
than that, the plan seems to be comprehensive In Its cover­
age, and attempts to tackle the basic problems confronting 
the economic growth of the country.
In Chapter V the Five-Year Plan will be evaluated In 
view of Its Implementation and accomplishments In the first 
two years.
CHAPTER V
EVALUATION OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN: REVIEW OF THE
FIRST TWO YEARS I96O/196I - I96I/I962
In this study4 the problems confronting the economic 
development of Syria have been analyzed and portrayed. The 
author Investigated the attempts made through planning at 
solving these problems. The results of these attempts have 
yet to be examined and evaluated with a view to their effec­
tiveness In solving the problems.
Before engaging In an overall appraisal of the Five- 
Year Plan, the plans for the first and second years need to 
be examined Individually, since for the purpose of Implementa­
tion and follow-up, the Five-Year Plan was broken down Into 
five annual stages.
The First Year Plan, 1960/1961
Details for the first year of the plan, whose execu­
tion started on the first of July, i960, were drawn In accord­
ance with the general framework of the Five-Year Plan. This 
plan constituted a point of departure toward continuous and 
sustained growth, and as such It could be considered as a 
transitional stage seeking to contribute to the attainment 
of the ultimate goals of a long-range development plan.
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i4o
The Investment Program
The volume of Investment during the first year of the 
plan was determined In accordance with the following principal 
considerations:^
1. Conformity with the Investment program of the 
Five-Year Plan and with the general goals for doubling na­
tional Income In ten years;
2. The actual means for financing the first year of 
the plan from local and foreign sources;
3. Incorporation of projects contracted before the 
Implementation of the plan In July, 196O;
4. Priority granted to projects whose studies were 
completed;
5. The distribution of projects among the private 
sector, public sector and other government authorities, ac­
cording to the abilities and needs of each;
6. Ensuring general economic balance and stability, 
and avoiding Inflationary tendencies which usually accompany 
the development process.
The development programs of the various sectors were 
drawn In compliance with the above considerations. The In­
vestments pertaining to these programs were appropriated In 
the Special Budget Issued by Presidential Decree No. 423 of
^U.A.R., Syrian Region, Ministry of Planning, The 
First Year Economic and Social Development Pl^, igoO/l^bl 
(Damascusl Government Press, 1960), p. 15. (fiereafter re- 
ferred to as the First Year Plan).
I4l
1960, the Development Budget Issued by Presidential Decree No. 
1242 of i960, and the budgets of other public authorities.^ 
The investments of the private sector were assessed 
in accordance with the nature of projects within its sphere 
of activity and its capacity for mobilizing private funds for 
such investments.
The investments of the first year of the plan as dis­
tributed between the public and private sectors and approp­
riated among the various projects, are listed in Table 49.
The total investment during this year was set at L.S. 463.9 
million, or about 17 percent of the total contemplated ex­
penditure of the Five-Year Plan. The private sector was 
assigned L.S. 170 million for its projects and the public 
sector L.S. 293.9 million.
Financing the First Year Plan 
The available sources for financing the public sector 
projects were estimated at L.S. 294.5 million, as shown in 
Table 50. This table shows that local funds for the public 
sector account for 48.2 percent of the total requisite invest­
ments, and foreign funds account for 51.8 percent.
This plan was prepared when Syria was a part of the 
United Arab Republic. The loans and documentary credits which 
were expected to come from the Egyptian Region at that time, 
were regarded as foreign funds because they did not generate
llbid.
TABLE 49
THE FIRST YEAR INVESTMENT PROGRAM OF THB FIVE-YEAR PLAN, I96Q/196I
(L.S. MILLION)
Public Sector
Project Private
Sector Development
Budget
Special
Budget
Other
Budgets® Total
Total
Investment
Irrigation'* 10.000 65.000 1.000 66.000 76.000
Agriculture 30.000 16.550 1.450 5.000 23.000 53.000
Industry® 30.000 45.000 — 10.550 55.550 85.550
Transport® 20.000 63.000 1.000 3.000 67.000 87.000
Education 17.000 -  ■ - 17.000 17.000
Health 2.000 6.000 3.366 - 9.366 11.366
Social Services - 6.850 0.900 1.500 9.250 9.250
Public Utilities® - 27.000 0.200 4.300 31.500 31.500
Housing 55.000 2.500 7.500 - 10.000 65.000
Changes In Inventories 15.000 — — - - 15.000
Miscellaneous 8.000 4.500 0.734 5.234 13.234
Total 170.000 253.400 15.150 25.350 293.900 463.900
Source: G.A.R., Syrian Region, Ministry of Planning, The First Year
Economic and Social Develoranent Plyi, 196O/1961 (Damascus: Government Press, i960),
p. 19. (Hereafter referred to as the First Year.Plan).
^The budgets Include those of Agrarian 
Reform Authority, Port of Latakla, 
and Fiji Water Authority.
b
Including land reclamation.
Including electricity, mining and oil.
IIncluding communications.
&
Including tourism.
H
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t a b l e  50
ESTIMATED SOURCES OP FINANCING THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR PROJECTS DURING I96O/196I 
(L.S. MILLION)
Source Revenue Percent of Total
A. Domestic Sources:
Surplus in Revenues from Public 
Debt Fund 20.0 6.8
Surplus from Insurance Fund and 
Government Salaries 15.0 5.1
Surplus from Social Insurance 
Authority- 20.0 6.8
Surplus from School Buildings 
Authority 10.0 3.4
Surplus from Government Authorities 13.3 4.5
Surplus from Agrarian Reform 
Authority 11.0 3.7
Available Funds from Municipalities 18.0 6.1
Other Revenues 14.7 5.0
Extraordinary Revenues 20.0 6.8
Total Domestic Revenues 142.0 48.2
B. Foreign Sources:
Loans, Documentary Credits from Egypt 43.5 14.8
Foreign Loans, Credits, Assistance 109.0 37.0
Total Foreign Revenues 152.5 51.8
Grand Total 294.5 100.0
Source: U.A.R., The First Year Plan, p. 59*
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within the Syrian economy, and the development plan for Syria
was drawn independently from that for Egypt.
The sources of savings available locally to finance
the projects assigned to the private sector were assessed at
L.S. 170 million. These funds were to be derived from three 
1major sources:
1. The sector of organized activity which consisted 
of the savings of organized businesses such as joint-stock 
companies and private corporations with limited liabilities. 
Savings from this source were estimated at L.S. 40 million.
2. The sector of unorganized activity which included 
the savings of all other private businesses excluding agri­
culture. This sector was expected to accumulate L.S. 60 
million in savings.
3. The agricultural and family sectors whose savings 
were estimated at L.S. 70 million.
The above estimates were based on the average savings 
of the private sector in the past five years.
Execution of the First Year Projects 
Total funds envisaged for investment during the first 
year of the plan were raised to L.S. 532.558 million, or by 
about L.S. 68 million over the original estimate shown in 
Table 49. These funds accounted for 19.6 percent of the total 
investments estimated for the Five-Year Plan. The share of
^Ibid., pp. 82-8 3 .
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the public sector during the first year was estimated at L.S.
362.5 million, or about 68 percent, and that of the private 
sector was estimated at L.S. 170 million, or 32 percent.
The supervision of progress In the execution of the 
first year projects revealed that the public sector fulfilled 
about 78 percent of Its Investment goals. The amount actually 
Invested by the end of the financial year 1960/196I totalled 
L.S. 282.065 million.^ The actual Investments of the private 
sector amounted to L.S. 188.6 million. This has exceeded 
the allotment of L.S. 170 million for the first year by L.S. 
18.6 million and constituted a fulfillment of 111 percent.
It will be seen that 88 percent of the Investment 
appropriated for the first year of the plan has been actually 
spent. In Table 51, the Implementation of projects by cate­
gories and sectors Is Indicated. The tables describing In 
detail the expenditures on the various projects are shown In 
the Appendix.
Performance of the Public Sector 
A contrast between the figures given In Table 49 and 
Table 51 reveals that the appropriations In Table 51 were 
Increased by about L.S. 68 million over the original estimates 
shown In Table 49. This was due to additional appropriations 
allotted to some government authorities and municipalities 
1
S.A.R., Ministry of Planning, Annual Report on the 
Economic and Social Development Plan, l9bO/19bl lDamascus: 
(Bureau Des Documentations Syriennes et Arabes, 196I), p. 12. 
(Hereafter referred to as Annual Report on the First Year 
Plan).
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TABLE 51
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS BY 
SECTORS- IN 1960/1961 
(L.S. MILLION) .
Appropriated Actually Spent
Project Five-Year
Plan
First
Year
Amount
Percent 
of First 
Year
I. Irrigation* 
Public Sector 
Private Sector
780.000
50.000
65.435
10.000 n-.m 8695
Total 830.000 75.435 65.836 87
2. Agriculture 
Public Sector 
Private Sector
95.000
175.000
26.656
30.000
14.690
41.470
55
138
Total 270.000 56.656 56.160 99
3. Industry,Mining,Geology
Public Sector 135.000 
Private Sector 100.000
15.269
27.000
9.372
46.000
61
170
Total 235.000 42.269 55.372 131
4. Power and Fuel 
Public Sector 
Private Sector
105.000
169.000
34.209
3.000
36.216 106
Total 274.000 37.209 36.216 97
5. Transport,Communications
Public Sector 387.000 
Private Sector 150.OOO
90.974
20.000
62.083 
27.000
68
135
Total 537.000 110.974 89.083 80
6. Education
Public Sector 107.000 30.489 25.854 85
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TABLE 51— Continued
Appropriated Actually Spent
Project
Five-Year First 
Plan Year
Amount
Percent 
of First 
Year
7. Health Services 
Public Sector 
Private Sector
46.000
10.000
9.765
2.000
7.161 73
Total 56.000 11.765 7.161 61
8. Housing,Utilities^ 
Public Sector 
Private Sector
47,000
256.000
76.672
63.000
60.181
64.670
78
103
Total 303.000 139.672 124.851 89
9. Social Services 
Public Sector 18.000 4.234 2.325 55
10. Cultural Services 
Public Sector - 2.760 2.222 81
11. Government Buildings 
Public Sector - 6.095 5.588 92
12. Changes In Inventories
Private Sector 90.000 15.000 - —
Total Public Sector 1,720.000 362.558 282.065 78
Total Private Sector 1,000.000 170.000 188.603 111
Grand Total 2,720.000 532.558 470; 668 88
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year
Plan, pp. 74-75.
Including land reclamation.
* Including tourism and recreation.
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raising the planned Investment of the public sector from 
L.S. 293.9 million to L.S. 362.558 million.
Although some circumstances have required the approp­
riation of such additional Investments to the plan of the 
first year, this was bound to create unbalance In the plan 
and the schedule of priorities on which It was established. 
Furthermore, the plan of the first year was drawn mainly on 
the basis of an assessment of funds available for the public 
sector. If the additional Investments were all executed, the 
Syrleui economy would have had to shoulder à new burden with 
possibly unwelcome results. If the goal of planning economic 
and social development were to replace haphazard acts by 
organized and coordinated actions, then It would be Imperative 
not to approve any Investment not listed In the annual plan—  
that plan which In reality was a framework based on the actual 
economic means of the country. Expansion over and beyong this 
framework may result In Its unbalance and may strain the 
foundations on which It rests.
This must not suggest that the plan must be Inflexible 
but that close adherence to Its outline Is desirable and may 
prove more effective to Its outcome.
The standing laws In Syria support the above view. 
According to Article 6, Law No. 232 of i960 on national plan­
ning, "the goals of the Five-Year Plan and of the annual 
plans shall be the basis for the general budget of the gov­
ernment, the Independent budgets, and the laws and decisions
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issued by the public authorities."^ Article 9 of the same
law further states that
. . . whereas the general plan engulfs all national re­
sources and sets the goals of all sectors, no projects 
or private works relating to economic and social develop­
ment may be contracted, financed, or executed should they 
be contrary to the general framework of the p l a n .2
These legal texts clearly testify that no laws or decisions 
pertaining to the development plan may be promulgated unless 
they conform with the general goals of the plan and its frame­
work. This requires the submission of draft laws and deci­
sions that may affect the proper implementation of the general 
development plan to the competent planning authorities.
In all the projects undertaken by the public sector 
except electricity, the fulfilled proportion was less than 
the extent planned, and the rate of execution varied from one 
project to another. This could be attributed to the follow­
ing factors:
1. Projects that scored a high percentage of fulfill­
ment were either those which were contracted previously, or 
those whose studies were complete and ready for implementation 
such as electricity, petroleum, government buildings and some 
irrigation and land reclamation projects.
2. Services in general, and projects of municipal 
services, tourism, summer resorts, cultural activity and the
^Ü.A.R., Syrian Region, Law No. 232 (Damascus: 
Government Press, i960), p. 5.
^Ibid., p. 10.
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like In particular, scored a high degree of fulfillment as 
the authorities in charge expended much effort.
3* A common factor among the executing bodies was 
the insufficiency of technical organs of a competent scale to 
undertake their projects, and the difficulties posed by the 
standing administrative and financial regulations in the face 
of reinforcing them.
4. Another factor limiting the general rate of ful­
fillment was the appropriation of relatively large amounts to 
projects whose studies were not yet completed, a matter that 
precluded the utilization of the entire funds. Outstanding 
examples of such projects included the Kamishly-Latakia Rail­
way, the Damascus International Airport, and the projects of 
the Economic Institute.
The various government bodies must be prevailed upon 
not to request the appropriation of funds in the development 
budgets except on the basis of the actual possible expenses 
of a project or a stage thereof, depending on actual means of 
execution. Otherwise, the Five-Year Plan will get unbalanced 
especially in' matters of growth rates and repercussions on 
income, the level of employment and capital formation. It 
appears tentatively wise not to list any project in the annual 
plans or the development budgets unless preliminary technical 
and economic studies were undertaken.
The above represents a group of general observations 
pertaining to the implementation of investments during the 
first year. Certain problems, however, have actually been
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attributed by the executing bodies, as causes for failure to 
realize the Investment time table.
1. Delay In the Issue of the development budget and 
Its notification to the sectors concerned. Delay In the Issue 
of other budgets pertaining to certain authorities-^ For 
example, the Municipal Development Budget was Issued In 
December i960, six months after the beginning of the finan­
cial year.
2. The Public Debt Fund delayed. In transferring to 
the sectors concerned, the required funds from budget 
appropriations.
3. Difficulties faced by the executing bodies In 
obtaining foreign currency, especially during the first six 
months of the financial year which preceded the drawing of 
the currency budget.
4. Time consumed by the State Council or other com­
petent bodies for the ratification of contracts.
5. Delay In concluding contracts with foreign 
countries pertaining to Important projects like the nitrogen 
fertilizers plant, the railway and the other projects whose 
study and execution were agreed upon to be undertaken by the 
Soviet Union.
6. The numerical and productive weaknesses of local 
contractors for undertaking all the projects of the develop­
ment plan, mainly due to the lack of time-saving mechanical 
tools and equipment.
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These are what seemed to be the major difficulties 
submitted by the various government administrations and 
authorities, some of which required urgent attention, while 
others were mere excuses. Inspection of the stages of execu­
tion by some of these bodies revealed that they draw the 
studies and announce the tenders on the various projects only 
after they are notified of the appropriation of the budgets.
One wonders what prevents the administrations and 
authorities from drawing the studies, preparing the tenders 
and submitting the contracts to the State Council before they 
are officially notified of the appropriated funds.
Regarding the true difficulties, some solutions were 
offered and effected by the competent planning authorities.^
1. In view of the difficulties in obtaining foreign 
currency, the sectors concerned drew a foreign currency budget 
for the period January-June 1961, which enabled the government 
administrations and authorities to acquire their requirements 
with a relatively greater ease.
2. Desirous of speeding the execution of projects 
concluded with local contractors, it was decided to pay local 
contractors up to 95 percent instead of 90 percent of actual 
executed work. It was also decided to advance to contractors 
up to 20 percent of total expenses, against a bank guarantee, 
provided they forego requesting compensation for price 
increases.
^S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year Plan, p. l4.
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3. Concerning the strengthening of the planning 
personnel at the ministries and public administrations, it 
was decided to hold training courses in this field at the 
Ministry of Planning, to all personnel in charge of planning 
and the supervision of execution. The first course consist­
ing of 25 trainees extended from April to May. It is hoped 
that such courses will be held regularly to enable the 
greatest number of operators in this field to acquire the 
practical experience needed.
These are some of the suggestions offered to overcome 
the difficulties which accompanied the execution of the first 
year plan. Undoubtedly, the several difficulties that will 
face the future execution works may be solved totally or 
partially by the "Planning and Supervision of Execution 
Committees", formed at the ministries and public administra­
tions in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning. It is 
indubitably better to discover possible difficulties before 
they arise than to solve them after they occur. This can be 
effected by constant revision and follow-up of the executed 
woxks by the said committees. Should the latter fail in their 
task, the Ministry of Planning always stands ready to study 
the problems and offer suitable solutions.
Performance of the Private Sector
The private sector proved to be more successful in 
its development efforts. Its accomplishments were very en­
couraging. The record showed that the private sector invested
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about L.S. 18.6 million In excess of Its allotted share. The 
total Investment of the private sector amounted to L.S. 188.6 
million, whereas the Investment envisaged for It by the first 
year plan was originally set at L.S. 170 million. This 
represented an overall fulfillment of 111 percent during the 
financial year 1960/1961.
As shown In Table 5I, the private sector executed 170 
percent of Its Industrial projects, 138 percent of the agri­
cultural projects, 135 percent of the transportation projects, 
103 percent of the housing projects, and 95 percent of Its 
Irrigation projects. No account has been given on the execu­
tion of the petroleum projects, health services and changes 
In Inventory.
Two salient features appear from the above figures:
1. Actual Investments by the private sector during 
the first year of the plan may have exceeded the above men­
tioned figures since complete statements on Its activity In 
health services, petroleum projects, and changes In Inventory 
were not available.
2. All available Information on actual Investments 
by the private sector showed that they exceeded the estimates 
by a wide margin except for Irrigation.
The absence of complete agreement between the esti­
mated and actual Investments of the private sector Is partly 
explained by the following:
1. Estimates of funds available for Investment by
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the private sector did not Include foreign documentary credits 
and loans.
2. Government bodies supervising their counterparts 
in the private sector did not heed the investment volumes 
envisaged by the plan, granting them investment licenses in­
discriminately without upholding any consideration of strong 
bearing to the plan and its principles.
3. Cost estimates of the projects undertaken by the 
private sector were not sufficiently precise, actual dis­
parities in execution augmenting or decreasing them.
The estimates of the first year plan on the capacity 
of the private sector to fulfill its allotted share may have 
been highly conservative, a matter that requires a better 
understanding of its ability to undertake projects reserved 
for it, taking into consideration the several factors that 
affect its psychological attitude toward investment in gen­
eral, and investment in certain fields in particular.
In conclusion, it is hoped that more detailed and 
accurate information on private investment activity under 
the plan would enable a better understanding and a deep com­
prehensive analysis of its activity and would lead to more 
useful results.
The Second Year Plan, 1961/1962
The execution of the second year plan started in 
July 1961. This plan was an integral part of the long range 
process of development. It constituted the second stage of
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the Five-Year Plan, and as such aimed at contributing to the 
ultimate objectives of the Five-Year Plan, within the funds 
appropriated for that purpose.
The Investment Program
The total funds appropriated for development projects 
in the second year plan amounted to L.S. 617.1^9 million.
Out of this total a sum of L.S. 157 million was assigned to 
the private sector and L.S. 460.l49 million to the public 
sector.
Since no information is available on the classifica­
tion of the private sector investments, the analysis of this 
stage of the plan is necessarily confined to the performance 
of the public sector. Accordingly, the investment program 
of the public sector only is given in Table 52.
It will be seen that the first five items listed in 
Table 52, represent what is considered as productive projects. 
These include irrigation and land reclamation, agriculture, 
industry, mining and geology, power and fuel as well as, 
transport and communications. Altogether these projects ac­
counted for about 70 percent of the total appropriations for 
the second year of the plan. The rest of the projects, which 
may by nature be classified as services, accounted for about 
30 percent.
From such classification it is evident that priority 
was given to those productive projects which were supposed to 
contribute directly to the growth of the national income and
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TABLE 52
INVESTMENT PROGRAM OP THE PUBLIC SECTOR
IN THE SECOND YEAR PLAN. I96I/I962
(L.S. MILLION)
Project
Appropriated
Funds
Percent 
of Total
Irrigation and Land Reclamation 72.780 15.8
Agriculture 29.505 6.4
Industry, Mining, Geology 45.310 9.9
Power and Fuel 100.950 21.9
Transport gind Communications 74.928 16.3
Education 26.358 5.7
Health Services 6.579 1.4
Public Utilities, Housing 91.164 19.8
Social and Labor Services 3.075 0.7
Cultural Services 2.300 0.5
Public Administration Services 7.200 1.6
Total 460.149 100.0
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Economic and
Social Development Pl^. 19bl/l9b2 (Damascus: Government
Press, 1903),p. 3. (Hereafter referred to as Annual Report 
on the Second Year Plan).
lead to the strengthening of the economic base.
Sources of Financing the Second Year Plan 
The sources available for finemcing the public sector 
projects of the second year plan were estimated at
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L.S. 460.l49 million, as shown in Table 53. As shown in this 
table, the domestic funds accounted for about 65.2 percent of
TABLE 53
ESTIMATED SOURCES OP FINANCING THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR PROJECTS DURING I96I/I962 
(L.S. MILLION)
Source Revenue
Percent 
of Total
A. Domestic Sources
Surplus in Revenues from Public
Debt Fund 19.500 4.3
Surplus from Insurance Fund and
Government Salaries 30.000 6.5
Surplus from Social Insurance
Authority 30.000 6.5
Surplus from Pension Fund of
Municipalities 3.500 0.8
Surplus from Government Authorities 66.750 14.5
Surplus from School Buildings
Authority 8.000 1.7
Available Funds from Municipalities 61.655 13.4
Extraordinary Revenues 20.000 4.4
Voluntary Loans 20.000 4.4
Public Participation in Karatshok
Oil Well 6.000 1.3
Revenues of the Economic Institute 5.000 1.0
Other Revenues 29.500 6.4
Total Domestic Sources 299.905 65.2
B. Foreign Sources
Loans, Documentary Credits from Egypt 45.000 9.8
Foreign Loans, Credits, Assistance 115.244 25.0
Total Foreign Sources 160.244 34.8
Grand Total 460.149 100.0
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
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the total estimated sources« and foreign funds accounted for 
about 34.8 percent.
It will be noticed that among the foreign sources, a 
total sum of L.S. 45 million was expected to come from Egypt, 
what was then considered as the Southern Region of the United 
Arab Republic.
However, local funds were derived from two sources:
1. Public and private savings;
2. Deficit financing.
Public savings accounted for about 48.8 percent of 
total sources, while private savings accounted for about 5.6 
percent, as shown In Table 54. It Is Important to note,
TABLE 54
MEANS OP FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET DURING I961/I962
Source Revenue Percent (L.S. Million) of Total
1. Local Savings
Public Savings 224.405 48.8
Private Savings 26.000 5.6
Total Local Savings 250.405 54.4
2. Deficit Financing 49.500 10.8
3. Foreign Loans 160.244 34.8
Grand Total 460.149 100.0
Source : S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, p. 5 .
l6o
however, that the revenues listed under public savings con­
sisted primarily of the savings of certain government 
authorities and agencies such as the Insurance Fund and Gov­
ernment Salaries, and Social Insurance Authority which in 
fact belonged partly or wholly to government employees and 
as such could be considered as private savings. But because 
these funds were managed by government authorities, they were 
listed under public savings.
Deficit financing, on the other hand, was responsible 
for about 10.8 percent of all the estimated sources.
Execution of the Second Year Plan 
The supervision of progress in the execution of the 
second year projects revealed that the public sector fulfilled 
about 49.2 percent of the envisaged investment, as shown in 
Table 55. The amounts actually Invested by the end of the 
financial year 196I/1962 totalled L.S. 226.582 million. The 
rate of achievement, however, varied from one project to 
another as described by the tables in the Appendix.
The private sector, on the other hand, fulfilled 100 
percent of its investment program by investing the entire 
funds allocated for its projects, L.S. 157 million.
Performance of the Public Sector 
It is quite clear from the record of achievement that 
the development progress of the public sector has slowed down 
in the second year. Only 49 percent of its planned projects
l6l
TABLE 55
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS BY 
PUBLIC SECTOR IN I96I/I962 
(L.S. MILLION)
Project Appropriated
Funds
Actual Investment
Amount Percent 
Executed
I. Productive Projects
Irrigation and Land
Reclamation 72.780 33.731 46
Agriculture 29.505 6.054 21
Industry, Mining, 
Geology 45.310 10.254 23
Power and Fuel 100.950 74.882 74
Transport and 
Communications 74.928 35.778 48
Total Productive
Projects 323.473 160.699 50
II. Public Service Projects
Education 26.358 14.428 55
Cultural and Recrea­
tional Services 2.300 1.036 45
Public Health 6.579 2.493 38
Housing, Public Util­
ities, Tourism 91.164 41.678 46
Social and Labor 
Services 3.075 1.700 55
Public Administration 7.200 4.548 63
Total Public Service
Projects 136.676 65.883 48
Grand Total 460.149 226.582 49
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
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were completed. It was shown in Table 55 that 74 percent of 
the power and fuel projects and 63 percent of the public 
administration projects were fulfilled. Both categories of 
projects showed the highest rate of achievement among the 
second year projects. Each of the educational and social 
service projects registered 55 percent execution. The 
execution of the rest of the projects did not reach 50 percent.
It will be noticed that the productive projects were 
allotted about 70 percent of the total appropriations in the 
second year plan, and the public service projects 30 percent. 
This relationship was maintained by the execution of the 
projects, as 70 percent of the funds invested were spent on 
productive projects and 30 percent on public service projects.
Some of the administrative difficulties encountered 
in the execution of the second year plan were similar to 
those met in the first year. However, the main reason for 
the low rate of execution was the shortage in the anticipated 
funds. The two main sources which were relied upon to finance 
the second year plan were public savings and foreign loans. 
Estimates from both sources constituted about 84 percent of 
the total anticipated funds. However, the revenues that were 
actually raised from these same sources accounted for about 
100 percent of the total revenues actually raised. Only 60 
percent of the public savings were realized, and 36 percent 
of the estimated foreign loans were raised. The total funds 
raised constituted about 42 percent of the sources anticipated
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by the plan, as shown In Table 56.
' TABLE 56
ESTIMATED AND REALIZED SOURCES OF FINANCING THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR PROJECTS, I96I/I962 
(L.S. million)
Source EstimatedRevenues
Realized
Revenues
Percent
Realized
1. Local Sources
Public Savings 224.405 134.042 60
Private Savings 26.000 - -
Deficit Financing 49.500 92 -
Total 299.905 134.134 45
2. Foreign Sources
Loans, Documentary 
Credits, Egypt 45.000 2.581 6
Foreign Loans, Credits, 
Assistance 115.244 54.985 48
Total 160.244 57.566 36
Grand Total 460.149 191.700 42
Source : S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, p. 12.
It will be observed from Table 56 that the funds 
anticipated in private savings did not materialize. This was 
due to the extraordinary political and economic conditions 
which did not encourage private individuals and organizations
l64
to Invest In public debt bonds and to participate In some of 
the development projects undertaken by the public sector.
The main event which caused the private organizations to shy 
away from Investing their'savings, was the nationalization of 
the banking system and other Industrial corporations In July, 
1961. This was followed by the military coup d'etat which 
led to the cessation of Syria from the United Arab Republic 
In September, 196I.
For the same reason, the government authorities re­
frained from the use of deficit financing In order to avoid 
the possible Inflationary effects which might have resulted 
from such action.
As to foreign sources. It will be noticed that only 
six percent of the credits that were supposed to come from 
Egypt was realized. This source was discarded after the 
withdrawal of Syria from the United Arab Republic In 
September, 196I.
Of the other estimated foreign loans and credits, 
only 48 percent was raised because the funds that could be 
used effectively from this source were limited by the stage 
which a particular project has reached, and by the availabil­
ity of local funds which were assigned to the project during 
the financial year. In other words, the funds that were 
raised In foreign loans and credits were those that could 
have actually been used.
It appears that the actual Investments shown In Table
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55 (L.S. 226.582 million) exceeded the funds actually raised, 
as shown In Table 56 (L.S. 191.7 million), by L.S. 34.882 
million. This difference was attributed to the fact that 
some of the self-financing government agencies spent more 
than the amounts recorded In the reports of the Public Debt 
Fund. Also, some government agencies such as the Ministries 
of Education and Agriculture received foreign aid which was 
not accounted for In the reports of the Public Debt Fund.
Accordingly, and in conformity with the records of 
the various government agencies, the total realized revenues 
of the Development Budget reached L.S. 226.582 million and 
not L.S. 191.7 million. This means that about 49.2 percent 
of the estimated sources were realized. Instead of the 42 
percent Indicated In Table 56.
It Is Important to note that the Investments of the 
public sector which were envisaged for the second year of the 
Five-Year Plan, were In fact those Investments which were em­
bodied In the Development Budget for the financial year 
1961/1962, and did not necessarily Include all the Invest­
ments of the public sector during this period. There are 
various government authorities which undertake Investments 
on their own, outside the sphere of the Development Budget 
such as the Ministry of Defense, Latakla Harbor Authority, 
Palestine Refugees Institute, Central Bank, and Agricultural 
Bank. All of these organizations undertake construction 
works and other similar projects which are of development
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nature. It would give a more accurate and comprehensive 
picture of the public sector Investments If such projects 
were Included In the Development Budget.
Foreign Loans and Credits
It was pointed out earlier In this study that the 
sources of financing the Five-Year Plan were not entirely 
domestic. In fact, foreign loans and aids accounted for
23.5 percent of the estimated sources of financing the Five- 
Year Plan (as shown In Table 38).
By July of 1963, the Syrian government actually drew 
$20.92 million of the $87 million credit extended by the 
Soviet Union under the Syro-Sovlet Economic and Technical Aid 
Agreement of 1957»^  This amount was spent on the provision 
of Soviet experts and technicians, as well as on equipment 
for specified projects. The terms of this agreement were 
described In Chapter III.
In i960, Czechoslovakia agreed to extend credit to 
Syria totalling $11.382 million at an annual Interest rate 
of three percent. The purpose of this credit was to provide 
equipment for the petroleum refinery at Homs. The entire 
amount was drawn by July, 1963.^
In 1962, Poland agreed to extend credit totalling
^S.A.R., Central Bank Bulletin (Deunascus: Central
Bank, 1983), p. 2l See also U.N., International Flow of 
Long-Tenn Capital and Official Donations, 1959-1961 (New York: 
United Nations, 1983), pp. lb and 27.
2lbld.
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$15 million at an annual rate of Interest of 2.3 percent.
This was In the form of private contracts for the purpose of 
providing Industrial equipment and machinery. However, by 
1963, none of this credit was drawn.^
Also In 1962, as a consequence of a three-year drought 
and after Syria broke away from the United Arab Republic, the 
Syrian government requested assistance from the United States, 
which resulted In an agreement to sell Syria, under Public 
Law 480, 100,000 tons of wheat and flour to be paid for In 
local currency. An additional 30,000 tons of wheat was also
p
provided.
The United States signed a new loan to Syria In I962 
for the main purpose of stabilizing Its currency and provid­
ing the foreign exchange cost of building a network of silos 
for cereal storage. The total amount of the loan was $l4 
million; of which $9 million came from AID (Agency for Inter­
national Development) and $3 million from the Export-Import
Bank.^ In addition, Syria secured a loan of $l6 million from
. 4
West Germany and $3 million from Italy.
Later, In 1963, West Germany agreed to extend addi­
tional credit to Syria totalling 330 million Deutsche Marks
^Ibld.
p
U.S., House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, 87^^ Cong., 2&&
Sess., 19b2, pT 56b.
3lbld.. p. 381.
4
Ibid.
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at an annual rate of Interest of 3*25 percent. This loan was 
Intended to provide the foreign exchange needs for the pre­
liminary stages of the Euphrates Dam.^
The total commitments of bilateral economic assistance 
to Syria reached $l48.4 million in 1962. This does not in­
clude the recent German loan of D.M. 350 million.
Evaluation of the Five-Year Plan on the 
Basis of Two Years of Experience 
Prom the account given of the progress in execution 
of the Five-Year Plan, the total investment of the public 
sector in the first year represented about l6.4 percent of 
its allocated share in the Five-Year investment program.
The private sector, on the other hand, invested about 19 
percent of its share in the Five-Year investment program.
In the second year, although the public sector in­
vested only 49.2 percent of the funds appropriated for its 
projects, the volume of investment fell short of that in the 
first year by L.S. 55*5 million only. The public expenditure 
in the second year accounted for about 13.1 percent of the 
share of the public sector in the Five-Year Plan. The pri­
vate sector, on the other hand, invested the entire funds 
allocated for its projects in the second year, and has thereby 
accomplished about 15-7 percent of its share in the Five-Year 
investment program.
^S.A.R., Central Bank Bulletin, op. cit.
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Overall, the public sector expenditures in the first 
two years reached 30 percent of its planned share in the Five- 
Year Plan, and the private sector investments amounted to
34.6 percent.
A close look at the accomplishments of the individual 
projects reveals that only 12 percent of the irrigation and 
land reclamation projects were completed by the end of the 
second year. This low rate of achievement is somewhat mis­
leading, because one single project, that of the Euphrates 
Valley River, was assigned a little less than half of the 
total public sector appropriations in the Five-Year Plan. A 
sum of L.S. 304 million out of a total estimated cost of 
L.S. 710 million, was earmarked for the Euphrates project 
which was only in its preliminary stages of surveys and 
studies. Out of the L.S. 13-4 million appropriated for this 
project in the first two years, only L.S. 7-3 million was 
actually spent. However, once the necessary surveys and 
studies are completed, more funds are expected to be allo­
cated for this project in the coming years.
In agriculture, the public sector executed about 22 
percent of the funds allocated in the Five-Year Development 
Plan. Some of the reasons which accounted for the slow prog­
ress in the execution of the agriculture projects were:^
1. The appropriation of relatively large funds to
^Adnan Shuman, "The Five-Year Plan of the Syrian Arab 
Republic in its First Two Years, 196O/1961 - 1961/1962," M  
Raed A1 Arabi (Kuwait: December, 1962), p. 18.
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projects whose studies were not yet completed;
2. The delay in the issuance of the development bud­
gets and the slow transfer of the required funds to the 
executing bodies. This led to the obstruction in the execu­
tion of many projects which were of seasonal nature;
3. The weakness of the technical framework of the 
executing bodies in the Ministry of Agriculture;
4. The relative shortage of rainfall which led to 
the slow execution of some of the projects which relied on 
the efforts and participation of the farmers.
The rate of execution of the industrial projects by 
the public sector ranged from 6l percent in the first year to 
23 percent in the second year, resulting in 15 percent execu­
tion by the end of the second year of the funds appropriated 
in the Five-Year investment program.
On the other hand, the execution of the power and 
fuel projects fared much better in both years. Although 106 
percent execution was registered in the first year, and 74 
percent in the second year, the total rate of execution by 
the public sector in both years reached 106 percent of the 
funds assigned to such projects in the Five-Year Development 
Plan, as shown in Table 57* This may mean either an under­
estimation of the cost of these projects or an overfulfill­
ment of these projects.
The transport and communications projects were exe­
cuted at the rate of 68 percent in the first year and 48
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TABLE 57
PUBLIC SECTOR EXECUTION OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(L.S. MILLION)
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I. Productive 
Projects
Irrigation 780.000 56.373 33.731 90.104 12
Agriculture 95-000 14.690 6.054 20.744 22
Industryb 135.000 9.372 10.254 19.626 15
Power and Fuel 105.000 36.216 74.882 111.098 106
Transport,
Communications 387.000 62.083 35.778 97.861 25
Total 1,502.000 178.734 160.699 339.433 23
Cl. Service Projects
Education 107.000 25.854 14.428 40.282 38
Health 46.000 7.161 2.493 9.654 21
Housing, Public
Utilities 47.000 60.181 41.678 101.859 217
Social and
Labor Services 18.000 2.325 1.700 4.025 22
Cultural
Services - 2.222 1.036 3.258 -
Public Admin­
istration — 5.588 4.548 10.136 —
Total 218.000 103.331 65.883 169.214 78
Grand Total 1,720.000 282.065 226.582 508.647 30
Source; Tables 37» 51 and 55.
^Including Land Reclamation. ^Including Mining and Geology.
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percent in the second year. The aggregate rate of execution 
by the public sector in both years amounted to 25 percent of 
the appropriations in the Five-Year investment program.
If the irrigation, agricultural, industrial, power 
and fuel, and transport and communications projects were 
classified in one categoiy as productive projects, it would 
seem that the rate of execution of such projects was 77 
percent in the first year and 50 percent in the second year. 
In both years, about 23 percent of the total funds allocated 
for productive projects in the Five-Year Plan was executed.
The public service projects were executed at the rate 
of 79 percent in the first year and 48 percent in the second 
year. The aggregate rate of execution of the Five-Year 
program in the first two years was 78 percent, as shown in 
Table 57.
A significant feature is the expenditure on housing 
and public utilities projects. The funds assigned to the 
public sector for these projects in the Five-Year Plan did 
not exceed L.S. 47 million. By the end of the second finan­
cial year, a total sum of L.S. 101.859 million was spent on 
such projects. This represented a rate of accomplishment of 
217 percent. The cost of such projects in the Five-Year Plan 
was highly underestimated.
The education projects, including cultural services, 
were executed at the rate of 84 percent in the first year and 
54 percent in the second year. During the first two years.
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however, 4l percent of the funds allocated for these projects 
In the Five-Year Plan was executed.
The Rationale of Planning
Planning seems to have become widely accepted as an 
essential means of guiding and accelerating economic develop­
ment in underdeveloped countries.
In the Middle East, Syria is not the only country to 
resort to economic planning. As a matter of fact, Egypt is 
in the process of implementing its Ten-Year Economic and 
Social Development Plan of 196O-1970. Iraq is executing its 
Five-Year Plan of 1961/1962 - 1965/1966.^  Jordem recently 
started implementing its Five-Year Plan of 1962-1967.^  Gen­
erally, the basic reasons for planned economic development 
given by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Par East are:^
1. The functioning of the traditional economies left 
alone may perpetuate stagnation and wide fluctuations;
2. Private initiative unaided may not easily gather
^U.N., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 
1961-1963 (New York; United Nations, 1954), p. 20. ÎHe 
Iraqi plan calls for total expenditure of 556 million Iraqi 
Dinars.
2
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Five-Year Program 
for Economic Development (Amman: The Jordan Development
Board, 1962). Total Investment under this plan is set at
127.3 million Jordanian Dinars.
United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Asia and the 
Par East, Vol. XII, No. 3 (New York: United Nations,
December, 1961), pp. 1-2.
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sufficient momentum to generate economic growth;
3. The market mechanism with all Its Imperfections 
cannot be solely relied on for mobilizing and utilizing 
effectively the available resources to achieve a maximum 
possible rate of growth.
Planning must have some centralized declslon-maklng 
and some government action In effecting such decisions In a 
coordinated way. There are In the real world no completely 
planned and completely unplanned economies. Planning Is ob­
viously a matter of degree. The degree of planning, however, 
varies widely from one country to another. There Is, on the 
one hand, the centrally planned economy In the communist 
countries of the U.S.S.R., China and Eastern Europe, where 
most labor, raw material and equipment resources are allocated 
by the government to the majority of the production units,
which dispose of the major part of their products according
to central direction. In these countries national economic 
planning Is an Integral part of the development of a socialist 
society.1
On the other hand, there Is the predominantly private 
enterprise economy of the United States, Japan, and other 
western countries. In which planning means chiefly projection 
by the government of the economic activity and the Influence
of the government on the rate of growth through fiscal and
^Oskar Lange, Essays on Economic Planning (London:
Asia Publishing House, 1963), pp. 1-4.
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monetary policies.
In between these two extremes, there are various
shades of "mixed economy". In which planning contains two
major elements:
. . . the government's direct utilization of saving to 
carry out Investment and management of resources for 
production, particularly In providing economic and social 
Infrastructure; and the government's measures to facil­
itate, stimulate, guide and even control private economic 
activity.1
In all these forms of planning the government plays the common 
role of creating the general conditions for development such 
as political and monetary stability and of making known the 
available resources and development potentialities.
What Is a national plan? How can It rationally de­
rive Its criteria? Among the economists who recognize the 
need for planning In underdeveloped countries Is Gunnar 
Myrdal. According to Ityrdal a plan Is
a blueprint of a cumulative process of economic develop­
ment In a country, as this process will evolve when 
started, sustained and controlled by certain Induced 
exogenous changes In the social system, represented by 
purposeful state Interferences as defined In the plan.^
This blueprint must be based on a study of the circular 
causation between all the relevant factors In the social sys­
tem of the country.
Myrdal considers three major alms of planning. One
^U.N., Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East,
op. clt.
2
Gunnar Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1957), p. Ô7*
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purpose of the national plan Is to effect the strictest 
economy with the available resources. Rational economic be­
havior is always concerned with the allocation of scarce re­
sources among alternative uses. This is the reality behind 
the notion of "opportunity costs". If, however, many under­
developed countries demonstrate waste of vezy scarce resources 
in "showpiece" projects, this is considered the result of a 
failure in planning, and the only cure is to improve planning. 
This involves getting down to "a realistic analysis of the 
concrete circular causal relations involved in the cumulative 
development process."^
Another purpose of the plan is to overcome the rigid­
ities which characterize an underdeveloped economy. The 
strategy of economic planning in underdeveloped countries 
must, very largely, consist in foreseeing by rational analysis 
where the bottlenecks, due to particularly tough rigidities, 
are likely to arise and then to direct policy measures 
accordingly.
A third general purpose of national economic planning 
is to free the minds of the people and the governments from 
many popular preconceptions often originating from their 
envious comparisons with the highly developed countries, 
which otherwise are certain to dominate the economic policies 
in underdeveloped countries.
Myrdal stresses the fact that a national economic
l%bid., p. 9 4 .
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plan cannot be rationally constructed by the application of 
the criteria of the price system and private business profit­
ability but that the plan must consist of the blueprinting 
in real terms of a cumulative process of circular causation, 
in the final analysis directed by political decisions. The 
national plan cannot rationally be made in terms of the costs 
and profits of individual enterprises because most of the 
investments to be planned are not profitable from the market 
point of view. Most of the investments are intended to create 
external economies for industries which are not yet estab­
lished but are planned for the future. Also private business 
calculations in terms of costs and profits are inadequate 
and do not necessarily reflect the social goals of national 
planning.
Myrdal concludes that the criteria for national plan­
ning are entirely outside the price system and that there do 
not exist any objective criteria for economic planning. "The 
plan and its targets have in the final analysis to be deter­
mined by decisions which represent choices made among differ­
ent, alternatively possible, sets of goals and'means.
Jan Tinbergen also recognizes the need for planning 
in underdeveloped countries. He believes that economic 
development may be furthered by what he calls a purposeful 
development policy. He considers a plan to be an essential 
part of that policy. This development policy, according to
^Ibid., p. 9 1.
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Tinbergen, would have four principal objectives;
. . .  to create the general conditions favorable to 
development; to acquaint the government, the business 
community and the public with the potentialities and ad­
vantages of development; to make a number of investments 
of the "basic" type, which may represent the government 
investment program or plan, consisting of a number of 
public projects; and to take measures designed to facil­
itate and stimulate private activity and investment.1
The details of such development policy are governed by the
structure of the country's economy, as determined by its
natural resources, climate and geographical situation, as
well as by temporary bottlenecks that may exist.
According to Tinbergen, the task of planning has
p
three major characteristic features. The first feature is 
that a plan refers to the future, and to that extent, it con­
tains an element of forecasting. A plan is based on a number 
of aims, which have to be specified in order to carry out the 
planning process. A third feature is that a plan requires 
coordination of the means of economic policy to be used in 
order to reach the aims and to avoid inconsistencies. He 
maintains that effective planning depends on the technical 
competence and integrity of the administration; the level of 
literacy and the civic spirit of the business community and 
and the population at large; and on the availability of data.3
^Jan Tinbergen, The Design of Development (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 3-8.
^Jan Tinbergen. Central Planning (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1964), p. Ü.
3jbid., pp. 71-72.
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Tinbergen suggests that the planning process may in­
volve as many stages as four or more. He describes these 
stages as follows:
1. The macro-stagef in which the rate of investment 
is chosen, implying a choice of the rate of development;
2. The sector stage, in which the development of a 
number of sectors is estimated;
3. The project stage, in which a choice between a 
number of projects is made;
4. The regional stage, in which the development of 
one or more regions is contemplated. This stage may 
either precede the sector stage or follow it, or even 
follow the project stage, depending on the nature of the 
planning problem.1
Additional stages include a number of preparatory, 
partial research problems, such as estimation of the optimum 
size of the enterprises in some industries, market analyses, 
and repetition of previous stages on the basis of the results 
of later ones.
p
Tinbergen suggests four criteria for optimum planning. 
An important criterion is the degree of accuracy obtainable, 
taken in the wider sense of being geared to the needs of the 
economy under the given circumstances. This means not only 
that the estimates must be as precise as possible, but also 
that proper variables must be included in the set of estimates, 
having in mind the aims and means of economic policy. A 
second criterion is the time needed for the operation; be­
cause of the usually short period available, especially for 
the preparation of short-term plans, economizing on time is
^Ibid., pp. 26-27 and pp. 88-89.
^Ibid., pp. 90-9 1 .
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an Important aspect of the economics of planning. A third 
criterion Is keeping costs down by trying to minimize the 
number of elementary operations Involved. A final criterion 
Is the degree of democracy allowed In the sense of satisfying 
Justified desires of Interested groups to have an opportunity 
of giving an opinion, or even participating In a number of 
decisions about the plan.
In order to apply the criteria most effectively, 
their relative Importance should be known. Tinbergen admits 
that It Is difficult to apply the criteria In a scientifical­
ly accurate way because of the lack of sufficient Information.
W. Arthur Lewis stresses the fact that planning re­
quires a strong, competent euid Incorrupt administration. But 
since no backward country possesses such an administration, 
he advocates that "governments should be lalsser-falre than 
they should pretend to plan".^  In other words, governments 
should not get Involved In comprehensive and rigid planning 
If they do not have the qualified personnel, the competence 
and the required machinery to cope with It. He therefore 
maintains that the first objective of planners must be to 
create an administrative machine that can do the woxk of 
planning, to train young men academically and In the tasks 
of administration, and to weed out mercilessly the Incom­
petent and the corrupt. In the meantime, he cautions that
^W. Arthur Lewis, The Principles of Economic Plamilng 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952), pp. 121-128.
I8l
no administration should be loaded with tasks more numerous 
or more delicate than It can handle and that the quantity 
and forms of planning should be limited strictly within the 
capacity of the machine.
However, In assessing a development plan, Lewis con­
siders three major factors; the contribution of the plan to
policy-making; the size of the Investment program; and the
1priorities emphasized In the plan. He regards sound economic 
policies to be more Important to economic development than 
mere expenditure of money by the government. He maintains 
that In private enterprise systems the amount the government 
has to Invest Is always less than one-half of the total cap­
ital formation required In the country. Therefore, If a 
private enterprise system Is to be maintained. It Is Important 
to adopt policies which encourage private Investment to come 
forward In the right magnitude In the right places. The most 
Important question to ask, when assessing a development plan. 
Is whether the policies are adequate to stimulate private In­
vestment In the production of commodities creating an approp­
riate framework, through reasonable policies and Institutions.
The other factor to be considered In assessing a 
development plan, according to Lewis, Is the size of
^W. Arthur Lewis, "On Assessing a Development Plan," 
Economic Bulletin of the Economic Society of Ghana (Accra:
May-June, 1955)j PP. 2-lb.
Seç also Gerald M. Meier, Leading Issues In Development 
Ek^nomlcs (New York; Oxford University Press, 19&4j, pp.
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expenditure. Development programs are usually prepared with 
a view to the needs of the country. But the needs of under­
developed countries are virtually unlimited. So, Lewis sug­
gests that "in determining the size of expenditure, the basis 
of a development plan is not needs but resources,"^ Lewis 
agrees that for most underdeveloped countries, the principal 
limitation in the size of the program is money. For some 
countries, the limitation is not money, but physical resources. 
A more serious limitation in almost all underdeveloped coun­
tries is political and administrative capacity. To carry 
out a program, decisions must be made at the right time; 
preliminary researches must be undertaken; contracts must be 
placed at the right time. Normally, in most of these coun­
tries not enough importance is attached to the absence of 
preliminary researches, which are "a bottleneck to absorptive 
capacity",2 It is, therefore, easier for these countries to 
prepare a program according to their needs than to administer 
and effect its execution.
Another way of appraising a development plan is to 
look at the priorities. According to Lewis, priority must 
be given to the following projects:
1, Basic surveys including geological and oil sur­
veys, mapping, marine biology, the measurement of river flows, 
and fundamental agricultural research;
^Meier, Ibid,, p, 524,
^Ibid,, p, 525.
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2. Basic training including primary, secondary and 
higher education, as well as technical training;
3. Public utilities including electricity, roads, 
water supplies, port services, railroads and telephone;
4. The balance between what is being done for the 
countryside and what is being done for the towns.
Lewis emphasizes that prestige expenditures must be
kept to reasonable proportions.
I would give high marks to a development program in which 
only 10^ of the expenditures was in nonsense Of this 
kind, whereas a programme in which the figure reached 
3QJÉ would seem to be well below par.l
The above presentation leads this author to believe 
that the essential task of planning economic development con­
sists in assuring an amount of productive investment which 
is sufficient to provide for a rise of national income sub­
stantially in excess of the rise in population, so that per 
capita income increases. Consequently, the problem of de­
velopment planning is one of mobilizing the resources of the 
country for purposes of productive investment, and then of 
directing that productive investment into such channels as 
will provide for the most rapid growth of the productive 
power of the national economy.
In order to achieve this task, a comprehensive plan 
should consist at least of the following parts:
1. Objectives and aggregate targets, primarily in
^Ibid., p. 528.
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terms of national Income and employment;
2. A public investment program with distribution of 
development expenditures among major sectors, chiefly for 
building up the economic and social infrastructure;
3. A projection of private investment among various 
major sectors;
4. Policy measures (especially in the fiscal, finan­
cial, foreign trade, foreign exchange and foreign investment 
fields) to stimulate, direct and influence private investment;
5. Sectoral programs containing individual projects;
and
6. Policies aiming at basic institutional changes, 
including land reform and labor policy.
There seems to be a consensus among economists that 
there are no objective criteria that can be generally applied 
to economic planning in underdeveloped countries. This is 
largely due to the lack of sufficient information and the in­
adequacy of,the price system. It is, therefore, most approp­
riate to evaluate the Five-Year Plan of Syria in terms of the 
set goals and achievements (as has been suggested by Myrdal 
and has already been done in the first part of this chapter), 
as well as in terms of the criteria suggested by Lewis.
Syria does not have a completely planned economy, nor 
does it have a predominantly private enterprise system.
Rather, it has a "mixed economy", in which the government 
plays a direct role in providing economic and social
185
infrastructure and in guiding and controlling private economic 
activity. One of the declared objectives of the Five-Year 
Plan (stated in Chapter IV) was to seek and encourage the 
cooperation of private enterprise. As a result, the private 
sector was allotted about 37 percent of the investment program 
of the Five-Year Plan. The policies of the government, 
through the plan, have aimed at stimulating private 
investment.
The other factor considered by Lewis in assessing a 
development plan is the size of expenditure. In preparing 
the Five-Year Plan, the Syrian.authorities took into consid­
eration the needs of the countly. Apparently, most of the 
limitations mentioned by Lewis were encountered in the execu­
tion of the plan. It was obvious that the investment achieve­
ments in the first two years of the plan fell short of the 
objectives. Some of the reasons accounting for this result 
were the overestimation of available funds, the lack of ad­
ministrative competence and the absence of preliminary re­
searches. It seems that the resources of the country were 
not given proper consideration in the preparation of the plan.
Another way of appraising a development plan is to 
look at the priorities, Lewis attaches great significance 
to projects in basic surveys and researches, basic training 
and education, public utilities, and balance between the 
countryside and the towns. The Syrian Five-Year Plan seems 
to have followed these priorities closely. The tables in
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the Appendix, describing the Implementation of projects In 
the first two years, show that large amounts of the allocated 
funds were spent on basic surveys, training and public 
utilities. The balance In Investment between the countryside 
and the towns was given proper attention. This was Indicated 
In the provision of electricity, drinking water, education, 
health centers and social services to the rural areas. Pres­
tige expenditures seem to be absent from the plan. Although 
the expenditures allocated to the Irrigation and land reclama­
tion projects accounted for about 30.5 percent of the Five- 
Year Investment program, they were allocated to several 
Irrigation and land reclamation projects all over the country.
As far as balance among the economic sectors Is con­
cerned, the plan. In Its allocation of funds, seemed to favor 
the agricultural sector. It Is clear from the Investment 
program (shown In Table 37) that the agricultural sector (in­
cluding Irrigation and land reclamation) was allotted about 
40.4 percent of the total planned Investment. This seems to 
be consistent with the growth problems which were pointed out 
In Chapter II, mainly the stabilization of the agricultural 
sector. However, the actual Investment In the first two 
years of the plan was more evenly distributed among the 
various economic sectors. For Instance, the agricultural 
sector (Including Irrigation projects) received 22 percent 
of the total public Investment In the first two years. The 
power and fuel sector received 22 percent. Housing and
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public utilities received 20 percent, transport and communica­
tions 19 percent, education nine percent, industry four per­
cent, and the rest of the services four percent.
One may ask whether the investment program of the 
plan, as was drawn up, aimed at balanced growth or unbalanced 
growth. Ragnar Nurkse defines balanced growth as "more or 
less synchronized application of capital to a wide range of 
different industries".^ In this sense, it would seem that 
the plan did not aim at balanced growth. This was apparent 
from the allocation of the bulk of investment to the agri­
cultural sector. Also in the industrial sector the investment 
was concentrated more on raising the production of electricity 
than on a wide range of different industries.
By and large, the Five-Year Plan was intended to 
provide a pragmatic solution to the problems hindering the 
sustained growth of the Syrian economy.
Economic Growth in Syria During 
Two Years of Planning
Thus far, the execution of the individual plans of 
the first two years and the record of achievement of both 
plans vis-a-vis the Five-Year Economic and Social Development 
Plan has been studied.
It is now appropriate to pose one important question. 
What was the effect of the two years of planning on the
^Nurkse, op. cit., p. 11.
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various sectors of the Syrian economy? At the present time, 
it is difficult to assess the contribution of the development 
expenditure, undertaken in the first two years of the plan, 
to the rate of growth of the Syrian economy. Some of the 
projects were started long before the implementation of the 
plan, such as the Ghab and Ashame, while others of long- 
range nature, such as the Euphrates and Khabour, will not 
yield any result for many years to come.
Although it is difficult yet to establish for sure 
the direct effect of two years of planning on the economy, 
an examination of the national income figures during this 
period may help to indicate the trend of growth of the 
economy. In Table 58, the financial year 1959/1960 is taken 
as a base year for the purpose of comparison.
The agricultural sector which constituted about 31.9 
percent of the national income in the base year has grown by 
6.2 percent in the first year 1960/1961. This rate of growth 
is quite moderate because of the averse natural factors. Al­
though the time distribution of rainfall was good, it was 
lower than the average quantity which usually gives a moderate 
yield, especially in the big region of agricultural produc­
tion. In addition, a heat wave scorched a large part of the 
cereal crops in the month of May. However, the progress 
realized in agriculture in 1960/1961 by comparison to 1959/ 
i960 was due to the natural factors which, though not as good 
as expected were, nevertheless, more favorable than during
Sector
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Agriculture 679 31.9 721 32.2 6.2 1,011 37.8 40.2 48.9
Industry 328 15.4 346 15.5 5.5 369 13.8 6.6 12.5
Construction 98 4.6 118 5.3 20.4 124 4.7 5.1 26.5
Transport and
138 136 11.8Communications 6.5 6.1 -1.5 152 5.7 10.1
Trade 314 14.7 322 14.4 2.6 378 14.2 17.4 20.4
Finance 45 2.1 39 1.7 -13.3 41 1.5 5.1 -8.9
Residential
Dwellings 166 7.8 174 7.8 4.8 181 6.8 4.0 9.0
General Government 180 8.5 192 8.5 6.7 212 7.9 10.4 17.8
Services 180 8.5 192 8.5 6.7 204 7.6 6.3 13.3
Total 2,128 100.0 2,240 100.0 5.3 2,672 100.0 19.3 25.6
Source: Calculated from S.A.R., Statistical Abstract, 1962, Table 3, P- ^95.
^ e t  Domestic Product at Factor Cost. ^Average for i960 and 196I.
*^ At Constant Prices of 1956. ®Average for 1961 and 1962.
c
Average figures for 1959 and i960.
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the three preceding years of drought. Another factor was 
partly the implementation of the plan. The irrigation proj­
ects of a long period of gestation were not expected to con­
tribute to such progress. It was rather the investments in 
such projects as fertilization, the use of improved sowing 
seeds, and the expansion of cultivated areas which gave 
immediate results within the year.
This shows the agricultural sector to be still subject 
to severe oscillations, in spite of the fact that the first 
year plan was able to help stabilize it in 196I and increase 
its general revenue in the fiscal year 196O/1961. In I960/
1961 the agriculture income accounted for 32.2 percent of the 
national income.
However, in the fiscal year 1961/1962, the agricultural 
sector registered a more impressive rate of growth over the 
preceding year. This is evident from the 40.2 percent in­
crease in agricultural income in this particular year. Most 
of this increase was largely due to the favorable natural 
factors and a good rainy season. The long range irrigation 
projects under execution could not have possibly influenced 
such growth, but some agricultural projects may have con­
tributed to it.
In the first two years of the Five-Year Plan, agri­
cultural income has grown by about 40.9 percent over the base 
year. This is a rather remarkable achievement, and undoubted­
ly contributes to the stability of the agricultural sector
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which is one of the major goals of the plan. In fact, the 
agricultural income by the end of 1962 reached a peak level 
of L.S. 1,217 million, instead of the figure shown in Table 
58 for the fiscal year 1961/1962. The agricultural share of 
the national income has grown to 37*8 percent in 1961/1962.
The industrial sector has shown a moderate rate of 
growth of 5-5 percent in the first year and 6.6 percent in
the second year. In the first two years of the plan, the
industrial income has grown by about 12.5 percent over the 
base year. The rate of growth in this sector cannot be com­
pared with that in the agricultural sector, because agricul­
ture is the backbone of the economy and the major source of 
income. However, this rate of growth was partly attributed 
to the new capacities established during the years preceding 
the first year plan, and partly to the projects initiated by
the first and second year plans.
The building and construction sector witnessed a 
great expansion, second only to agriculture, in the first two 
years of the plan. The growth rate in this sector during the 
first two years of the plan reached 26.5 percent over the 
base year. This rate of growth may rightfully be attributed 
to the plan, because of the relatively great funds invested 
in this sector.
Trade, finance, transport and communications were not 
able to expand in 196O/1961 by comparison to 1959/1960, be­
cause of the collapse of banking activities which led to the
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reduction in monetary transfers, documentary credits, dis­
counts, and the reduction in the quantity of goods transported 
from production centers to ports, • Only the trade sector 
registered 2.6 percent increase, while the transport and 
communications declined by 1,5 percent and finance fell by
13.3 percent.
However, this trend was reversed in 196I/1962, when 
the transport and communications sector registered 11.8 per­
cent increase over the previous year, and the trade sector 
rose by 17,4 percent. Although the finance sector has some­
what recovered in 1961/I962, the record for both years showed 
a decline of 8.9 percent over the base year. Altogether, the 
transport and communications sector witnessed an expansion of 
10,1 percent in the first two years of the plan over the base 
year, and the trade sector showed 20.4 percent growth by the 
end of the second year over the 1959/1960 level.
The rental income showed a relatively moderate rate 
of growth of 4.8 percent in the first year and four percent 
in the second year. In both years the rental income has 
grown by nine percent over the base year.
The government sector showed a growing rate of expan­
sion which was necessitated by the role it has assumed. In 
both years of the plan, it has grown by 17.8 percent over the 
base year.
Income from services increased by 13.3 percent in 
both years. This was largely due to the great expansion of
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both public and private services which was effected by the 
plan.
According to Table 58, national income has grown 
from L.S. 2,128 million in 1959/1960 to L.S. 2,240 million in 
1960/1961, or 5.3 percent. In the fiscal year 196I/1962, na­
tional income rose to L.S. 2,672 million, or 19.3 percent 
over the previous year. This Jump in the rate of growth was 
mainly due to the expansion of the agricultural sector. How­
ever, in the first two years of the plan, national income 
witnessed a growth of 25-6 percent over the 1959/1960 level.
In fact, the end of the year figures showed that the national 
income has grown from L.S. 2,133 million in 1959 to L.S.
2,987 million in 1962, a growth of 40 percent.
It is obvious that agriculture is the major component 
of national income, and its rate of growth greatly influences 
that of national income. It is the central force around 
which the economic activity of the country rotates. It will 
be recalled that the main concern of the Five-Year Plan was 
to regulate the agricultural activity and production in such 
a way as to sustain its rate of growth at a high level in 
order to attain the economic stability which is so much needed 
for the plan to achieve its goals.
If the government can succeed in this endeavor under 
the plan, then there is a better chance for growth to be sus­
tained. The reasons for the necessity of maintaining the 
high level of agricultural income and its growth, at this
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stage of plfiuining, are manifold.
1. The level of agricultural income directly influ­
ences the volume of national income.
2. Agricultural income has an indirect effect on the 
economic activity of the country insofar as it affects the 
levels of income of the other sectors in the economy. Agri­
cultural products furnish the raw material for some major 
industries, such as textile and canning.
3. With the measures taken to limit land ownership 
and the subsequent distribution of land to farmers, it is 
quite possible that the rise in income could be more widely 
diffused throughout the population, leading to a higher pur­
chasing power and expansion of the home market.
4. Agriculture has a direct effect on the balance of 
payments position. It is a major source of foreign exchange, 
since over 75 percent of the exports are agricultural prod­
ucts. Foreign exchange revenues from this source do not 
merely help to redress the balance of payments deficits, but 
also aid in financing the import of machinery and equipment 
required for the execution of the plan.
5. The savings which result from the high level of 
agricultural income can be channelled into financing the 
development projects of the other sectors of the economy.
Thus, it is desirable to strengthen the agricultural 
sector and maintain its high rate of growth, at least until 
the industrial sector catches up and balanced growth becomes
195
a normal condition. The prospects for the success of the 
plan in effecting a steady rate of growth regularly sustained 
become greater.
However, expanding agricultural production in a world 
market, which is showing ever-increasing exportable surpluses, 
may spell danger and uncertainty to the economy. It exposes 
the Syrian economy to the vagaries of international price 
fluctuations of agricultural products, particularly of cotton 
and wheat. It would seem that the main requirement in agri­
culture is to diversify output with emphasis on such products 
for which there is large potential demand locally and abroad. 
At present, Syria imports large quantities of rice, raw sugar, 
fruits and live animals which can be locally produced and for 
which there is also a large and expanding market in neighbor­
ing Arab countries.
Agricultural exports should be diversified as far as 
possible in order to minimize Syria's dependence mainly on 
two crops for its foreign exchange earnings. Should the 
yields or prices of these products fall in one year, the 
country would immediately face foreign exchange difficulties, 
as well as suffer from a fall in income. With its small share 
of total world production, Syria cannot hope to influence 
the international supply or prices of cotton or cereals 
whether by control of internal production or of stocks. It 
has to follow the policies set by major producers and make 
the best profits in the short run so long as they last. The
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weak position of Syria in this field is obvious. The best it 
would hope to do is to adjust itself to international changes 
as quickly as possible so as to minimize losses, and to ex­
ploit to the full any natural advantage, in the way of low 
costs, that it has in producing certain products. To diver­
sify production and stabilize yields, the area under irriga­
tion has to be extended. In order to raise productivity 
greater use must be made of fertilizers, chemicals, selected 
breeds and strains, and direct investment in more and better 
livestock and implements. To make the best of natural ad­
vantages for export pusposes, transport means have to be im­
proved; raw materials should be cleaned, graded and, if possi­
ble, processed; efficient storing, refrigerating and market­
ing organizations should be established in order to take 
advantage, among other things, of early-season production of 
cereals and of some fruits and vegetables.
As has been noted, most of these projects are embodied 
in the Five-Year Plan, and some of them are already under 
execution. As a matter of fact, the plan is well on its way 
toward achieving these objectives.
There is, however, one important condition which 
underlies the future success of the plan, and that is the 
political stability which is so essential for assuring the 
continuity of development and growth. If this factor can be 
guaranteed then Syria can succeed in launching the take-off.
So far, Syria has successfully fulfilled most of the
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preconditions for the take-off. The changes in attitudes, 
values, and social structure have become conducive to growth. 
The transition from the traditional society to modem society 
has been effected. The feudal system has been uprooted. 
Revolutionary changes have been introduced and are taking 
place in agriculture and transportation. Modem manufactur­
ing enterprises using new methods of production have appeared 
and some of them have even become well established such as 
the textile industry. Financial institutions for mobilizing 
capital are well entrenched, and their contribution to 
development has become quite significant.
The central government has emerged as an indisputable 
powerful force in guiding the affairs of the country. It has 
resorted to economic and social planning as a means of regu­
lating and sustaining the rate of growth of the economy. Its 
efforts are manifested in the execution of the first two 
years of the Five-Year Plan, discussed earlier in this study.
The Five-Year Plan, like most plans, has its weak­
nesses, and many obstacles will have to be surmounted in the 
course of its implementation. Central economic planning in 
general is always a difficult task and, where it has been 
tried, has seldom been a complete success in the advanced 
countries. Now, what amounts to a sort of superplanning has 
to be staged by underdeveloped countries with weak political 
and administrative structures and largely illiterate popula­
tions. Ounnar Myrdal believes that there are reasons for
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expecting numerous mistakes and in many cases total failure 
and maintains that "the alternative to making the heroic 
attempt is continued acquiescence in economic and cultural 
stagnation, or regression, which is politically impossible 
in the world of today
However, the launching of the plan has brought about 
two important developments:
1. The willingness and readiness of the government 
to assume a vital role in solving the problems of economic 
growth and in removing the bottlenecks which have interrupted 
growth £uid prevented it from becoming sustained.
2. The establishment of the institutional framework 
for economic and social planning.
This course of action is irreversible. Experience in 
this field will contribute to further success in the future.
It may be reasonably concluded that Syria has entered 
the phase of the take-off. It may take the country more than 
three decades before it can pass on to the next stage of the 
drive to maturity. This, however, is a mere speculation. The 
take-off period may not even last that long, because Syria, 
unlike some underdeveloped countries, does not suffer from 
overpopulation. This may be foreseen as a helpful factor in 
speeding up the process of development and growth.
^Myrdal, op. cit., p. 86.
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this study, an attempt was made to answer 
two basic questions:
1. Has a steady rate of growth been sustained in 
Syria from 1950 to i960?
2. Nhat have been the contributions of economic 
pleuining in Syria? Has planning provided the answer to the 
fulfillment and maintenance of a sustained rate of growth in 
Syria?
In the process of answering the first question, the 
author traced the factors underlying the rate of growth of 
the Syrian economy from 1950 to i960 and pointed out the 
problems encountered in the process of development. The 
answer to the second question involved an examination of 
the attempts made to tackle these problems and an evaluation 
of the Five-Year Plan.
It became clear from the analysis presented in 
Chapter II that the scarcity of goods and the expenditures 
of Allied Forces during the war, reinforced by profit oppor­
tunities and manipulated by an "investment conscious" busi­
ness community which has engaged in little conspicuous
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spending, induced the expansion of agricultural output and 
made possible the establishment of modern industry immediately 
after the end of the Second World War. These motivating 
forces set the Syrian economy on the path to growth. Later 
on, the Koresm War and the cotton boom contributed to the 
consolidation of that growth and led to further expansion 
of production and income.
Despite this rapid upsurge of the economy, which 
occurred early in the fifties, Syria was unable to maintain 
a steady rate of growth. This was manifested in the fluctua­
tion of the rate of growth of national income throughout the 
decade. It was shown in Chapter II that national income 
grew steadily from L.S. 1,380 million in 1950 to L.S. 2,176 
million in 195%. This represented 57.6 percent growth in 
four years, or an average annual rate of l4.4 percent. In 
1955, however, not only was national income unable to main­
tain the level reached in 1954, but actually dropped by about 
11.8 percent to a level of L.S. 1,920 million. In 1956, 
national income rose by about 19*9 percent over the 1955 
level to L.S. 2,303 million. This level exceeded the 1954 
level by about 5.8 percent. In 1957, national income grew 
by about 6.4 percent over the previous year to L.S. 2,451 _  
million. In 1958, the level of national income dropped by 
about l4.2 percent to L.S. 2,102 million. In 1959, national 
income rose by about 1.5 percent to L.S. 2,133 million, and 
in i960, it dropped by about 0.5 percent to L.S. 2,123 million.
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However, on I96I, the trend was reversed, and national income 
started gaining momentum by rising to L .S .  2,357 million, a 
rate of growth of about 11 percent over the previous year.
The growth of the economy was even more impressive in 1962, 
when national income reached a peak level that was never 
attained before. This was L.S. 2,987 million, an increase of 
about 26.7 percent over the 1961 level, and for the first 
time surpassing the previous record reached in 1957 by about 
22 percent.
In general, a rather surprisingly high rate of growth 
was achieved from 1950 to 1957 which was interrupted only in 
1955. From 1958 to 1960, the rate of growth tapered off and, 
in fact, the economic activity fell drastically throughout 
most of this period. In 196I, the trend was reversed and 
economic growth started gaining momentum, until the level of 
income reached in 1962 surpassed the previous record of 1957.
It followed from the above trend of economic develop­
ment in Syria that the high rate of growth attained in the 
early part of the decade, 1950-1957, was not regularly sus­
tained, in spite of the fact that the rate of gross invest­
ment never fell below 11 percent of national income and 
actually averaged about l4 percent annually.^
There were several factors responsible for the slow 
down and irregularity of the rate of growth. To begin with,
^Throughout the decade, the ratio of gross investment 
to national income fluctuated between 11 and 19 percent. The 
maximum ratio was reached in i960.
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when the favorable wartime conditions, which contributed to 
the rapid growth In the postwar period, spent their force, 
economic expansion seemed to slow down considerably there­
after. The activity of private enterprise, which played a 
prominent role In the postwar expansion, was hindered by the 
shortage of overhead facilities. By 1955, the Syrian economy 
reached a stage In Its development at which the government 
was forced to undertake a more Important promotional role. 
Private enterprise alone became unable to maintain the past 
rate of growth because, within the given prevailing condi­
tions, agricultural expansion reached Its zenith. The amount 
of Idle land that could be cultivated, within the capacity of 
private enterprise and without significant Investment, was 
severely diminished, and agricultural prices no longer 
afforded such a powerful stimulus to the expansion of 
acreage. It was obvious that the extension of Irrigated 
area depended Increasingly on public Investment, particularly 
since the area which could be economically Irrigated by pri­
vately Installed pumps could not be greatly expanded. 
Furthermore, high transport costs and the low (Quality of 
wheat became serious handicaps to Syria In an Increasingly 
competitive world wheat market.
The unreliability of rainfall and the frequent re­
currence of drought was peitiaps the major cause of the fall 
In agricultural production and Income. The drought In 1955 
was mainly responsible for the fall In Income. This happened
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again in three consecutive years 1958, 1959 and i960. No 
economy, so heavily dependent upon agriculture, could survive 
such natural catastrophes and still be able to maintain a 
high rate of growth.
The need for widespread irrigation projects became 
imminent. The continual availability of water supplies in 
abundance was the only means by which the economy could be 
safeguarded against the scarcity of rainfall and drought be­
cause, by stabilizing the agricultural sector, the stability 
of the entire economy could be secured.
Positive action was needed to maintain and stimulate 
Syria's wheat exports by providing better and cheaper trans­
port and establishing facilities for the storage, grading 
and cleaning of cereals in order to reduce losses and improve 
quality. Certain measures were needed for raising agricul­
tural and livestock yields. Stimulation of the use of se­
lected seeds and better implements was required in order to 
improve crop rotation in the direction of soil-building crops 
and greater diversification.
By 1 9 5 5 f it became clear that the economy was facing 
an acute shortage of electric power. Transport became the 
most important bottleneck in the economy. While the expan­
sion of the production base of the economy was the paramount 
problem, the extension of educational facilities, the improve­
ment of public health and housing conditions, as well as the 
provision of other important social services, required
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Immediate attention.
Most of these problems called for a substantial In­
crease In public Investment. The government became Increas­
ingly aware of the need for assuming a positive role In the 
economy. Several foreign experts were Invited to study the 
economic problems of Syria and advise the government on the 
means to solve them. The concern of the government was 
further testified to by Its request for an International Bank 
Mission In 1954 to work out recommendations for development. 
The reports and recommendations of these experts were pre­
sented In Chapter III.
Consequently, the Issues raised In the second ques­
tion concerning the contributions of economic pi ginning toward 
the solution of these problems were tackled In the latter 
part of this study.
It became apparent that economic planning was a 
necessity. The first step came In 1955 when the government 
Issued the Extraordinary Budget for Economic Development em­
bodying the Seven-Year Plein. The Institutional freunework 
required for the formation eind execution of the pleui was 
founded by the establishment of the Economic Council guid the 
Economic Development Institute.
As pointed out In Chapter III, the execution of the 
Seven-Year Plgui was halted In 1956, as a result of the soar­
ing military expenditures necessitated by the Suez crisis. 
Immediately following the Suez crisis, Syria sought foreign
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aid from the Soviet Union which resulted in the ratification 
of the Syro-Soviet Economic and Technical Aid Agreement in 
1957.
In 1958, shortly after the unity with Egypt was de­
clared, economic and social planning became an integral part 
of the economic policy of the government. The concept and 
goals of planning were broadened to cover not only the devel­
opment of economic resources but also the reorganization of 
the social structure. With the issuance of the Ten-Year 
Plan, a war was waged on ignorance, disease and poverty.
The Ten-Year Plan was broken down into two stages for 
the purpose of implementation and follow-up. The Five-Year 
Economic and Social Development Plein, described in Chapter 
IV, was put to execution in 196O/1961. Details of the execu­
tion emd follow-up of the first two years of this pleui were 
discussed in Chapter V.
The plan was evaluated in terms of the set goals and 
accomplishments in the first two years, as suggested by 
Myrdal, as well as in terms of the criteria suggested by 
W. Arthur Lewis. These methods of evaluation were chosen by 
this author because, as the discussion in Chapter V indicated, 
there were no generally acceptable objective criteria that 
could be applied to economic planning in underdeveloped 
countries. This was largely due to the lack of sufficient 
information and the inadequacy of the price system.
Myrdal suggested that the plan and its targets had in
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the final analysis to be determined by decisions which repre­
sented choices made among different, alternatively possible, 
sets of goals and means. These choices were policy decisions 
reached in terms of national development goals as determined 
by the political process. Lewis considered three maJor~fac- 
tors to be important in assessing a development plan. The 
first factor was the contribution of the plan to policy-making. 
In other words, the plan should be assessed in terms of the 
adequacy of the policies adopted in stimulating private in­
vestment. The other factor was the size of expenditure #iich, 
according to Lewis, must be determined on the basis of the 
country's resources rather than its needs. The limitations 
to the size of the investment program in most underdeveloped
countries were considered by Lewis to be not only financial,
but physical resources including political and administrative 
capacity. The third factor was priorities. Lewis attached 
great significance to investments in basic surveys and re­
searches, basic training and education, public utilities, 
and balance between the countryside and the towns.
Accordingly, iu evaluating the Five-Year Plan of 
Syria, it was shown that the public sector invested about 78 
percent of the funds allocated for its projects in the first 
year 1960/1961, or about l6.4 percent of its share in the
I. ... 4 ■ ’
Five-Year investment program. In the second fiscal year 
1961/1962, the public sector invested only 49.2 percent of 
the funds appropriated for its projects, accounting for about
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13.1 percent of its share In the Five-Year Plan. In the 
first two fiscal years 196O/1961 and 196I/1962, the aggregate 
expenditures of the public sector accounted for about 30 per­
cent of its planned share in the Five-Year Plan.
The performance of the private sector was more im­
pressive. In the first year, the private sector scored about 
111 percent accomplishment of its allocated investment, ac­
counting for about 19 percent of its share in the Five-Year 
investment program. In the second year, the private sector 
invested the entire funds allocated for its projects, which 
accounted for 15*7 percent of its share in the Five-Year Plan. 
In both years, the aggregate funds invested by the private 
sector amounted to about 34.6 percent of its total share in 
the Five-Year Plan.
The total performance of both sectors in the first 
year amounted to 88 percent of the first year investment 
program, representing 17*3 percent of the Five-Year total 
investment program. In the second year, the total performance 
of both sectors amounted to 62 percent of the second year 
investment program and represented l4.1 percent of the total 
investment planned by the Five-Year Plan. The overall in­
vestments by both sectors in the first two years reached 
L.S. 854.25 million, accounting for about 31.4 percent of 
the investment program of the Five-Year Plfui.
Most of the problems encountered in the execution of 
the plan were of technical and administrative nature, as
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mentioned In Chapter V. The public Investment program was 
oriented more toward furnishing the needed social overhead 
facilities. About two-thirds of the public investment in 
both years went to productive projects and one-third to 
public service projects.
It was stated in Chapter V that Syria had a "mixed 
economy" in which the government played a direct role in 
providing economic and social infrastructure and in guiding 
and controlling private economic activity. One of the de­
clared objectives of the Five-Year Plan (stated in Chapter 
IV) was to seek and encourage the cooperation of private 
enterprise. As a result, the private sector was allotted 
about 37 percent of the investment program of the Five-Year 
Plan. It would, thus, seem that the policies of the govern­
ment, through the plan, aimed at stimulating private 
investment.
In preparing the Five-Year Plan, the Syrian author­
ities took into consideration the needs of the country. 
Apparently, most of the limitations mentioned by Lewis were 
encountered in the execution of the plan. It was obvious 
that the investment achievements, in the first two years of 
the plan, fell short of the objectives. Some of the reasons 
accounting for this result were the overestimation of avail­
able funds, the lack of administrative competence, and the 
absence of complete preliminary researches concerning the 
individual projects, at the time the funds were appropriated.
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It seemed that the resources of the country were not given 
proper consideration in the preparation of the plan.
It was further shown that the Syrian Five-Year Plan 
followed closely the priorities emphasized by Lewis. The 
tables in the Appendix, describing the implementation of 
projects in the first two years, showed that large amounts 
of the allocated funds were spent on basic surveys, training 
and public utilities. It also seemed that the balance in 
investment between the countryside and the towns was given 
proper attention. This was indicated in the provision of 
electricity, drinking water, education, health centers and 
social services to the rural areas. Prestige expenditures 
were absent from the plan. Although the expenditures allo­
cated to the irrigation and land reclamation projects ac­
counted for about 30.5 percent of the Five-Year investment 
program, they were not assigned to one project. As a matter 
of fact, they were allocated to several irrigation and land 
reclamation projects all over the country.
As far as balance among the economic sectors was con­
cerned, the plan seemed to favor the agricultural sector in 
its allocation of funds. It was clear from the investment 
program (shown in Table 37) that the agricultural sector (in­
cluding irrigation and land reclamation) was allotted about 
40.4 percent of the total planned investment. This seemed to 
be consistent with the growth problems which were pointed out 
in Chapter II, mainly the stabilization of the agricultural
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sector. However, the actual Investment In the first two 
years of the plan was more evenly distributed among the 
various economic sectors. For instance, the agricultural 
sector (including irrigation projects) received 22 percent 
of the total public investment in the first two years. The 
power and fuel sector received 22 percent. Housing and pub­
lic utilities received 20 percent, transport and communica­
tions 19 percent, education nine percent, industry four per­
cent, and the rest of the services four percent.^ The reason 
why industry received only four percent was because the power 
and fuel (electricity and oil) were dealt with separately and 
because the private sector was given greater share of the 
investment in industry.
It would also seem that the plan, as was drawn up, 
did not aim at balanced growth. This was apparent from the 
allocation of the bulk of investment to the agricultural 
sector. In the industrial sector, the investment was con­
centrated more on raising the production of electricity than 
on a wide range of different industries. By and large, the 
Five-Year Plan was intended to provide a pragmatic solution 
to the problems hindering the sustained growth of the Syrian 
economy.
However, at the present rate of execution, the gov­
ernment may not be able to complete the implementation of the
^The rest of the services included public health, 
social and labor services, and public administration.
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Five-Year Plan by the end of the fiscal year 1964/1965. The 
investment program totalling L.S. 2,720 million cannot 
possibly be fulfilled. This program was overly ambitious.
The plan assumed average fair weather conditions. It also 
assumed fairly stable political conditions.
The first assumption is beyond the control of the 
government, because the average rainfall varies from one year 
to another. While rainfall was below the average in 1960/1961, 
it rose above the average in 1961/1962. The fact that this 
assumption is hard to attain presents in itself the very 
problem which the plan aims to solve. This can be achieved 
only in the long run after the irrigation projects are 
implemented.
The latter assumption also did not stand. Since the 
initiation of the plan, Syria has witnessed two military 
coups d'etat, in September 196I and March 1963, with a major 
political shake-up in July 1963. The government is contin­
uously threatened by constant attempts to overthrow it. It 
is unrealistic to assume political stability under the present 
conditions. Syria has been in a constant state of war with 
Israel since 1948, a condition which necessitated high defense 
budgets even at the expense of development.
With political instability prevailing and the nation­
alization laws taking place, it is hardly possible to create 
a conducive and healthy climate for private enterprise to 
operate. The participation and full cooperation of private
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enterprise, presumed by the plan, cannot be counted upon. 
However, political stability for Syria is a relative matter. 
Undoubtedly, the creation of political stability can help a 
great deal in speeding up the implementation of the plan and 
assuring continual progress and sustained growth.
Syria has had a checkered history of economic devel­
opment. As to the stage it has reached in economic develop­
ment, it may be reasonably concluded that the economy has 
passed the stage of the preconditions for the take-off.^ It 
has successfully fulfilled most of the conditions for the 
take-off, in that the rate of gross investment of the national 
income has been maintained above the 10 percent level stip­
ulated by Rostow. Also, the emergence of the textile industry 
together with the cement and canning industries, as substan­
tial manufacturing sectors demonstrating a high rate of growth, 
fulfills Rostow*s second condition for the bake-off. The 
emergence of the central government as a powerful force in 
guiding the economic and social affairs of the country through 
planning, together with the existence of the required insti­
tutional framework, all of which, tending to exploit the im­
pulses to expansion, testify to the fact that Syria has ful­
filled the conditions for the take-off.
It may be reasonably concluded that economic planning 
has proved to be the answer to Syria's problems of economic
^The year i960, upon the issuance of the Five-Year 
Plan, may be arbitrarily considered as the turning point 
from the preconditions stage to the take-off phase.
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growth. The growing public investment in agriculture and 
irrigation, fuel and power, transport, housing and public 
utilities, is an indication of the concentration of efforts 
to remove the bottlenecks which have prevented the economy 
from sustaining its rate of growth.
This author maintains that strengthening the agricul­
tural sector and stabilizing its production and income should 
be the prime tasks of the government. Since agriculture in 
Syria is the major component of national income, and its rate 
of growth greatly influences that of national income, main­
taining its high rate of growth will tremendously improve the 
chances for growth to be sustained. A high level of agricul­
tural income can help improve the balance of payments posi­
tion of Syria and provide the savings which can be channelled 
into financing the development projects of the other sectors 
of the economy.
However, to maintain a high level of agricultural in­
come, productivity must be raised and diversification in out­
put is needed. To diversify output and stabilize yields, the 
area under irrigation must be extended and irrigation projects 
must be speeded up. In order to raise productivity, greater 
use must be made of fertilizers, chemicals, selected seeds 
and breeds, and better implements.
The future success of the plan will also depend on 
the full cooperation of private enterprise. Since the 
activity of this sector has proved to be successful and its
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past contribution to growth Is unquestionable. Its full 
participation must be sought and encouraged. So long as the 
government regulates and controls the operations of private 
enterprise. It can easily direct Its Investments In the pro­
ductive projects scheduled by the plan.
Furthermore, the creation of an environment of greater 
political stability will undoubtedly enhance the prospects 
of success of development efforts and will tend to assure a 
sustained rate of growth.
APPENDIX
IMPLEMENTATION OP PROJECTS DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS 
OP THE SYRIAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN
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TABLE 1
IMPLEMENTATION OP IRRIGATION AND LAND RECLAMATION
PROJECTS IN 1960/1961
(L.S. THOUSAND)
0) -P
Actual
Investment
Project
(d g>
a m 
82
1 -
■p
1
•p
SA
a 0
A. Public Sector
1. Euphrates Project
study of Storage Dam 3,250 2,470 76
Study of Lower Basin 3,750 2,992 80
Total 7,000 5,462 78
2. Khabour Project 3,000 2,055 68
3. Ohab and Ashame Projects 
Dams and Arches 25,575 25,451 99
Drainage Works 1,778 1,778 100
Irrigation Works 5,999 5,998 100
Roads 1,262 1,261 100
Various Works 5,386 4,898 91
Total 40,000 39,386 98
4. Upper Orontes Basin 500 240 48
5. Rouge Project 4,000 2,547 64
6. Sinn Project 1,975 954 48
7. Barada and Awaj Projects 700 236 34
8. Yarmouk Project 2,625 1,369 52
9. Irrigation of Southern 
Frontier Land 70 12 17
10. Land Reclamation 2,000 583 29
11. Various Projects 
Study of Dams and Irriga­
tion Canals 200 136 68
Flood Control In Hama 230 68 30
Administrative and Expropria­
tion Expenses 2,300 2,918 127
Total 2,730 3,122 114
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Project
Actual 
1g ^  Investment 
■p a________■_______
A  m -P +3 m
I l  I
| S  I< < O 44
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12. Agrarian Reform Authority
Projects 700 284 41
13. Ministry of Public Works 
Projects
Exploitation of Irrigation 
Canals 95 85 89
Expenses for Water Measure­
ments 4o 38 95
Total 135 123 91
Total of Public Sector 65,435 56,373 86
B. Private Sector 10,000 9,463 95
Grand Total of Irrigation and Land
Reclamation 75,436 65,836 87
Source; S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year
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TABLE 2
EXECUTION OP AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS IN I96O/I96I
(L.S. THOUSAND)
•o
0) -P
Actual
Investment
Project
(d Q)
A  ea 
22 1
+» •p m
S A
p A
M0) 4-1 
A  0
Public Sf 'tor 
A. Hinis^ ry of Agriculture 
1 ^rlcultural Projects: 
Cotton and Cereals
Seeds Breeding 1,824 1,094 60
Trees and Forestation 1,424 723 51
Crops Protection 999 999 100
Total 4,247 2,816 66
2. Animal Resources:
Water and Fodder 1,496 1,496 100
Fodder Warehouses 500 82 16
Improvement of Breeds 4l6 4l6 100
Veterinary Care 823 823 100
Development of Fisheries 109 35 32
Total 3,344 2,852 85
3. Agricultural Guidance 703 672 96
4. Technical Training and
.Education. 610 610 100
5. Experimental Stations and
Research 2,716
3,840
2,701 100
6. Silos 1,042 27
7. Wells and Underground
Water Supply- 2,500 1,696 68
Total of Ministry of
Agriculture 17,960 12,389 69
a
I.
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Actual 
« 4a Investment
3 1
Project Am -p +Ï M
2 0) C C k 2;>  p  0) (Ü
' I
P4 o
crarlan Reform
1. Foul Breeding Station at Hama
2. Cow Stations at Delr Ezzor,
300 204 68
Hama & Ghab 2,675 506 19
3. Cooperatives
4. Farm, Engineering and Office
170 51 30
Equipment 1,833 1,398 76
5. Forestation, Tree Nurseries 305 142 47
6. Reserve Fund 3,413 —
Total Ministry of Agrarian
.Reform 8,696 2,301 26
Total Public Sector 26,656 14,690 55
II. Private Sector 30,000 41,470 138
Grand Total of Agriculture 56,656 56,160 99
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year
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TABLE 3
IMPLEMENTATION OF INDUSTRIAL, MINING AND GEOLOGY
PROJECTS, IN 1960/1961
(L.S. THOUSAND)
T3
(U -P
•y C«5 0)
Actual
Investment
Project (44a0, m
II
<
-p
1
p 
P  CO 
C U U  ® -H bJ 0 Pci 0) k >4 <U
Ph 0
Industry
A. Public Sector
Nitrogen Fertilizers Plant 1,100 31 3^
Technical Training 1,700 1,055 62
National Salt Factory 1,000 - -
Aid to Yams and Fabrics Fund 500 500 100
Economic Institute Projects 3,500 1,028 29
Industrial Projects Authority 1,270 66 5^
Rural Industries, Training 732 478 65
Agricultural Industries 1,000 659 66
Total Public Sector 
Reserves in First Year Plan
10,802
1,290
3,817 35
Total After Deduction
.of Reserves 9,512 3,817 40
B. Private Sector 27,000 46,000 170
Total of Industry 36,512 49,817 136
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•o0) -P
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Investment
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II. Mining and Geology
Geological Maps 2,200 1,600 73
Topographical Map 2,500 1,500 60
Iron Ore Prospection 1,857 1,600 86
Chrome and Manganese Prospection 150 285 190
Salt Rocks Prospection 400 285 71
Phosphates Prospection 450 285 63
Total
Reserves in First Year Plan
7,557
1,800
5,555 73
Total After Deduction of
Reserves 5,757 5,555 96
Grand Total of Industry,
Mining and Geology 42,269 55,372 131
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year
a
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TABLE 4
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF POWER AND FUEL 
PROJECTS IN 1960/1961 
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project
•o4) +)
I IA m 
k >
1 “
Actual
Expenditures
-p
I
n
C A O  
4) AtH 
O <  -P
k cd4) 4h H 
A  O k
I. Electrlcits 
A. Public £
' Projects 
lector
1.
Damascus Co. 3,950 6,055 153
Aleppo Co. 3,085 3,767 122
Horns and Hama Co. 4,001 3,122 78
Delr Ezzor Co. 96 70 73
Kamlshll Co. 334 224 67
Total 11,466 13,238
Transfers to Ministry of
Education 250
Total after Deduction of
.Transfers 11,216 13,238 118
Ministry of Municipalities
Electricity for Wadi Barada 150 150 100
Jdaydet el Wadi 30 30 100
Yabroud 100 62 62
Ime 25 25 100
Mshata, Ayoun el Wadi,
Kfareln 120 120 100
Salma, Drelklsh, Kanawat 94 34 36
New Electric Unit, Sllfne 40 40 100
Total 559 46l 82
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Project
•o0 -pII
01 ta
i l
<
Actual
Expenditures
I § | lo <  p  k (tf tt) *H 04 O h
II.
3. Municipal Electricity 
Projects 4,100 3,230 79
Total Public Sector 
Reserve Fund
15,875
1,066
16,929
Total after Deduction of 
Reserves 14,809 16,929 114
B. Private Sector 1,000
Total Electricity Projects 15,809 16,929 107
Petroleum Projects 
A. Public Sector 
1. Prospection
Survey under Contract 
No. 944 
Prospection at Karatshok 
Deep Drilling
2,000
5,000
9,000
2,232
3,077
6,404
112
61
71
Total 16,000 11,713 73
2. Storage and Transport 
Completion of Tanks in 
Governorates 
Latakia Pipeline Network 
Latakia and Homs Tanks 
Butane Tank, Homs Refinery 
Pipelines for Oil Products
1,300
500
2,000
300
5,200
1,300
129
52
237
5,821
100
26
3
79
112
Total 9,300 7,539 81
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Project
•o
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rt g
PU CQ
II
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i
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i l l
o <  -P k (d 
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d« o k
3. 011 By-Products 
Butane Unit 
Oxygen Unit
100
250 35 14
Total 350 35 10
Total Public Sector 
Reserve Fund
25,650
6,250
19,287
Total after Deduction 
of Reserves 19,400 19,287 99
B. Private Sector 2,000 - -
Total Petroleum Projects 21,400 19,287 90
Grand Total of Power and 
Fuel 37,209 36,216 97
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year
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TABLE 5
EXECUTION OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
PROJECTS IN 1960/1961
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project
"O0)
"a 03
T! c 0.5
1
Actual
Investment
«
1 g |8 0) 0
I. Public Sector
1. Land Communications
Main Roads Outside Cities 17.923 16,081 90
Roads Inside Cities 7.500 6,711 89
Bridges 2,000 1.326 66
Railways 21,056 13.522 64
Transport Inside Cities 300 273 91
Total 48,779 37.913 78
2. Civil Aviation 
New Damascus Airport 3\800 170 4
Existing Airports 2)262 2,162 95
Syrian Arab Airways 9.^83
15.545
9.483 100
Total 11.815 76
3. Harbors 
Tartous Harbor 6,466 5.771 89
Latakia Harbor 5.506 1,634 — 30
Total 11.972 7.405 62
4. Wire and Wireless Communications 
Sbayne Receiving Station 525 164 31
Dimas Transmission Station 750 771 103
Telephone Network Expansion 10,610 1,484 14
Total 11,885 2,419 20
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•o Actual
® Investment
Project
H to 
Pt à
S i
1
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1 11 0) 0)
5. Postal Services
New Post Office Buildings 400 85 21
Means of Transport 300 18 6
Equipment 240 — — ■
Total 940 103 11
6. Television and Broadcasting 2,600 2,428 93
Total Investments by Public Sector 91,721 62,083
Reserve Fund 747
Total after Deduction of Reserves 90,974 62,083 68
II. Private Sector 20,000 27,000 135
Grand Total 110,974 89,083 80
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year
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table 6
EXECUTION OP EDUCATION PROJECTS IN I96O/196I
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project
a>
•p(d ta •Hft!
g S
I
Actual
Investment
I
"O P 0)
1. Various Stages of Education
Elementary-
Secondary
Teachers' Training 
Secondary Industrial 
Secondary Female 
High School Industrial 
High School Female 
High School Commercial 
School Health Services
. Total
2. Higher Education
Commerce College, Aleppo 
Technical Training College, Aleppo 
Agricultural College, Damascus 
College of Fine Arts, Damascus
Total
3. School Buildings Authority
Elementary School Buildings 
Secondary, High School and 
Teachers' Training Buildings 
Technical Education Buildings 
Liquidation of School Buildings 
Various Works
Total
4,328 3,394 78
666 224 34
466 249 53
837 463 55
50
803 Ü
28 16 57
114 41 36
185 153 83
7,477 5,023 67
300 254 85
1,174 1,127 96
456 290 63
400 212 53
2,330 1,883 81
4,008 3,947 98
1,114 1,114 100
1,878 1,877 100
6,500 6,100 94
500 400 80
14,000 13,438 96
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^ Actual
« Investment
«s CQ
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Project ^ -g-g
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4. Universities
A. Damascus University
Sites for Buildings 
Chemistry Department Wing 
Purchase of University City 
Sites
Construction of Buildings 
Equipment
Basement for Dental Department
400
635
1,213
500
100
15
634
1,211
466
100
15
49
100
100
93
100
100
Total 2,863 2,621 91
B. Aleppo University
Purchase of University City 
Sites
Construction of Buildings 
Equipment
650
1,212
100
649
635
100
100
52
100
Total 1,962 1,384 70
Scholarships
Ministry of Education 
Major Projects Administration 
Central Bank 
Foreign Scholarships
260
400
24
1,173
101
207
24
1,173
39
52
100
100
Total 1,857 1,505 81
Grand Total 30,489 25,854 85
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year Plan,
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TABLE 7
PLANNED AND REALIZED INVESTMENTS IN HEALTH SERVICE
PROJECTS DURING I96O/I96I
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project
■P
T3 C
0> 4)
s
+>as 03
rH 4)
O4 >a
H
Realized
Investment
I
+> tj
g 4) 
0> N
23o> (d04 0)
tn
I. Public Sector
1. New and Enlarged Hospitals
Swelda, Heuna^  Aleppo Hospitals 2,500 2,388 95
Hassakeh Hospital 930 569 61
Damascus Hospital, New Story 550 452 82
Expansion of Homs Hospital 400 305 76
Total 4,380 3,714 85
New and Expanded Clinics 
Two New Clinics, Idllb 110 90 82
New Clinic, Kadmous 80 71 89
Two New Clinics, Derta 130 125 96
Two New Clinics, Malkle 54 - -
Clinics In Mraybet, Dmalr, 
Sadad, Slrrln, Rakka 300 221 74
Industrial Labor Clinic, Delr 
Ezzor 60 50 83
Agricultural Labor Clinics, 
Hama, Rakka 60 5 8
New Yarmouk Camp Clinic 79 79 100
Total 873 641 73
3. Health Centers 465 182 39
4. Damascus Nursing School 450 450 100
5. Mobile Health Units 366 1 -
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Project
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6. Other Health Projects
Hospital and Clinic Equipment 2,020 1,210 60
Reconstruction, Kamlshll
Hospital 25 15 60
Expropriation of U.S. Mission
Hospital, Delr Ezzor 381 381 100
Expansion of Ministry of
Health Building 187 30 16
Kitchen of Ibn Slna Hospital 63 63 100
Repairs and Equipment, Delr
Ezzor Hospital 150 145 97
Total 2,826 1,844 65
7. Completion of Health Services
Buildings 405 329 81
Total Public Sector 9,765 7,161 73
II. Private Sector 2,000 - -
Grand Total 11,765 7,161 61
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year Plan^
pp. 90-91.
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TABLE 8
EXECUTION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, HOUSING, TOURISM
AND SUMMER RESORTS PROJECTS IN I96O/I96I
(L.S. THOUSAND)
X» c 0 0) 
G 8
Realized
Investment
Project S m• iH 0) 0. >
■p n
k (d 
& K
1
I. Public Sector
1. Drinking Water
Water Networks for Towns and 
Villages 
Drilling and Equipping Wells 
Maintenance of Drinking Water 
Water Supplies to Villages
5,675
^'856
1,200
4,660
951
82
90
100
79
Total 11,197 9,573 85
2. Town and Village Planning
3. Tourism and Summer Resorts
4. Housing
5. Independent Water Corporations
6. Municipalities
333
3,580
29,194
13,068
19,300
333
2,521
21,222
9,979
16,553
100
70
i
Total Public Sector 76,672 60,181 78
II. Private Sector
1. Residence Housing
2. Office Buildings
3. Recreation Projects
55,000
5,000
3,000
60,707
3,963
110
79
Total Private Sector 63,000 64,670 103
Grand Total 139,672 124,851 89
p. 9 2 .
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year Plan,
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TABLE 9
PLANNED AND REALIZED INVESTMENTS IN SOCIAL
AND LABOR SERVICES, I96O/I96I
(L.S. THOUSAND)
•p•o c 0) 0
§ p3 m
Realized
Investment
Project p
1
p tj
gg0) a
S
1. Industrial Labor Unions 96 62 64
2. Agricultural Training 30 19 63
3. Cooperative Establishments
4. Social Services
584 290 50
Equipping Three New Social Centers 522 434 83
Operating Social Centers 
Completion of Haslamye Delinquents
1,118 370 33
Center
Completion of Koudsaya Delinquents
148 109 74
Center 
Equipping and Operating
108 68 63
Delinquents Centers 
Model Institute for Rehabilitation
104 94 90
of Blind 290 1 -
Training of the Blind 
Completion of Social Centers at 
Harran el Awameed, el Bourghal,
49 4o 82
Ifreen
Studies for Construction of Social 
Centers in Hassake, Deir Ezzor,
1,155 814 70
Rakka 30 24 80
Total Social Services 3,524 1,954 55
Grand Total 4,234 2,325 55
p. 9 3 .
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year Plan,
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TABLE 10
PLANNED AND REALIZED INVESTMENTS IN CULTURAL AND
RECREATIONAL SERVICES, I96O/196I
(L..S. THOUSAND)
•d a
Realized
Investment
Project
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1
+> T)
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Ministry of Culture
Cultural Centers, Salaries of 
Employees 370 283 76
Establishment of Centers and 
Mobile Units 200 200 100
Purchase of Works of Art 65 59 91
Art Delegations, Conferences 70 29 4l
Implementation of Cultural Agreements 30 25 83
Translation, Publication, Lectures 85 72 85
Film Production 50 37 74
Literacy Campaign 95 59 62
Festivals, Conferences, Exhibitions 45 35 78
Total 1,010 799 79
Directorate of Museums
Extension, Damascus Museum 100 40 40
Construction, Palmyra Museum 400 400 100
• »
Construction, Aleppo Museum 350 350 100
Total 850 790 93
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Project
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3. Higher Youth Council
Playgrounds and Clubs, Sweida, Homs,
Hassakeh 400 254 63
Playgrounds and Clubs, Der'a, Idlib,
Deir Ezzor, Latakia 500 379 76
Total 900 633 70
Grand Total 2,760 2,222 80
Source: 8.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year Plan,
p. 94.
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TABLE 11
PLANNED AND INVESTED FUNDS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PROJECTS, 1960/1961
(L.S. THOUSAND)
03 Funds
*2 Invested
Project "O 43 43'S
3  0) 03
cd g p g)
-  I  s |
1. Government Buildings
Completion of Palace of Justice,
Damascus l40 133 95
Completion of Palace of Justice,
Aleppo 768 625 81
Completion of Ministry of Finance 
Building 1,150 1,150 100
Offices of Directors of Districts 100 100 100
Government Employees Houses,
Hassakeh 8 8 100
Government Building, Mayadln 50 -
Central Bank 887 887 100
Total 3,103 2,903 93
2. Prisons and Police Stations
Homs, Hassakeh, Mambej Prisons 1,525 1,518 99
Police School Construction 425 404 95
Reconstruction of Police Station, 
Aleppo 64 63 98
Frontier Stations 172 163 95
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TABLE 11— Continued
Funds 
•o Invested
^   ;Project xJ -p 43 0)
I §
I  I  s iOn PL, H
Stable for Hariamain Station 6 6 100
Study of Aleppo Central Prison 50 25 50
Total 2,242 2,179 97
3. Studies, Wages, Salaries
Cost of Mechanical Equipment 75 59 79
Studies of Various Construction 
Projects 250 144 58
Inspection of Constructions 300 186 62
Wages, Salaries Compensation to 
Experts 125 117 94
Total 750 506 67
Grand Total 6,095 5,588 92
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the First Year Plan,
p. 9 5 .
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TABLE 12
EXECUTION OF IHRIOATION AND LAND RECLAMATION
PROJECTS IN 1961/1962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project Planned
Investment
Actual
Amount
Investment
Percent
Executed
Euphrates Project 6,450 1,792 28
Khabour Project 1,000 180 18
Ohab and Ashame Projects 35,000 24,969 71
Upper Orontes Basin 1,000 140 14
Rouge Project 3,500 1,247 36
Slnn Project 8,500 1,380 16
Barada and Awaj Basins 1,000 62 6
Yarmouk Project 6,000 1,262 21
Irrigation of Southern Frontier 3,000 19 1
Agrarian Reform Authority 
Projects 80 - -
Land Reclamation 4,500 112 2
Administrative and Execution 
Expenses 2,750 2,568 93
Total 72,780 33,731 46
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, p. 23.
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TABLE 13
EXECUTION OF AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS IN I96I/I962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project Appropriated
Funds
Actual
Amount
Investment
Percent
Executed
I. Ministry of Agriculture
1. Agricultural Projects 
Cotton and Cereals
Seed Breeding 10 - -
Trees and Forestation 2,948 1,121 38
Crops Protection 617 426 69
Total 3,575 1,547 43
2. Animal Resources
Water and Fodder 2,500 1,131 45
Fodder Warehouses 30 - —
Improvement of Breeds 699 134 19
Veterinary Care 300 148 49
Development of Fisheries 195 16 8
Total 3,724 1,429 38
3. Agricultural Guidance 435 102 23
4. Technical Training and
Education 820 280 34
3. Experimental Stations and
Research 2,691 790 29
6. Silos 2,970 610 21
7. Wells and Underground
Water Supply 1,000 704 70
8. Cooperatives 350 54 15
9. Ministry of Supply
Projects 2,300 - -
10. Ministry of Agrarian
Reform 11,640 538 5
Grand Total 29,505 6,054 21
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, pp. 33-3 4 .
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TABLE 14
IHPLEHENl'ATION OF INDUSTRIAL, MINING AND GEOLOGY
PROJECTS DURING I961/I962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project Appropriated
Funds
Actual
Amount
Investment
Percent
Executed
I. Industrial Projects
Nitrogen Fertilizers Plant 685 94 14
National Salt Factory 815 -
Technical Training,
Research 4,000 1,900 48
Industrial Projects
Authority 20,000 174 1
Aid to Yams and Fabrics
Fund 2,500 2,500 100
Economic Institute
Projects 5,000 - -
Rural Industries and
Training 655 445 68
Agricultural Industries 405 37 9
Tobacco Administration 2,750 1,410 51
Total Industrial Projects 36,810 6,560 18
II. Mining and Geology
Geological and Topographical
Mbps* 5,500 '“2,243 41
Salt Rocks and Phosphates
Prospection 3,000 1,451 48
Total Mining and Geology 8,500 3,694 43
Grand Total 45,310 10,254 23
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, pp. 39-40.
^Includes Iron Ore, Chrome and Manganese Prospection.
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TABLE 15
PLANNED AND REALIZED INVESTMENTS IN POWER AND FUEL
PROJECTS DURING I96I/I962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Realized Investment
Project
Planned
Investment Amount
Percent
Realized
I. Electricity Projects
1. Damascus Company 11,750 14,055 120
2. Aleppo Company 6,100 4,843 79
3. Homs and Hama Company 12,600 5,922 47
4. Kamishly Company 350 300 86
5. Deir Ezzor Company 950 47 5
Total 31,750 25,167 79
:i. Petroleum Projects
1. Prospection
Geophysical Survey 2,000 1,943 97
Deep Drilling 32,800 32,630 99
Prospection at 
Karatshok 17,000 1,875 11
Prospection for Gas 1,000 - -
Total 52,800 36,448 69
2. Storage and Transport^
Completion of Tanks 
in Govemorates 300 136 45
Latakia Storage Tanks 1,705 743 43
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Realized Investment
Project Planned
Investment
Amount
Percent
Realized
Horns Refinery Butane 
Tank 250 159 64
Pipelines for Oil 
Products 14,000 12,194 87
Total 16,255 13,232 81
3. Oil By-Products
Butane Unit 45 8 18
Oxygen Unit 100 27 27
Total 145 35 24
Total Petroleum Products 69,200 49,715 72
Grand Total 100,950 74,882 74
Source: 8.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, pp. 49-50.
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TABLE 16
EXECUTION OP THE TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
PROJECTS IN 1961/1962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Realized Investment
Planned
Project Investment
Amount
Percent
Realized
1. Land Communications
Main Roads Outside Cities 12,100 9,941 82
City Streets
(Municipalities) 8,320 6,l4l 74
Bridges 4,000 1,389 35
Railways 14,500 3,295 23
City Transport 
(Municipalities) 767 453 59
Total 39,687 21,219 53
2. Civil Aviation
New Damascus Airport 10,000 4,020 40
Existing Airports 1,541 530 34
Total 11,541 4,550 39
3. Tartous Harbor 4,000 3,933 98
4. Wire and Wireless 
Communications ■
Sbayne Receiving Station 200 176 88
Dimas Transmission Station 100 77...
Expansion of Telephone 
Network 13,720 2,777 20
Total 14,020 3,030 22
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Realized Investment
Project Planned
Investment
Amount
Percent
Realized
5. Postal Services
New Post Office Buildings 380 250 66
Means of Transport 150 8 5
Equipment 150 - -
Total 680 258 38
6. Television euid Broadcasts 
Ing
5,000 2,788 56
Grand Total 74,928 35,778 48
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, pp. 57-59.
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TABLE 17
EXECUTION OF EDUCATION PROJECTS IN I96I/I962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Realized Investment
Project Appropriated
Funds
Amount
Percent
Executed
Elementary 3,058 1,645 54
Secondary and High 
School 2,230 480 22
Teachers' Training 4l6 255 61
Secondary and High 
School Industrial 2,515 650 26
High School Commercial 159 28 18
Secondary and High 
School Female 106 24 23
School Health Services 30 27 90
Aid to Private Schools 100 —
Total 8,6l4 3,109 36
2. Higher Educational Institutes 
Agricultural College,
Damascus 400 100 25
College of Fine Arts, 
Damascus 300 53 18
Commerce College, Aleppo 200 133 66
Technical Training 
College, Aleppo 100 36 36
Total 1,000 322 32
3. School Buildings Authority 
Elementary Scnool 
Buildings 3,500 2,827 81
Secondary, High School 
and Teachers' 
Training Buildings 1,250 967 77
Technical Education 
Buildings 2,250 2,823 125
Total 7,000 6,617 95
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TABLE 17— Continued
Project
Realized Investment
Appropriated
Funds
Amount
Percent
Executed
500 676 135
500 - —
1,000 581 58
1,100 183 17
900 648 72
4,000 2,088 52
1,200 1,199 100
700 - —
300 - -
1,000 43 4
800 240 30
4,000 1,482 37
8,000 3,570 45
700 526 75
300 40 13
244 244 100
1,244 810 65
4. Universities
A. Damascus University 
Sites for Buildings 
Equipment
Chemistry Department 
Wing 
Construction of 
Buildings 
Purchase of University 
City Sites
Total
B. Aleppo University 
Building Sites 
Equipment
College of Engineering 
New Wing 
College of Agriculture 
New Wing 
Purchase of University 
City Sites
Total
Total Universities
5. Scholarships
Ministry of Education 
Major Projects 
Administration 
Foreign Scholarships
Total
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TABLE 17— Continued
Realized Investment
Project Appropriated
Funds
Amount
Percent
Executed
6. Council of Higher 
Education 500 - -
Grand Total 26,358 14,428 55
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, pp. 65-68
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TABLE 18
PLANNED AND REALIZED INVESTMENTS IN CULTURAL
AND RECREATIONAL SERVICES DURING I96I/I962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Realized Investment
Project Planned
Funds
Amount
Percent
Realized
Ministry of Culture 
Establishment of Centers in
Deir Ezzor, Sweida and Dar •a 220 92 42
Construction of Centers in
Homs and Ein el Arab 230 31 13
Purchase and Equipment of 
Three Mobile Units 120 30 25
Damascus Music Institute 200 110 55
Damascus and Aleppo
Theatres 350 120 34
Total 1,120 383 34
Directorate of Museums 
Construction of Aleppo
Museum 500 495 99
Extension of Damascus
Museum 80 58 73
Construction of Palmyra
Museum 100 100 100
Equipment and Repair 500 — —
Total 1,180 653 55
Grand Total 2,300 1,036 45
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, pp. 72-7 3 .
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TABLE 19
PLANNED AND REALIZED INVESTMENTS IN HEALTH
SERVICES DURING I96I/I962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Realized Investment
Project Planned
Investment
Amount
Percent
Realized
1. New and Enlarged Hospitals
Sweida, Hama, Aleppo 
Hospitals 2,842 1,375 48
Hassakeh Hospital 600 21 4
Completion of Rakka 
Hospital 600 398 66
Damascus Hospital, 
Equipment 289 48 17
Homs Hospital, Equipment 269 - -
Total 4,600 1,842 40
2. New gind Expanded Clinics
Construction of Clinics In 
Mraybet, Dmalr, Sadad, 
Slrrln, Rakka 200 134 67
Agricultural Labor Clinic, 
Deir Ezzor 35 29 83
Total 235 163 69
3. H' alth Centers 530 97 18
4. Damascus Nursing School 765 175 23
5. Mobile Health Units 165 - -
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TABLE 19— Continued
Realized Investment
Project Planned
Investment Amount
Percent
Realized
6. Other Health Projects
Expropriation of U.S. 
Mission Hospital, 
Deir Ezzor 119 119 100
Expansion of Ministry of 
Health Building 150 88 59
Equipment Damascus Eye 
Hospital and Douma 
Hospital 15 9 60
Total 284 216 76
Grand Total 6,579 2,493 38
Source; S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year 
Plan, pp. 77-79.
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TABLE 20
EXECUTION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, HOUSING, TOURISM AND
RESORTS PROJECTS IN I96I/I962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Realized Investment
Project Planned
Investment
Amount
Percent
Realized
Drinking Water Projects 13,750 3,401 25
City and Village Planning 333 173 52
Tourism and Resorts 6,284 2,787 44
Drainage 800 175 22
Housing 4,250 556 13
Frontier Villages, Ministry of 
Defense 1,466 1,466 100
Independent Water Corporations 11,713 8,512 73
Municipalities 52,569 24,608 47
Total 91,165 41,678 46
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, pp. 84-85.
251
TABLE 21
PLANNED AND REALIZED INVESTMENTS IN SOCIAL AND 
LABOR SERVICES, I961/I962 
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Project Planned
Investment
Realized
Amount
Investment
Percent
Realized
1. Industrial Labor Unions 100 57 57
2. Agricultural Training 40 23 58
3. Social Services
New Social Center, Sweida 1,695 1,237 73
Delinquents Centers,
Damascus, Aleppo 325 227 70
Model Institute for Re­
habilitation of Blind 490 15 3
High Institute for Social
Services 215 64 30
Training for Social
Services Officers 20 - -
Care for the Delinquents 100 32 32
Care for the Disabled
Persons 50 20 4o
Care for the Aged 10 - -
Reforming and Housing
the Destitute 20 15 75
Aid for the Prisoners and
their Families 10 10 100
Total Social Services 2,935 1,620 55
Grand Total 3,075 1,700 55
Source: S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year
Plan, pp. 90-91.
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TABLE 22
EXECUTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PROJECTS IN I96I/I962
(L.S. THOUSAND)
Realized Investment
Project Planned
Investment Amount
Percent
Executed
2.
Government Buildings
Government Building, Rakka 250 111 44
Government Building,
Hayadin 142 88 62
Studies of Various Building
Projects 58 44 76
Completion of Damascus
Palace of Justice 90 27 30
Completion of Aleppo
Palace of Justice 340 250 73
Completion of Ministry 
of Finance Building 750 510 68
Customs Buildings 1,240 471 38
Damascus International Fair 1,750 1,750 100
Total 4,620 3,251 70
Prisons and Police Stations 
Completion of Markadeh
Police Station 30 20 67
Completion of Homs and
Hassakeh Prisons 1,050 984 94
Completion of Damascus
Police School 1,000 293 29
Construction of New Police
Stations 500 — —
Total 2,580 1,297 50
Grand Total 7,200 4,548 63
Source; S.A.R., Annual Report on the Second Year 
Plan, pp. 94-95.
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